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Approximately one-half of Americans participate in a pension plan offered by their employers 
and subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (Howard 2007, 
76).  Yet ERISA is frequently ignored by social scientists researching retirement income because 
of its complexity.  Given the enormous amount of foregone tax revenues that support private 
pensions, the motivating question of my dissertation is:  How did the American state change as 
Congress delegated power over American pension plans to private employers?  I argue that a 
weak system of bureaucratic oversight and the federal courts’ deference to pension 
administrators allowed fiduciaries to control policy implementation and assume a role 
traditionally reserved for the state – blurring the line between public and private.   
 
My purpose here is to provide an analytical history of ERISA that explores its methods of 
delegating both policymaking control over and the detailed nuances of administration of private 
pension plans to private actors.  I explore the concept of fiduciary status as a safeguard when 
government outsources the implementation of policy to private actors.  Regardless of whether 
fiduciary standards have ensured sufficient accountability in the ERISA context – and I find that 
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We have all heard the lament about the decline of defined benefit pension plans.  Traditional 
pension plans have withered, and most Americans – especially those with lower incomes – save 
little for retirement and rely mainly on Social Security for retirement income.  But the vast 
majority of employees covered by employer-sponsored retirement savings plans such as 401(k)’s 
do participate, and few without the option to participate in employer-sponsored plans save 
through alternate vehicles like individual retirement accounts.1  President Obama is working to 
expand access to and participation in retirement savings plans outside the employment 
relationship, but the importance of employer-sponsored plans to the American safety net 
remains. 
 
The American welfare state depends heavily on employers to provide their employees with 
social welfare benefits (e.g., health insurance and pensions).  A long emphasis on self-reliance 
and small government resulted in years of tax subsidies encouraging the connection of welfare 
benefits to work and a uniquely American path to social security (Hacker 2002).2  Management 
consultant Peter Drucker called the growth of private pensions an “unseen revolution” and “an 
                                                            
1 Seventy-two percent of those with annual salaries from $30,000 to $50,000 who were covered by an employer plan 
participated, while only five percent of those not covered by an employer plan saved through an individual 
retirement account (IRA).  Dorning, Mike, and Margaret Collins.  “Obama Offering Retirement Savings Plan for 
Workers,” Bloomberg, January 1, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-28/obama-seen-offering-
retirement-savings-plans-for-workers.html. 
 
2 Early research on the importance of public-private linkages in the welfare state showed that private welfare 
benefits are shaped and subsidized by the government through tools such as tax incentives (Howard 2007; Stevens 
1988).  These incentives empowered many private actors (i.e., employers, insurance companies, and unions) who 




outstanding example of the efficacy of using the existing private, nongovernmental institutions 
of our ‘society of organizations’ for the formulation and achievement of social goals and the 
satisfaction of social needs” (quoted in Hacker 2002, 82).  Political scientist Jacob Hacker (2002, 
82-83), however, sees danger when welfare policy control is located outside government and the 
path of welfare policy can be changed “through stealth”:  “[T]he politics of private pensions is 
subterranean politics, only occasionally involving a broad circle of participants and resisting the 
scrutiny that public programs typically invite – even when sizable public resources and 
recognized national policy goals hang in the balance.”  
 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) formalized nearly a century of 
public-private relationships by regulating systematically for the first time pension promises made 
by employers to employees (Stevens 1988; Klein 2003).3  ERISA was designed to protect 
workers from the insecurities of a private pension system while simultaneously encouraging the 
growth of that private system (Hacker 2002).4  After all, protecting employee expectations of 
receiving pensions would be meaningless if employers stopped offering pension plans because of 
onerous regulations.    
 
“Based on the sheer number of lives touched, the passage of ERISA is arguably the third ‘big 
bang’ of the American welfare state” after Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid (Howard 
2007).  By 1974, nearly 31 million Americans were covered by a private pension plan, and 
                                                            
3 Historian Stuart D. Brandes (1976, 5-6) defines welfare capitalism as “any service provided [by employers] for the 
comfort or improvement of employees which was neither a necessity of the industry nor required by law.” 
 
4 For a discussion of the 1964 collapse of the Studebaker pension plan for 11,000 of its current and former auto 




today, roughly one-half of private workers participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan 
(Thompson 2005, 1; Dushi and Iams 2013, 46).  A significantly larger proportion of the 
population receives Social Security benefits.  In 2011, 87% of married couples and 85% of non-
married individuals aged 65 or older received Social Security benefits.5  Many Americans, 
however, and particularly the wealthiest, hold the majority of their retirement assets in the form 
of private pension benefits.  While Social Security benefits constituted the major source of total 
income (at least 50%) for 74% of non-married individual beneficiaries in 2011, they were the 
major source for only 52% of married beneficiaries, who tend to be wealthier than non-married 
beneficiaries.6                   
 
ERISA governs the enactment and maintenance of private pension plans, including both 
traditional defined benefit (i.e., employer pays retiree a fixed sum per month) and defined 
contribution (i.e., employer and/or employee contributes to an account tax-free and employee 
receives the money in the account after investment gains and losses at retirement) pension plans.  
Although in 1974, 87% of participants in private pension plans had defined benefit plans, by 
1995 participation in defined contribution plans exceeded participation in defined benefit plans – 
and the gap has subsequently widened (Thompson 2005, 1; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004).  
Employers have full discretion to provide or not provide pension benefits and need not act in the 
                                                            
5 The proportion of Americans covered by Social Security will rise because government workers now have nearly 
universal participation in Social Security during employment while many former government workers are not 
covered by Social Security.  
 
6 “Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2013.”  Social Security Administration: 8.  Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2013/fast_facts13.pdf.  Total income did not include 
withdrawals from savings, non-annuitized IRAs, or 401(k) plans, resulting in an overemphasis on the extent to 




best interests of employees when deciding what form of pension benefits to offer.  However, 
once an employer decides to provide its employees with a pension plan, ERISA plays a central 
role.   
 
Those who manage an ERISA pension plan or its assets, which may include executives at the 
employer or third parties, are considered fiduciaries.  Fiduciaries are “caretakers” who must act 
in the best interests of employees and stand in a position of power over plan participants 
(employees and former employees).7  An industry of third party service providers who serve 
employers and fiduciaries by administering pension plans and providing investment or legal 
advice, and therefore take on a fiduciary role themselves, has developed.  These third party 
service providers profit from fees generated by pension plans.  ERISA, in addition to 
corresponding Department of Labor and Internal Revenue Service regulations and federal case 
law, sets forth the rules that govern the relationships between these private parties.  Besides 
providing a framework for pension administrators, ERISA also permits plan participants and 
their beneficiaries to bring lawsuits in federal court to challenge a denial of their claims to 
benefits or the manner in which the plan is run.8     
                                                            
7 ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and – (A) for the exclusive purpose of : (i) providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the 
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims; (C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the 
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments 
governing the plan insofar as such documents are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III 
of this chapter.”). 
 
8 ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (“A civil action may be brought – (1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . (B) 





In spite of the number of Americans that are participants in or beneficiaries of an ERISA-
covered pension plan, the enormous value of the assets managed under the plans, and the 
importance of the decade-long struggle to pass the statute to the country’s political history,9 there 
is little analysis of the statute within political science literature.10  Every day, private actors 
affiliated with employers make decisions about whether to grant one participant’s claim for 
benefits or change one rule about how one pension plan will be administered.  ERISA sanctions 
their right to make these decisions.  In the aggregate, these decisions make pension policy.  The 
questions that my dissertation explores are how did we get here and who is watching. 
 
The first question of how we got here, to the current state of pension policy, implicates not just 
the historical path but a conscious decision made at the time of ERISA’s passage that it was 
acceptable to place this power in private hands.  Once Congress and the President acknowledged 
the need to overhaul regulation of private pensions, regulation could have reasonably followed 
several different paths.  The resulting scheme gave private employers substantial leeway to 
implement Congress’ desired policy objectives and delegated quasi-public power to private 
actors, both of which demonstrate a blurring of the line between public and private actors.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan . . .”).  ERISA prohibits litigation of these claims in state 
courts.  ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 
9 It took over a decade – spanning the tenures of four Presidents – to secure the passage of reforms, from President 
Kennedy’s establishment of the President’s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds in 1962 to President Ford’s 
Labor Day ceremony signing ERISA into law in 1974.  Much of that time was spent wrangling with powerful 
interest groups and congressional infighting over the jurisdiction of committees responsible for labor and tax 
legislation.  See Wooten (2004). 
 
10 One notable exception is the work of Jacob Hacker (2002) in The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public 
and Private Social Benefits in the United States.  While Hacker is one of the only political scientists to examine 





ERISA can thus add to the literature on delegation of legislative powers and its current 
exploration of delegation to private actors instead of or in addition to the bureaucracy.  The 
question of how and why Congress sanctioned such extensive delegation and the design of this 
particular delegation should inform future decisions about whether and how to delegate to 
private actors.   
 
The second question of who is watching these employer representatives that control trillions in 
U.S. assets asks whether these private actors are behaving in accordance with legislative intent 
(although that is a notoriously murky concept), statutory design, and the best interests of plan 
participants (as ERISA explicitly requires).  The issue is essentially accountability – who 
determines whether these private actors are behaving as desired; how is compliance measured, 
meaning what are the standards to which they are supposed to adhere and how is deviation 
determined; and what are the consequences if the private actors fail to behave as desired. 
 
ERISA’s framework assigns to multiple government institutions and plan participants (given the 
private litigation remedy) the task of supervising pension administrators and asset managers and 
holding them accountable.  Governmental actors include:  (1) Congress, which designed the 
ERISA system and continues to make legislative adjustments; (2) the bureaucracy, including 




responsibility over ERISA pension plans;11 and (3) the federal courts, which interpret the statute 
by adjudicating pension claims.  ERISA can therefore contribute to administrative law and 
political science scholarship on accountability because there are multiple pressure points to help 
evaluate which methods have worked well and should be applied in the future and which have 
gone awry.   
 
ERISA demonstrates how historic public-private partnerships shift and change over time by 
circumstance and by design.  The nature of delegation research currently is to determine how 
best to manage the delegation of increasing power and control to the private sector.  ERISA was 
designed to protect promises made by employers to employees – to regulate private behavior that 
is beneficial to society.  The extent to which government is able to order private relations and 
enforce promises goes to the very justification for its existence.   
 
Who Governs?:  Structuring Delegation to Private Actors12 
 
If bureaucratic structure and oversight is heavily debated when Congress delegates to 
government actors, then structuring delegations to private actors deserves at least as much 
attention.  My goal here is not to debate the wisdom of delegation in general or in the case of 
ERISA specifically (Lowi 1979), but instead to focus on the importance of legislative tools to 
                                                            
11 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which guarantees defined benefit pension plans up to a statutory 
maximum through insurance premiums, is another government actor with jurisdiction over ERISA but not relevant 
for my discussion here. 




control private actors used by Congress to achieve public goals (Moe 1989).  The extent to which 
Congress is willing to delegate to private actors depends on the success of those tools.   
 
An exploration of ERISA’s design provides insight into ways Congress can craft statutes to 
ensure accountability when it transfers extensive policymaking authority to private actors.  
ERISA uses fiduciary duties to hold private actors accountable.  The bureaucracy and the courts 
have enforcement roles designed to ensure compliance.  The result of a decade of congressional 
work on pension reform deserves a prominent place in the delegation literature.  A review of that 
literature demonstrates where ERISA can add value. 
 
Before I address the delegation literature, however, I need to address why ERISA is a case of 
delegation at all.  Traditionally, delegation occurred when Congress drafted broad legislation and 
then directed government agencies to establish more detailed standards to regulate the private 
sector.  Research focused on whether bureaucrats stayed true to congressional goals or caused 
policy to drift in an undesired direction.  Outsourcing instead occurred when the government 
paid a private supplier directly for the provision of goods or services set forth in a contract 
governing the relationship.13  Because the task was more clearly defined by the contract, the 
main concern of government and researchers alike was ensuring that the quality of the goods or 
services provided was high and met expectations.14   
 
                                                            
13 The United States has a long history of public and private interaction.  “[W]hile the language of ‘outsourcing,’ 
‘contracting,’ and ‘deregulation’ is certainly contemporary, the history of U.S. government reliance on intersecting 
public-private partnerships runs much deeper” Novak (2009, 27). 
 




At first glance, ERISA may seem more like outsourcing because the government directs tax 
subsidies to employers in exchange for providing pension plans under the terms of the statute 
and employers are not asked to ignore their own interests when deciding whether or not to offer 
such plans.  Two aspects of ERISA, however, make this instead a case of delegation:  (1) the 
extent of the discretion left to employers and their representatives, and (2) the lack of a contract 
between the government and employers. 
 
As explained further below, Congress drafted ERISA as a broad statute that included many gaps 
to avoid overly burdening employers voluntarily offering pension benefits and because political 
battles made it impossible to pass more detailed legislation.  Employers’ latitude therefore 
includes both decisions about what type (if any) of pension benefits to offer and, to a large 
extent, how to administer those benefits.  Congress was concerned with not only the typical 
outsourcing concern that employers provide the expected services (i.e., provide pensions that 
meet ERISA’s accrual, funding, and vesting standards) but also with employers pursuing the 
public good by protecting employees from themselves.  ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule demands 
that employers and their representatives set aside their own self-interest when administering 
pension plans.15  In typical contractual relationships, each party acts in its own self-interest 
according to clearly specified terms.  This is not the case with ERISA.    
 
                                                            
15 “[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and—(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 




The lack of a contract between the government and employers to provide pensions for employees 
(third party beneficiaries in the language of contract law) also makes ERISA an example of 
delegation instead of outsourcing.  This may seem overly simplistic given that the statute sets 
forth what the government wants employers to do and they can accept the offer of tax subsidies 
in exchange by creating and maintaining pension plans.  The lack of contractual privity, 
however, is indicative of a different relationship between the parties.  Here, Congress can at any 
time change the terms under which employers provide pensions – there is no duration for which 
they are fixed, and employers have no ability to negotiate those changes directly with the 
government.  Employers can also choose to exit the relationship at any point.  There is no term 
during which they must continue to offer pension benefits as long as they honor past benefits 
promised and vested.  This uncertainty and lack of a binding relationship between the parties is 
what takes ERISA out of the contracting realm and into the realm of delegation, particularly in 
conjunction with the discretion accorded to employers to motivate them to continue the 
voluntary relationship.   
 
Although some scholars have also distinguished situations where funding is provided through 
grants or tax subsidies from outsourcing because there is no direct payment, I do not believe this 
difference is dispositive.16  ERISA’s tax subsidies may not be offered only to one or a small 
number of private firms competing for government (and therefore the people’s) business as in 
direct fee-for-service arrangements, but the individual citizen (or consumer) can evaluate the 
                                                            
16 Although Freeman and Minow (2009, 7) argue that encouraging private actors to advance public goals through 
“subsidies” is not the same as direct payments to particular firms, they offer no empirical evidence to support this 




firms providing pensions and select among them.  Assuming competition among employers for 
employees exists and employees have knowledge of the pension benefits offered by different 
employers, employees who value a better pension plan will switch employers as necessary to 
gain that benefit.  Assuming that there is little to no competition among employers for employees 
or knowledge of employers’ pension benefits or that the transaction costs for switching 
employers are high, this is a problem faced under either the delegation or contract label.   
 
Although I argue that ERISA constitutes delegation instead of outsourcing, the boundary 
between the two methods of private implementation of government goals is fuzzy.  Where the 
outsourcing literature adds to the story told here, particularly on the quandary of holding private 
actors accountable, I will discuss it below.  My overarching framework, however, is within the 
sphere of delegation, of private actors treated as public actors and the complications that arise. 
 
Congressional delegation occurs for many reasons, including time constraints, the desire to 
benefit from the accumulated knowledge of specialists (Moe 1984, 756), and electoral 
advantages (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 2) such as credit claiming for constituent service 
(Mayhew 1974) and blame avoidance in controversial areas (Fiorina 1982).  Political scientists 
spent years debating how and whether Congress holds bureaucrats accountable when it delegates 
authority to implement legislation and cedes control over its policy goals.  This research is 
consumed by the classic principal-agent problem.  The principal-agent dilemma addresses the 




complete one or more tasks delegated by the principal exactly as the principal would if the 
principal had the time and/or expertise to complete the task himself in an efficient manner. 
 
Delegation involves risks.  As Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 5) aptly summarized: 
The opportunism that generates agency losses is a ubiquitous 
feature of the human experience.  It crops up whenever workers are 
hired, committees are appointed, property is rented, or money is 
loaned.  The message that we are all feckless agents of a Divine 
Principal is at the very heart of Judeo-Christian theology.   
 
In addition to outright theft or self-dealing, delegation can result in shirking and slippage.  While 
an agent pays the cost for hard work in time (if not money), the reward goes mainly to the 
principal.  An agent may therefore “shirk” – or exert less effort – to complete the delegated task, 
resulting in slippage – or the gap between what the principal wants done and how the agent 
completes the task.  Because monitoring involves costs, a principal must weigh the benefits of 
monitoring (reduced shirking and slippage) against these costs (Moe 1984, 750-51).  Some 
amount of slippage is inevitable at each point of delegation and oversight (e.g., when citizens 
delegate to government, when the legislature delegates to the bureaucracy or private actors, and 
when the courts or Congress hold hearings regarding complaints about the agent’s behavior) 
(Moe 1990, 231). 
 
Ways of controlling the agent once the decision to delegate has been made can be divided into 
ex-ante and ex-post methods.  While interest groups can raise “fire alarms” to alert Congress 
when agents act in undesirable ways (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), Congress largely uses 




1987, 1989).  These procedures allow interest groups to participate in the agent’s work and help 
force the agent to disclose information necessary for other parties (and the principal(s)) to 
understand and participate in its decisions at key points.  Thus, principals can “stack the deck” 
for ex-ante control.17   
 
Principals can also seek to hold agents responsible with oversight or ex-post control.  Decisions 
about whether to use ex-ante or ex-post mechanisms and how much to use are “separate” but 
“not independent” (Bawn 1997).  Although costs of ex-ante oversight are generally higher, 
congressional committees with greater information and credit claiming opportunities frequently 
have lower costs and prefer higher amounts of oversight (or “police patrol” oversight as per 
McCubbins and Schwartz) (Aberbach 1990; Bawn 1997).     
   
Recently, political scientists have recognized that government18 faces the same basic principal-
agent problem when delegating to private actors.  But government delegation to private actors 
instead of the bureaucracy presents unique difficulties for policy implementation.19  Beyond the 
classic notion that firms are motivated by maximizing profits and that makes it difficult to align 
                                                            
17 For a discussion of the effectiveness of ex-ante structural mechanisms in controlling delegation, see Spence 
(1999), finding that procedures that increase the costs of specific agency decisions (instead of agency decision 
making more generally) are more successful.   
 
18 Although the political science literature largely models Congress as the principal in delegation studies, I take no 
position on whether Congress or the executive or both is the principal.  When discussing congressional negotiations 
over ERISA’s statutory design, I refer to Congress as the principal for expediency.  I also refer to the bureaucracy 
and the courts as principals in redelegating additional authority to the private actors under discussion or attempting 
to control their behavior. 
 
19 “A central characteristic of much government privatization is that private delegates are granted powers not simply 
for their own advantage, but rather to enable them to act—and more specifically, to interact with third parties—on 
the government’s behalf” (Metzger 2003, 1463).  These private actors have additional power based on the 




their goals with those of Congress, political scientist Jessica Green (2007) has focused on how 
the voluntary nature of the relationship between principal and agent in this case affects Congress’ 
ability to control its agents.  The literature is now moving toward an exploration of how 
Congress can control private actors (or hold them accountable at least) when it decides to 
delegate to them.  This is the natural progression of previous work on controlling the 
bureaucracy.  Accountability is “‘the most difficult issue’ when governance is provided by 
private actors.” (Mattli and Buthe 2005, 227). 
      
Congressional efforts to force employers to behave exactly as Congress or employees want when 
offering pension benefits were doomed from the start.  And legislators knew it.  Employer 
representatives faced an inherent conflict between employee interests in receiving the greatest 
amount of benefits possible and employer interests in containing costs.  A voluntary private 
pension system required Congress to give employers significant discretion and incentives to 
maintain pension plans – such as the ability to have their own executives and contractors run the 
plans.  All the political fighting over the balance between protecting employees and growing the 
private pension system came down to this basic fact.  Recognizing that Congress could never 
have complete control over the regulation of voluntary, private pensions then, my analysis 
focuses on how to design a system of sufficient accountability.  How political compromise was 
reached under ERISA and the results should inform any discussion of the risks of delegation and 
whether different structures mitigate those risks to an extent necessary to achieve the benefits of 





Who Has the Final Say:  Managing Delegation to Private Actors 
 
The first step when exploring a method of holding private actors with delegated powers 
accountable is to define accountability.  Many of the administrative law scholars researching the 
topic, usually in the outsourcing context, skip this initial step and end up with a circular 
argument that following the suggested procedures or enforcement mechanisms is accountability.  
Law professor Jerry Mashaw, however, supplies a framework:   
[W]e should be able to specify at least six important things: who is 
liable or accountable to whom; what they are liable to be called to 
account for: through what processes accountability is to be 
assured; by what standards the putatively accountable behavior is 
to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding those 
standards have been breached.  
 
(Mashaw 2006, 118, quoted in Freeman and Minow 2009, 16).  I use Mashaw’s framework here 
because it is both general enough to apply to all delegations to private actors and comprehensive 
enough to evaluate existing and proposed accountability mechanisms (including those under 
ERISA).   
 
Before evaluating accountability mechanisms, I want to say more about the particular risks of 
delegation to private actors that make this exercise so important.  The first risk is that there will 
be increased slippage away from government’s goals because delegation is made to a private 
actor instead of a more traditional public actor.  The second risk is that the very act of delegation 
diminishes government’s capacity to supervise a private actor, particularly when combined with 





Increased slippage from delegation to private actors occurs as a result of the multiple principals 
problem (which, among other things, drives firms to focus on profits), increased agent autonomy 
because of outside revenue sources, and the voluntary nature of the principal-agent relationship 
(Mattli and Buthe 2005, 232; Green 2007, 19; Green 2014, 46).  On the first point, political 
scientists Walter Mattli and Tim Buthe (2005, 232) argue that “[t]he key difference between 
delegation to public agents and delegation to private agents is that delegation to private agents 
creates a multiple-principals problem.”  Private agents are largely collective actors (firms or 
organizations) with one or more owners or patrons who are the prior and more direct principals 
of the private agents.  At a minimum, each of these private agents “has at least two principals, 
one public and one private” (232).  Private agents with conflicts of interest therefore abound. 
 
One result of the multiple-principals problem is that private actors that are for profit entities face 
pressure from their private principals to maximize profits.  The desire to maximize profits can 
result in cutting costs for goods or services provided through the delegation relationship even if it 
means reducing the amount of goods or services provided (assuming that the amount is not 
specified in legislation or contract) or the quality of the goods or services provided.  Although 
economist Andrei Shleifer (1998, 139) argues that the potential harm from the profit motivation 
of firms is not a reason for government to instead provide the services itself since terms can be 
spelled out in detail ex-ante and competition among firms and reputational incentives motivate 
the firm to maintain high quality services, there are some areas of delegation (particularly outside 
the domain of government contracts on which he writes) where there is little or no competition 





On the second reason for increased slippage from delegation to private actors, firms are not 
reliant on their principals within government because of outside funding sources and are also 
insulated from oversight (Green 2007, 19; Green 2014, 46).  Principals within government lack 
the same budgetary control over firms that they have over agencies.  Bureaucrats know at all 
times that if they stray too far from congressional intent, they are likely to be punished fiscally.  
Firms are more autonomous, and the place of firms outside the traditional government 
organizational structure makes it difficult to reign in that autonomy.  Principals have less 
knowledge of how the delegation is being managed, and their ability to enforce their goals 
informally is limited.   
 
Finally, at the heart of the problem with slippage when delegating to private actors is the 
voluntary nature of the relationship.  “When states delegate to public actors, the relationship is 
‘involuntary’, in the sense that state agencies (on the domestic level) . . . are not in a position to 
refuse any task delegated to them.  This logic does not hold for private actors, who can simply 
refuse to enter into any arrangement that they do not find beneficial” (Green 2007, 19).  The fact 
that these relationships are voluntary changes the power structure in the relationship.  While 
firms may like the revenue or tax subsidies provided by the government as part of the delegation, 
if the burdens associated become too onerous, they can exit the relationship.20  That may not be a 
problem for the public principal(s) if there are many other firms willing to supply the services, 
but it is a big problem if there is not another firm ready and able to step in.  Knowledge of firms’ 
                                                            





ability to break off the relationship can lead to fewer requirements for and oversight of private 
actors. 
 
After addressing the increased risk of slippage as a result of delegation to private actors, the next 
risk of government delegation to private actors to discuss is that of diminished capacity within 
the government after delegation.  As administrative law scholars Jody Freeman and Martha 
Minow discuss in their book on government contracting, all three branches of government may 
lack the knowledge and information to properly supervise delegations in an era of increased 
outsourcing.  Thus, there may be no one left to ensure that implementation by private actors 
meets “democratic norms” (Verkuil 2006, 418; Freeman and Minow 2009, 2-5).21  This is of 
particular concern where the services provided by the private actor are complex and the 
principals must have expertise in the subject area to evaluate the quality of the services provided.   
 
For these reasons, delegation to private actors is fraught with risk that those actors will behave in 
a way not desired by government or the people who themselves have delegated powers to the 
government to act on their behalf.  The success or failure of the government’s attempt to hold 
private actors accountable under ERISA – to force them to comply with government will or to 
correct their behavior where they fail – is therefore the second motivating question behind my 
dissertation.    
 
                                                            
21 “More broadly, widespread contracting out could wreak havoc with the balance of power among the branches of 
government: weakening the legislative and executive branches through fragmentation and delegation, and 






The tools available to public principals seeking to hold private actors accountable are extensive.  
Freeman and Minow (2009, 3) identify “three accountability regimes of law, markets, and 
politics” to structure oversight of private actors.  These categories are useful for exploring 
existing and potential oversight of delegation outside of the formal contract scenario as well.  I 
am concerned here with the failure of market accountability and a proposal for improved legal 
and political accountability in its place.   
 
I will not discuss market accountability in depth because the situations in which it fails like 
ERISA are the ones that motivate my research.  “With perfect contracting and regulation, there is 
no difference between state and private provision of goods and services. . . . the pursuit of ‘social 
goals’ does not, on its own, make the case for government ownership” (Shleifer 1998, 135).  In 
fact, Shleifer (1998, 139-40) argues that government provision of services only makes sense 
where:  (1) there are opportunities for cost cutting by private firms that reduce quality of services 
provided; (2) innovation by firms is not a big factor; (3) consumer choice is impeded by a lack of 
competition; and (4) firms are not concerned about harming their reputation by failing to provide 
high quality goods and services in the area.  Since ERISA is precisely one such situation – where 
firms are motivated to reduce amount or quality of services and those details are not (or cannot 
be properly) specified in a contract, innovation is not a big factor, there is little competition or 
high transaction costs make switching suppliers difficult, and reputation concerns for firms are 




where consumers have difficulty learning about the quality of the services supplied and difficulty 
switching suppliers even if they do gain such information (Freeman and Minow 2009, 16).   
 
Government accountability usually entails a mix of political and legal measures (e.g., elections 
and enforcement in courts, respectively).  Insufficient investment in government oversight is 
made because one purpose of delegation is to save money (Freeman and Minow 2009, 16-17).  
Costly oversight in the form of expanded bureaucratic capacity for supervision or a new venue 
for adjudication of disputes negates the value of privatization and can hold the failings of private 
delegates up for public inspection and outrage – resulting in political consequences.  For this 
reason, altering political accountability is more difficult than altering legal accountability.   
 
Improving legal accountability can also help motivate and improve political accountability.22  
Administrative law scholars do not view lawsuits in isolation as providing comprehensive 
security when supervising private actors.  “Ideally, legal reforms should prompt agencies to . . . 
monitor government contractors more thoroughly.  Agencies likely will have superior access to 
information [about consumer needs and the services provided]” (Mendelson 2009, 243).  Even if 
procedures applied to executive agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are applied to private actors through the legal system, 
oversight by Congress, the executive, and the public is necessary (Mendelson 2009, 244).23   
                                                            
22 The same values that pervade political accountability mechanisms are important when focusing on legal 
accountability.  “Public participation” and “rights of review” are key (Green 2007, 13).  Transparency is necessary 
for the public to participate and to ensure a full review (13).        
 
23 Providing for APA and FOIA-like transparency and rights of comment involve the public in “implementation and 





In many ways, legal accountability under ERISA has failed.  And its domination of political 
accountability has multiplied the effects of that failure.  The ascendancy of the private litigation 
remedy in ERISA and the failure of the courts to sufficiently protect plan participants as intended 
by Congress adds to the debate about how and whether private litigation remedies are a useful 
accountability tool.  The interaction of the political and legal accountability mechanisms under 
ERISA also informs whether redundancy is beneficial or causes coordination problems.  In the 
end, a delicate political compromise and the inability to adjust and remake political bargains 
when accountability proved insufficient hindered the achievement of ERISA’s core goal.  
 
Fiduciary Obligations as a Control Mechanism 
 
Although political and legal accountability under ERISA has been imperfect, one success is 
ERISA’s use of fiduciary duties to control the behavior of employers and their representatives 
and force them to elevate the interests of employees.  Pension administrators and asset managers 
still face an inherent conflict of interest, but fiduciary obligations force them to tread lightly 
when making decisions.  A fear of liability (not to mention pressure from regulators) influences 
the administration of pension plans.  Had more effective political and legal enforcement existed, 
fiduciary standards could have been the answer to the need to delegate broad authority to private, 





When the policy space is very complex, as with pension regulation, grants of power are 
necessarily broad and provide private actors with great discretion.  “Certain public problems . . . 
lend themselves to neither specific behavioral commands nor measurable outcomes.”  
(Bamberger 2006, 389).  Congress typically sacrifices control to realize the benefits of 
bureaucratic expertise, and the same may be said for delegation to private actors.  Facing a lack 
of access to information possessed by private actors, this delegation is at times an expedient and 
necessary strategy.24  Congress has used the strategy of delegation in areas of complex 
legislation and difficult political compromise for many years.  In fact, leaving significant 
discretion to the private sector instead of burdening it with cumbersome regulation is frequently 
part of the political compromise. 
 
Acknowledging that Congress may not have the ability to set forth detailed instructions when 
delegating to private actors in a complex area, or may not want to do so because curtailing 
discretion results in sacrificing the benefits of agents’ expertise, the question remains how to 
ensure accountability and thereby “tame complex risk” (Bamberger 2006, 380).  “[D]iscretion in 
the interpretation and implementation of regulatory directives may compromise three related 
governance values:  rationality in choosing between solutions; responsiveness to public interests; 
and reviewability by others” (Bamberger 2006, 403).  Therefore, any proposed method of 
                                                            
24 Agencies delegate to the private firms they regulate in these complex areas to obtain the benefits of their expertise.  
As legal scholar Kenneth Bambeger (2006, 392) has written in this area, agencies and the private actors they 
regulate “are partners in regulation, implicitly and explicitly enlisted to fill out the substance of legal norms and 
develop the means for implementing those broader principles locally.”  The political science literature too explores 
the give and take between agencies and the private actors they regulate, seeing influence and coercion flowing in 




improving accountability of private actors to whom authority has been delegated by legislators 
(and agencies) should be evaluated to determine whether it meets these important criteria.    
 
The common law has been handling complex delegation issues under the classic principal-agent 
scenario for many years.  The law of agency addresses the problems that arise when an agent 
enters into a fiduciary relationship with a principal – when the relationship triggers a higher level 
of protection because of the special vulnerability of the principal in the relationship.  A conflict 
of interest exists here because the agent is tasked with ignoring his own interests in favor of 
those of another (Metzger 2003, 1463).  It is necessary to address, then, whether common law or 
codified fiduciary standards are a sufficient means of holding private actors accountable.   
 
My dissertation explores the ability of fiduciary duties to maintain or help maintain 
accountability over private actors to whom the government delegates substantial discretionary 
authority in a complex area.  ERISA is an example where Congress delegated substantial 
authority to private actors in a complex policy space and utilized fiduciary standards developed 
by courts under the common law and enforced by both the bureaucracy and those courts to hold 
actors accountable.  It is not the only example where fiduciary standards are used to hold private 
actors accountable.  For example, the foster care system holds foster parents accountable for 
meeting their fiduciary duties under state common law.  ERISA, however, has the benefit of 
greater transparency for research purposes since it was a significant federal statute where 




an accountability regime) and copious legislative history exists.  There are also several decades 
of evidence showing the effects of ERISA’s design, including significant case law.  
 
Plan for Dissertation 
 
My dissertation provides an analytical history of ERISA that explores its methods of delegating 
both policymaking control over and the detailed nuances of administration of private pension 
plans to private actors.  Regardless of whether fiduciary standards have ensured sufficient 
accountability in the ERISA context – and I find that they have not – I argue that the potential is 
there and offer some observations on where ERISA went wrong.   
 
Chapter 1 explores what it means to be a fiduciary.  The nature and responsibilities of this role 
are instructive when evaluating its success in holding private actors accountable. 
 
Chapter 2 chronicles the lengthy battle to pass ERISA, focusing on how common law fiduciary 
standards became a central part of the statute. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses why Congress decided to delegate such extensive responsibility over 
pensions to private actors. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the triumph of legal accountability over political accountability in ERISA’s 





Chapter 5 explains the failure of legal accountability under ERISA – in essence, what went 
wrong and why the private litigation remedy failed to properly enforce ERISA’s fiduciary 
protections, resulting in a lack of accountability. 
 
The Conclusion examines how fiduciary obligations as enforced by the bureaucracy and the 
courts failed to hold private actors accountable under ERISA based on the criteria set forth in the 
Introduction.  I argue that there is still hope for fiduciary protections to play a vital role in 
accountability mechanisms where the government delegates extensive authority to private actors 






CRAFTING FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS:  POWERS AND DUTIES 
 
To evaluate fiduciary status and duties as a mechanism for holding private actors with delegated 
powers accountable, it is necessary to first explore what it means to be a fiduciary.  Although 
ERISA has codified common law fiduciary standards, the courts continue to inform our 
understanding of fiduciary powers and duties through interpretation and enforcement of this 
statute.  The common law is therefore at the center of any discussion about who fiduciaries are 
and how they can and should behave.  This chapter traces the delicate balance back and forth 
between power and duty, discretion and restriction.  Special risks inherent to all or some 
fiduciary relationships are addressed.  Finally, the traditional theory that public officials are 
constrained by fiduciary obligations to those they govern connects the courts’ historical attempts 
to reign in private fiduciaries with historical attempts to reign in public fiduciaries.  The country 
has long used fiduciary protections to hold both public and private actors with significant power 
over others accountable.      
 
Defining a Fiduciary Based on His Powers 
 
A clear definition of the fiduciary role in American society is difficult given the many different 
responsibilities and powers that fiduciaries possess. 25  As Justice William Brennan of the United  
                                                            
25 The word “fiduciary” developed in nineteenth century English courts to describe relationships of trust existing 
outside the formal legal meaning of that word as modern trust law developed to encompass specific agency 




States Supreme Court wrote:   
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives 
direction to further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What 
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?  In what respect has he 
failed to discharge these obligations?  And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty? 
 
(quoted in Frankel 2011a, 2).  Thus, the heart of the fiduciary concept is the relationship between 
the fiduciary and the person who places his trust in that fiduciary (a “beneficiary”26) to 
accomplish a task.  Generally, a fiduciary relationship forms when one party acts on behalf of 
another “while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the 
beneficiary” (Smith 2002, 1402).  For example, fiduciary relationships arise because service 
providers, such as lawyers, doctors, and investment advisers, offer an expertise that is not 
common or easily obtained.27  The parties to a fiduciary relationship set the initial terms and 
conditions under which the property or power will be shared by one with another.  The law then 
enforces these terms or sets limits on what the terms may be (Frankel 2011a, 8).   
 
The difficulty of creating a unified theory of fiduciary law based on legal history is evident in the 
repeated attempts by Professor Tamar Frankel to do so and the responses of other legal scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
relationships by classifying such relationships into four overlapping categories:  (1) where a person has control of 
the property of another; (2) where a person is given a job by another; (3) where a person has limited or partial rights 
to property; and (4) where one person has undue influence over the other.   
 
26 There are various terms used to refer to the person who places his trust in a fiduciary, such as a “principal” under 
agency law, a “beneficiary” under trust law, and a “participant” or “beneficiary” under pension law.  Professor 
Tamar Frankel coins the term “entrustor” for use in her articles and book exploring a unified concept of fiduciary 
law.  In this section, I use the term “beneficiary” since I discuss fiduciary law in general and the roots of ERISA in 
trust law.  The use of the term “beneficiary” instead of “principal” also has appropriate connotations regarding the 
power imbalance in the fiduciary relationship between pension provider and participant. 
 
27 These traditional relationships, including trustee/beneficiary, director/shareholder, and attorney/client, have been 
described as “formal”, while many “informal” relationships of trust have been defined as fiduciary without a clear 




to her work.  Attempting to provide concrete guidance, Frankel (2011a, 4) identifies three 
common characteristics of all fiduciary relationships:  (1) “entrustment of property or power,” 
(2) trust of fiduciaries by those beneficiaries who provide them with property or power, and (3) 
risk to those beneficiaries.  This last element, which can also be called the “potential for 
opportunism” (Smith 2002, 1444), is the key to the creation of laws regulating fiduciary 
relationships because when the risk (or potential costs) of trusting fiduciaries becomes too high, 
these important relationships will not take place.28  Laws are imposed to mitigate the risk 
involved with trusting another person and prevent harm to those who give their trust, and Frankel 
argues in favor of broad fiduciary protections.   
 
Some legal scholars who view fiduciary law as merely a species of contract law, however, seek 
to narrow the range of relations brought within the protective orbit of fiduciary law and to 
narrow the protections themselves.  Professor Larry Ribstein (2011, 901) favors a definition of 
fiduciary relationships that does not encompass broadly such relationships as those between 
doctor and patient or spouses.  Ribstein instead defines a fiduciary as one who has “open-ended 
management power over property without corresponding economic rights.”  Under this 
definition, a fiduciary possesses unwavering discretion to act through power delegated by the 
property owner.   
 
As the discussion above illustrates, there is great debate over the proper definition of a fiduciary 
and the proper reach of fiduciary duties.  When regulating different relationships of trust, 
                                                            
28 Without an information asymmetry, there is no incentive to hire the fiduciary for his advice and services, but this 




lawmakers and courts choose who will fall into this fiduciary category.  Lawmakers and courts 
also decide whether strict fiduciary protections are required or if the parties can be left to bargain 
among themselves. 
 
The Role of Discretion in the Fiduciary Relationship 
 
Fiduciaries are hired for their expertise and require discretion to use their skills to aid 
beneficiaries.  Beneficiaries may not even know enough about the area of expertise to tell 
fiduciaries how to accomplish their tasks or closely supervise their work.  In addition, a long-
term relationship would be overly cumbersome and costly if a beneficiary had to set forth every 
possible future task for a fiduciary and would not be flexible enough to address changing 
conditions (such as changing stock market conditions) (Frankel 2011a, 25-35; Sitkoff 2011, 
1040-41).  In the past, the law sought to limit the amount of discretion accorded fiduciaries (e.g., 
by terminating an agent’s authority on the incapacity of his principal and by disabling a 
corporation from acting outside the limited purpose set forth in its charter), but this prevented 
fiduciaries from engaging in useful behavior (Sitkoff 2011, 1042).  The amount of discretion 
accorded to the fiduciary depends on the nature of the task assigned to the fiduciary and the 
amount of independence accorded to the fiduciary to accomplish these tasks without directions 
from the beneficiary (Frankel 1983, 810).  With increased discretion, however, comes an 





The risk that a fiduciary will abuse his or her power can be mitigated through mechanisms other 
than fiduciary law.  First, power will ideally be delegated to a fiduciary who does not have a 
conflict of interest with the beneficiary.  It is unlikely to find a completely disinterested party to 
serve as fiduciary, however, particularly now that most fiduciaries are in the business of 
providing such services (Frankel 1983, 811).  Second, performance based compensation helps 
ensure that it is in the fiduciary’s interest to achieve optimal performance when managing 
property.  Such compensation spreads the risk of a poor outcome between the beneficiary and the 
fiduciary (811-12).  Third, the beneficiary may control the fiduciary by retaining the right to 
terminate the fiduciary, specifying in a detailed contract the terms of the relationship, providing 
direct orders instead of delegating, or setting forth detailed standards for the fiduciary’s conduct.  
Unfortunately, these checks on fiduciary power involve high monitoring costs and undermine the 
very purpose for the fiduciary relationship (812-14).29     
 
The amount of discretion beneficiaries are willing to allow is also dictated by the type of laws 
governing fiduciary behavior.  General standards provide more discretion than bright-line rules 
that spell out in detail how a fiduciary must behave.  “Fuzzy rules . . . leave a gray area that 
presents a risk of violating the law,” although they may also help reduce enforcement costs by 
leaving fiduciaries uncertain of the extent of their reach and therefore unwilling to push their 
behavior to the boundary between legal and illegal (Frankel 2011a, 104-05).  With broad 
standards like the duties of loyalty and care discussed below, courts seek to complete the parties’ 
                                                            
29 Frankel (1995, 1222-23) also mentions and discards the possibility of insuring against the risk of loss due to 
breach of fiduciary duty.  Not only would it be difficult to decide on the proper level of coverage, but insurance 
companies are unlikely to insure against intentional misconduct.  Finally, the cost of such insurance would be at 




agreement by setting the terms they would likely have agreed to had they anticipated the 
situation in question.  This reduces transaction costs when entering into a fiduciary relationship 
since the parties themselves need not enter into terms that cover every possible situation that 
could arise.  It also, however, increases “decision costs” by forcing the judiciary to more actively 




Most discussions of fiduciary duties focus on the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.31  Recent 
research has debated whether fiduciary law is or should be a body of law distinct from contract 
law.  This debate has implications for whether fiduciary duties offer additional safeguards in a 
relationship that make it more reasonable for government actors to delegate their authority to 
private parties. 
 
The foundation of this debate is the economic analysis of “contractarians” Judge Frank 
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel (1993) that states unequivocally that fiduciary relations 
fall within the various types of contractual relations.  As they state, the fiduciary “package” is 
“empty” because the parties still contract for their own gain – the basic purpose of any contract 
(426).  According to Easterbrook and Fischel, under fiduciary law, judges use the guise of the 
                                                            
30 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of how the judiciary, however, failed to actively monitor compliance with ERISA’s 
broad fiduciary standards as expected when the statute was passed. 
 
31 Professor D. Gordon Smith (2002, 1409-10) asserts that fiduciaries are expected to be more careful about self-
interested behavior than a party merely engaged in a contractual relationship with another because the fiduciary 




duty of loyalty to provide a “public service” by filling in the terms the parties would have agreed 
to if the cost was not prohibitive to specify the terms to govern all possible situations (427).  
“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing . . .” because they are 
subservient to actual contracts and the parties can contract out of their obligations (429).32  
Langbein (1995-1996, 650)33 agrees with Easterbrook and Fischel that fiduciary duties are 
contractual because the formation of fiduciary relationships is voluntary and fiduciary law’s 
protections are default rules that can be circumvented by the parties.34  However, he argues that 
Easterbrook and Fischel are “too dismissive” when they say that fiduciary duties “have no moral 
footing” because “they embody deep moral precepts about the behavior appropriate for a trustee 
or other fiduciary” (658).  
 
On the other side are “anti-contractarian” arguments that there is something unique about 
fiduciary relationships that requires special protection and takes these relationships outside the 
                                                            
32 “Contractarians” like Ribstein argue that fiduciary protections should be narrowly construed and do not always 
see fiduciary rules as beneficial in society.  As Justice Benjamin Cardozo famously described the standard for 
fiduciary behavior in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928): 
 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. . . . A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio 
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. 
 
(quoted in Ribstein 2011, 903).  According to Ribstein (2011, 913), compensation structure and enhanced disclosure 
of conflicts provide sufficient protection for the relationship, and broad fiduciary protections are unnecessary. 
 
33 Langbein (1995-1996) explores generally how the need for additional trustee discretion in the modern era of 
portfolio management resulted in a shift from limited trustee powers to broad discretion governed by the protections 
of fiduciary duties. 
 
34 But see Hansmann and Mattei (1998, 466-67, 471), asserting that Langbein says trust law is contractual because 
of his normative purpose to make trust law less restrictive on trustees who face conflicts of interest.  Instead, they 
argue that the property-based features of trusts are central and not contractual aspects.  The trust form is used as a 




realm of contract law.  Although scholars on this side of the debate have difficulty agreeing on 
what makes fiduciary relationships different from other, non-fiduciary relations, they agree that 
fiduciary relationships differ from contract relationships in “doctrinal structure” and “ethical 
basis.”  They believe that fiduciary relationships “facilitate the doing of justice, that they 
promote virtue, and that they enhance freedom in a distinctive way” (Fitzgibbon 1999, 305).   
 
In a fiduciary relationship, unlike in contract, the beneficiary is dependent on the fiduciary.  This 
dependence is the reason that fiduciary law is designed to protect the beneficiary.  Unlike in 
contract law, where both parties seek self-gain and the law sanctions such conduct, fiduciary law 
is designed to protect the beneficiary (Frankel 1983, 800).       
 
Anti-contractarians argue that fiduciary obligations are not merely default contract provisions.  
Professor Deborah DeMott (1988) argues that contractarians are “traveling light as legal 
theorists” by assuming that simply because fiduciary duties may at times make it unnecessary for 
parties to detail these obligations in a contract, fiduciary duties are default rules or implied 
contractual provisions.  She calls on contractarians to make it clear if they are instead making a 
normative argument (889).35  Frankel (1995) also argues that it is a cumbersome process for a 
beneficiary to waive any of the fiduciary duties (and some cannot be waived at all), and therefore 
courts are not merely rewriting the agreement between the parties as they would do so without 
                                                            
35 In return, Easterbrook and Fischel (1993, 434, citing DeMott 1988, 909-10) take issue with DeMott because she 
states that fiduciary law is a tool that allows the law to respond to situations in which “one person’s discretion ought 
to be controlled,” which they argue is not a cohesive theory like that of contract law.  Yet, “[n]either ‘contract’ nor 
‘fiduciary’ exists in nature” (Brudney 1997, 596).  The idea that contract entails a voluntary relationship between 
parties seeking self-gain where the parties freely set their terms without government interference is not without 
controversy.  The state does intervene to set the rules on which the parties’ bargain will be enforced, and some rules 




transaction costs.  To waive fiduciary duties:  “(1) [beneficiaries] must receive notice of the 
proposed change in the mode of the relationship; (2) [beneficiaries] must receive full information 
about the proposed bargain; (3) the [beneficiaries’] consent should be clear and the bargain 
specific; (4) the proposed bargain must be fair and reasonable” (1234).  It seems unlikely that 
fiduciaries will be able to easily meet these requirements and transform the relationship into a 
true contractual relationship where both parties have freedom to bargain and define their 
relationship.36        
 
I agree with the anti-contractarians that fiduciary law is a distinct body of law.  Even if it is 
difficult at times to define precisely who is a fiduciary or what a fiduciary does, fiduciary 
obligations provide the reassurance necessary for these relationships of trust to occur.  As my 
dissertation shows, these obligations also provided the reassurance necessary for the state to 
delegate an enormous amount of authority to private actors.  These private actors’ behavior is 
limited by the fiduciary standards contained in a statute or set by common law, but standards 
necessarily sacrifice certainty in their application for flexibility to cover a variety of 
circumstances and prevent having to revisit a rule each time a new set of facts arises to which it 
is applied (Hart 1961, 124-28).  Much discretion and therefore power is placed in the hands of 
fiduciaries, as explained by legal theorist H. L. A. Hart (1961, 125): 
It is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative 
one) that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever we 
seek to regulate unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of 
                                                            
36 In addition, there is the question of why much of fiduciary law is left to the province of common law while a few, 
exceptional categories of fiduciary relations are governed by statute and how this affects the debate over whether 
fiduciary obligations are merely a species of contract.  The length of the fiduciary relationship and information and 
power asymmetries between employers and employees may be one explanation for ERISA’s exceptionalism 




conduct by means of general standards to be used without further 
official direction on particular occasions.  The first handicap is our 
relative ignorance of fact.  The second is our relative 




The Duty of Loyalty 
 
The duty of loyalty requires that fiduciaries act solely in the interest of beneficiaries.37  The duty 
requires that fiduciaries avoid self-interested behavior when “exercising discretion with respect 
to the beneficiary’s critical resources” (Smith 2002, 1407).  The duty of loyalty also requires that 
the fiduciary adhere to instructions provided by the beneficiary, act in good faith, and account to 
the beneficiary (disclose information) (Frankel 2011a, 108, 122, 129).38        
 
Disloyalty typically occurs when there is a conflict between the fiduciary’s interests and the 
beneficiary’s interests but may also involve representing multiple beneficiaries with conflicting 
interests.  Disloyalty can occur in three scenarios.  First, the fiduciary uses his position (without 
the beneficiary’s consent) to direct business opportunities to himself (“self-dealing”).  For 
example, the fiduciary passes himself off as the owner of the trust property and uses it as 
collateral to purchase additional property.  Second, the fiduciary transacts with the beneficiary 
                                                            
37 “Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his agency 
for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in which the agent is employed.” 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394 (1958).  According to Ribstein (2011, 208-10), this is the only true fiduciary 
duty.  Other related “non-fiduciary” duties, such as the duty of care, are implied in contract.  Law Professor D. 
Gordon Smith (2002, 1406-07, 1409) similarly argues that fiduciary duty refers only to the duty of loyalty because 
“the duty of care is ‘not distinctively fiduciary.’”   As will be discussed below, regardless of how one may define the 
concept of fiduciary duty using legal history, Congress defined fiduciary duty to include the duty of care under 
ERISA.  In doing so, Congress relied on its own interpretation of fiduciary duties as mediated by legal scholars and 
judges.    
 




with his or the court’s consent but that consent is based on inadequate disclosure.  For example, 
the fiduciary invests the beneficiary’s assets with the beneficiary’s consent but does not tell the 
beneficiary that the company he is investing in is owned by the fiduciary’s brother.  Third, the 
fiduciary transacts with a third party in a way that implicates the beneficiary’s interests, such as 
misappropriating an opportunity and pursuing “secret profits” (Cooter and Freedman 1990, 305-
06).  For example, a buyer of real estate purchases a house from a seller through the seller’s real 
estate agent.  The agent, a fiduciary, knows that the price offered is above the seller’s minimum 
sales price but pockets the difference without informing the seller (DeMott 2007, 1053).   
 
Since delegating discretion to a fiduciary necessarily involves ceding control, the difficulty with 
penalizing breaches of the duty of loyalty is discovering them.  A poor outcome (such as a 
negative return on investment) does not necessarily mean that the fiduciary has engaged in a self-
interested act (such as misappropriating all or part of the value of property entrusted to the 
fiduciary).  While the beneficiary can observe the outcome, because the outcome is based both 
on the fiduciary’s act and chance it is difficult to tell whether the fiduciary’s act or chance caused 
the poor outcome (Cooter and Freedman 1990, 330-31).  In addition, the more effort the 
beneficiary must expend in monitoring a fiduciary to prevent a breach of this duty, the less 
reason there is for the existence of the fiduciary relationship at all since the costs may begin to 
exceed the benefits.   
 
Penalties for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty seek to rectify this situation.  The duty of 




and unjust enrichment (DeMott 2007, 1049).  If the only remedy were disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains, given imperfect enforcement, there would still be a large incentive for the fiduciary to 
breach his duty.  More is needed to deter improper conduct (Cooter and Freedman 1990, 304).  
The aggrieved party need only demonstrate that the fiduciary’s actions were a substantial factor 
in a loss to the beneficiary – a low threshold.  Once this burden is met, the beneficiary may be 
entitled to punitive damages in addition to requiring the fiduciary to disgorge any gains received 
through improper use of the beneficiary’s property (even if the beneficiary was not harmed at all 
by the breach) (DeMott 2007, 1056-57).  The deterrent value of these remedies demonstrates the 
importance at law of preventing breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.     
 
The prohibitions on self-interested behavior by fiduciaries do not seek to prevent all self-dealing, 
however.  Rather, they promote advance disclosure to the beneficiary so that he can make an 
informed decision on whether to consent to the transaction (Sitkoff 2011, 1043).  The fiduciary’s 
ability to obtain advance consent and his ability to terminate the relationship soften the harshness 
of remedies for breach of the duty of loyalty (DeMott 2007, 1052-53).39  The high cost of 
penalties for fiduciary breaches has not deterred many from entering the field, and providing 
                                                            
39 But see Langevoort (2011, fn 30), discussing how disclosure may give fiduciaries “greater moral wiggle room” 
and result in greater acceptance of their advice among beneficiaries.  Even when aware of a conflict of interest, 
beneficiaries rarely have full information about how that conflict has affected a fiduciary’s advice, frequently 
discounting possible bias or at least exhibiting an increased tendency to accept the advice based on the existing 
relationship of trust (citing Cain 2005 and Sah 2011).  Although an experiment by Church (2009) finds that 
disclosure and the threat of sanctions in the financial adviser/advisee context resulted in less biased advice by the 
adviser and better evaluation of that advice by advisee, their experiment models sanctions as costly for the 
beneficiaries but certain to result in punishment where the fiduciary engages in bad behavior.  The experiment also 
assumes the advisee has complete freedom regarding whether to invest or not and that the relationship is a one-time 
interaction – an unrealistic scenario because pension plan participants, for example, do not choose the plan’s 






fiduciary services has become a big business with big profits.  As a result, there is frequently a 
culture at these companies that serve as fiduciaries that motivates greed and self-dealing instead 
of ethical behavior (Langevoort 2011).40 
 
The Duty of Care 
 
The duty of care requires fiduciaries to act “with prudence, attention, and proficiency” in 
providing their services (Frankel 2011a, 169).41  Fiduciaries must have or obtain the information 
required to competently perform their tasks and act on such information after engaging in a 
reasonable deliberative process (Cooter and Freedman 1991, 1062).  Fiduciaries are required to 
use the specialized training and skills that caused the beneficiary to hire them and to react 
appropriately to unfavorable circumstances (Frankel 2011a, 172-73).  The performance of a 
fiduciary with specialized training and skills is measured by the standard of what a “reasonable 
or prudent person” with those skills would have done in the same circumstances (Sitkoff 2011, 
1044).  This standard does not hold fiduciaries liable for mistakes or unfavorable outcomes but 
instead for failing to complete their duties in a professional manner (Frankel 2011a, 170-74).   
 
                                                            
40 “It is thus worth thinking hard about what the favored traits are in the fiduciary business and how they interact 
with – and easily frustrate – the law’s efforts to insist on fiduciary responsibility from those who are, in heart and 
soul, salespeople” (Langevoort 2011, 995).   
 
41 Like Ribstein and Smith, Professor William A. Gregory (2005, 183) argues that the duty of care is not a fiduciary 
duty at all but instead a negligence concept that has been conflated with the fiduciary duty of loyalty by courts and 
legal scholars.  He argues that “[t]o describe negligent acts as being breaches of fiduciary duty is misleading, 
because a breach of fiduciary duty ‘connotes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere incompetence is not enough.’”  Gregory’s 
point is that only duties that are unique to the fiduciary role are fiduciary duties.  Instead, he argues that the duty of 




Measuring performance, however, is difficult.  Even courts must rely on other experts to judge 
fiduciaries’ performance (Frankel 2011a, 170-74).  As with the duty of loyalty, it is difficult to 
determine whether the fiduciary has used “reasonable” effort based on outcome since, in the 
absence of disloyalty, a poor outcome can result from either poor effort or chance (Cooter and 
Freedman 1991, 1056-57).42  Courts typically evaluate the “process” used by the fiduciary to 
fulfill his role (Laby 2004, 117).  Unscrupulous intent is not required to find a breach of this duty 
(Laby 2004, 109).43 
 
Special Risks Associated with Many Beneficiaries and a Large Amount of Assets 
 
Typically, as the number of beneficiaries increases, the total amount of property (e.g., money) 
that the fiduciary is responsible for increases.  As is often the case, with more money comes 
more power for the fiduciary.  Among other responsibilities, fiduciaries select service providers 
to help manage assets, such as lawyers and investment advisers, and these third parties compete 
to please the fiduciaries that hire them – not the beneficiaries who own the assets.  Two 
consequences are:  (1) externally, it becomes difficult for those doing business with a fiduciary to 
distinguish whether he manages the assets or owns the assets and (2) internally, each 
                                                            
42 “Whether the trustee is prudent in the doing of an act depends upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear 
to him at the time when he does the act and not at some subsequent time when his conduct is called in question” 
(Laby 2004, 119, quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts 174 cmt b (2004)).   
 
43 Professor Arthur Laby (2004, 141-45) argues that the negative duty of loyalty trumps the positive duty of care.  
This emphasizes the importance of trust in the relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary rather than the quality 
of services provided.  One example of how the two duties can conflict in the ERISA context was faced by Enron 
directors who also served as administrators of the company’s ERISA plans that invested in company stock.  The 
court found that the plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to ERISA plan participants 
even though any disclosure of the company’s precarious financial condition by the directors would arguably have 




beneficiary’s control over the fiduciary is weakened because of the small share of his ownership 
(Frankel 2011a, 11).  The first consequence leads to greater temptation to breach the duty of 
loyalty, as discussed above, and the greater ability to do so since because of apparent ownership 
of the assets managed.  My focus in this section, however, is the distinct difficulty in controlling 
the fiduciary as the number of beneficiaries increases.      
 
Acting as a fiduciary to a large number of beneficiaries is a public service role even when 
performed by supposedly private actors.  In a 1995 article, Frankel defines “public fiduciaries” as 
those engaged in “commercial relationships, that is, mass-produced, non-personal relationships 
with numerous public [beneficiaries]” and private fiduciaries as only those in relationships with 
few beneficiaries (1251-52).  She identifies two categories of public fiduciaries:  (1) fiduciaries 
who manage large pools of assets for efficiency (e.g., pension fund managers) and (2) fiduciaries 
to entities owned by many beneficiaries (e.g., directors of public corporations).  The first 
category, which I focus on in this section, is typically regulated by law as private fiduciaries 
(Frankel 1995, fn 117).  I define public fiduciaries to include only government actors (e.g., 
congressmen or employees of government agencies) and not fiduciaries to mass amounts of 
beneficiaries to tease out the differences between private parties supplying services to the mass 
public and government actors doing the same.  Frankel’s terminology, however, indicates the 
easy comparison between her “public fiduciaries” and government actors, as discussed further in 





Frankel (1995, 1252-53) recognizes that fiduciaries who provide services to a large number of 
beneficiaries have significant power because the beneficiaries are “rationally passive”, meaning 
that the cost for an individual beneficiary to monitor a fiduciary exceeds the small benefit to the 
beneficiary that results because of his small share of ownership.  A fiduciary managing property 
for many beneficiaries cannot be subject to the direction of each beneficiary on a daily basis – 
that would make managing the property impractical and defeat the purpose of centralizing 
management to increase efficiency.  With a large number of beneficiaries, it is more likely that 
each has a small financial interest and will not rationally expend the large amount of time, effort, 
and money necessary to monitor and/or remove the fiduciary for the entire group and will instead 
“free ride” on the effort of any active investors (1256).  As Frankel states, “A fiduciary managing 
$500 million for one [beneficiary] has far less power than a fiduciary managing the same amount 
for 50,000 [beneficiaries]” (1257).  Fiduciaries controlling the property of a large number of 
beneficiaries also have more power to affect the economy and financial order of our society.  If 
beneficiaries feel powerless to control bad behavior among fiduciaries, if for example strong 
legal standards do not restrict fiduciary malfeasance, they may withdraw their assets from the 
system entirely (1259-60).   
 
In addition to the general risk to all beneficiaries where a fiduciary has greatly increased power, 
there is a risk to beneficiaries that the fiduciary will prefer the interests of some beneficiaries 
over others.  The fiduciary has many different principals to respond to – and it is often an 
impossible task to give all the beneficiaries, who will often have conflicting goals and desired 




when dealing with various beneficiaries of a pool of assets managed by the fiduciary.44  This 
duty falls within the duty of loyalty discussed above (Fischel and Langbein 1988, 1109; DeMott 
2007, 1054).45  At its most basic level, any payment from the pool of assets harms the interest of 
the other beneficiaries by reducing the pool of assets, and the fiduciary must decide who has the 
right to payment in different circumstances (Fischel and Langbein 1988, 1128-29).     
 
When beneficiaries’ control over fiduciaries is weakened for the reasons discussed above, the 
law seeks to protect their interests (Frankel 2011a, 39).  Frankel argues that the more 
beneficiaries, the more strict regulation of fiduciaries and remedies for breaches of these rules 
should be (Frankel 2011b, 1297).  However, the costs of regulation are high.46        
 
                                                            
44 Although the duty of impartiality traditionally referred to the fiduciary’s duty to consider both life and remainder 
interests in trust property (Langbein 2007, 1075), the duty is equally applicable for trusts that manage assets owned 
by large numbers of beneficiaries.  See Restatement (Third of Trusts) § 79 (2007):  “A trustee has a duty to 
administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries of the trust.” 
 
45 ERISA ignores impartiality and instead emphasizes that pension fiduciaries must act in the best interest of 
employees – implicitly assuming that those employees share common interests.  The Revenue Act of 1921 first 
introduced the exclusive benefit rule, or the idea that an employer creating a pension plan had to set up a trust for the 
exclusive benefit of employees, into the American private pension system.  ERISA continues this same rule (Fischel 
and Langbein 1988, 1109).  Fischel and Langbein (1988, 1120-21, 1159-60), however, show that it is foolish to 
assume all pension plan participants have common interests.  They detail typical conflicts, such as that between 
older and younger workers over the extent to which employers should provide compensation in the form of pension 
benefits at all and the conflict between active employees and retirees.  ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule does not 
sufficiently explain how to balance these competing interests, and, over a decade after the passage of ERISA, 
Fischel and Langbein argue for the incorporation of the trust law duty of impartiality into pension law.   
 
46 See Cummings and Finke (2010), arguing that all professionals providing financial advice should be subject to 
fiduciary standards instead of regulated by self-regulating organizations (e.g., FINRA) or government to ensure that 




Similarity of Public and Private Fiduciaries 
 
Similarities between public and private fiduciaries make it easier for Congress to delegate 
authority to private actors subject to many of the same constraints they face when engaged in a 
relationship of trust with large numbers of people.  Elected officials, whom I will call here public 
fiduciaries, and private fiduciaries are similar in that both face checks on their discretion 
(including the Constitution in the former case) to prevent mishandling of the trust placed in these 
officials and to ensure the use of due care in the performance of their services (Frankel 2011a, 
279).  The Founding Fathers were acquainted with fiduciary law (Ponet and Leib 2011, fn 34).  
They therefore set forth the terms governing public fiduciaries’ performance of their duties just 
as the parties to a private fiduciary relationship agree on basic terms to govern their relationship 
(Frankel 2011a, 281-82).  At the federal constitutional convention in 1787, many delegates 
espoused “ideals of fiduciary government,” drawing on concepts already contained within state 
constitutions (Natelson 2004, 1083).47  This comparison of public officials and private fiduciaries 
                                                            
47 Federalist No. 49 (“The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numberous. They are 
distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance 
embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a 
personal influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights 
and liberties of the people.”); Federalist No. 55 (“I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can 
be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to 
the choice of the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the 
solemn trust committed to them.”); Federalist No. 57 (“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first 
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue 
to hold their public trust.”); Federalist No. 63 (“Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is 
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body.  It can only be found in a 
number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each 
individual; or in an assembly [i.e., the Senate] so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence 
of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community.”) (papers cited in 




is known as the public trust doctrine (Natelson 2004, 1087).  As Grover Cleveland said, “We are 
the trustees and agents of our fellow citizens” (quoted in Natelson 2001, 192).   
 
The public trust doctrine, as set forth by Professor Robert G. Natelson (2004, 1088, 1091) but 
nowhere formally required of elected officials, includes:  (1) a duty to follow instructions, such 
as those outlined in the Constitution; (2) a duty of reasonable care; (3) a duty of loyalty; (4) a 
duty of impartiality, which requires that public officials not favor one group of citizens over 
another; and (5) a duty to account for their actions, including remedying harm (although this is 
limited in the case of public officials).  The parallels between the duties owed by a private 
fiduciary, as discussed above, and the duties owed by a public fiduciary are clear.   
 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty suggests (but does not require) that elected officials engage with 
the governed regularly to address any potential conflicts of interest (Ponet and Lieb 2011, 1258).  
The duty of care requires public fiduciaries to have the knowledge to execute their jobs and 
avoid “indiscretions” (Frankel 2011, 283).  This duty also includes consulting the governed 
regularly to ascertain their wishes, although the public fiduciary must then use his own judgment 
and skills to translate those wishes into legislative action (Ponet and Lieb 2011, 1259).        
 
Logic suggests that the fiduciary demands on public officials should be higher because it is so 
difficult for citizens to exit the relationship if they are dissatisfied with the officials’ performance 




impossible at worst, and removing public officials is nearly impossible because the costs to 
organize such a campaign are high (Natelson 2001, 199).48      
 
Yet there is no general fiduciary duty imposed on public officials, and they are instead subject to 
varying checks and balances designed to control their behavior indirectly (Natelson 2001, 193).  
Not only does an individual dissatisfied with an official’s performance have far less legal rights 
vis-à-vis the official than he would against a private fiduciary, the official is rarely even subject 
to an accounting:   
The private fiduciary must be prepared to justify his decisions by 
showing reasonable investigation and disinterested analysis; if he 
cannot, he may see his decisions invalidated and be subject to 
liability. Yet outside a few instances in which the courts apply 
‘strict scrutiny’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ government officials 
may proceed on slender or no empirical basis and in circumstances 
of clear conflict of interest, and the courts will sustain the decisions 
and protect from liability those who made them.49   
 
(Natelson 2001, 201-02).  Natelson argues that the same fiduciary protections that apply to 
private fiduciaries should also apply to public officials because they help protect the vulnerable 
beneficiaries in this relationship of trust.50     
  
                                                            
48 It may, however, be similarly difficult for a single beneficiary to exit a relationship with a fiduciary that involves a 
large number of beneficiaries (see Frankel 1995, 1254, 1256-58).  While the market may offer alternatives to the 
fiduciary, a single beneficiary lacks the power to make a change among service providers.  In the context of 
employer-sponsored and tax-subsidized pension plans, exit by terminating the relationship (i.e., quitting one’s job) is 
costly.   
 
49 This of course assumes that private fiduciaries are frequently called to account, a proposition in doubt where they 
report to many beneficiaries who are rationally passive, as discussed above. 
 
50 To refute arguments that the application of fiduciary duties to public officials is not possible, Natelson (2001, 194) 




Just as Natelson recognizes the utility of an extra check on the power held by those who regulate 
the affairs of a large number of (frequently uninformed) beneficiaries, the traditional checks and 
balances established in the state have conditioned legislators to find solace in fiduciary law as a 
check on the behavior of private actors.  This tool allowed Congress to delegate authority over 
the property of millions of employees to more well-informed employers that it acknowledged 
would always be tempted to act in their own self-interest.  Congress believed that this tool of 
fiduciary protections could hold back the self-interested behavior of employers and their agents 
when acting for the beneficiaries. 
 
There is an inverse relationship between private and public fiduciary power once Congress 
decides to regulate a particular field.  An increase in private power comes at the expense of 
public control, and Congress ceded significant control over retirement income to private actors.  
The excesses of private fiduciary power in a time of limited regulation, as we have seen recently, 
frequently result in increased government control (Frankel 2011a, 285).  For example, the well-
known corporate governance failures in the Enron scandal resulted in the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  Therefore, the pendulum may swing back in the future, and 
Congress can retake some of the power over retirement income.  The area of regulating private 
fiduciary power is still in its infancy compared to society’s experience with regulating public 
fiduciary power – despite trust law’s centuries-old legacy (Frankel 2011a, 286).  The importance 
of Congress’ willingness to utilize fiduciary law to protect the public and allow it to delegate 





In Chapter 2, I will discuss how Congress delegated substantial authority to private actors under 
ERISA and whether fiduciary protections written into the law motivated the delegation.  My 
focus here is to show Congress’ intent to use fiduciary duties to hold private actors accountable, 






HOLDING EMPLOYERS ACCOUNTABLE:   
CONGRESS USES FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES UNDER ERISA 
 
Advocates of full codification of the common law – or law made by judges through court 
decisions – argue that there should be no gaps in the law, or instances where “the code does not 
provide a rule to solve the case” (Weiss 2000, 458).  In fact, executive and legislative bodies that 
instituted legal codes “liked the idea of reducing judges to legal calculating machines, because it 
secured their own power over the law and it protected citizens from arbitrary standards in 
judging” (459).  In practice, it has been impossible to codify the law without leaving gaps (459-
62).   
 
ERISA is not an example of a statute that left a few gaps open for regulatory agencies and the 
courts to fill.  Instead, ERISA’s framers acknowledged that they were leaving many details to be 
determined and, as discussed above, delegation in a complex area such as pension management 
typically involves leaving significant discretion to the agent.  This chapter examines the role of 
fiduciary standards in Congress’ decision to cede primary power over the many vagaries and 
gaps remaining in pension regulation after the passage of ERISA to private actors.   
 
Why Codification of Common Law Fiduciary Standards Was Necessary 
 
The most basic question to address when discussing ERISA’s fiduciary rules is why they were 




time it takes for pension participants to qualify irrevocably for their benefits and not risk 
forfeiting those benefits upon job loss, for example) and funding standards were needed because 
they did not previously exist – the government had allowed employers and employees to make 
their own pension bargains without setting any minimum terms.  Judges had used state common 
law of trusts, however, to enforce fiduciary obligations against trustees for many years.  ERISA 
required that all pension plans be in the form of trusts but need not have preempted state trust 
law’s application to pension plans, so why was codification of the fiduciary rules necessary at 
all?  And how, if at all, did ERISA change trust law?   
 
In answer to the first question, codification was necessary because trust law was designed 
originally to respond to interfamilial gifts to a small number of people managed by neutral 
trustees.  Codification was therefore necessary not to set in place an entirely new legal regime 
but instead to adapt trust law to the employee benefit context.  In answer to the second question, 
ERISA expanded the fiduciary duties of trust law and made them mandatory for all involved in 
the administration of a pension plan – refusing to let fiduciaries opt out of the expansive new 
duties for pension plan administrators. 
 
There has long been a debate among legal scholars regarding whether the common law should be 
codified in all areas of the law.  “Codification refers to the legislative pronouncement of 
previously fluid judge-made law in an organized and authoritative form” (Rosen 1994, 1127).  
Although the debate was at its height from the 1830s to the early 1900s, with those against 




twentieth century.51  Opponents of codification have traditionally argued that the common law 
adds needed “flexibility” that allows the law to adapt to changing facts and times, while 
proponents assert that unelected judges should not be making law (Rosen 1994, 1122-23).  With 
respect to fiduciary standards, Congress incorporated these standards from trust law into ERISA, 
which is why agencies and courts look to trust law for answers when ERISA is silent or 
ambiguous (Langbein 1997, 168).52     
 
Professor Langbein (2003, 1319) argues that “the reach of trust-law principles in ERISA is far 
deeper and more controlling” than the courts often recognize but that ERISA adapted trust law to 
the employee benefit context.  ERISA codified the duties of loyalty and prudence from trust law 
but otherwise did not write existing trust law into the statute wholesale.  Instead, Congress 
intentionally relied on the courts to look to trust law to fill in its “skeletal” outline and adapt trust 
law to the employee benefits context (1325-26).  Unable to compromise on thorny political 
issues, Congress punted to the courts to make resolving these issues unnecessary.  Refusing to 
spell out each detail of the legal framework that would govern employee benefit plans also gave 
Congress flexibility when regulating a complex field that few understood and whose response to 
such regulations fewer could predict (1329).  Adopting much of the trust law framework saved 
                                                            
51 For a general discussion of the history of codification in American legal history, see Rosen (1994) and Weiss 
(2000).   
 
52 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (“In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties draw 
much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA's 
enactment.”) (internal citations omitted); Firestone Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA’s 
legislative history confirms that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to 
[ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.’  Given this language and 
history, we have held that courts are to develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-




Congress the time of having to generate and agree on a new regime while also providing the 
legitimacy associated with a well-established body of law (1328). 
 
Remarks by ERISA architect Senator Jacob Javits explain why codification of trust law was 
necessary and what fundamental changes were made to existing law.  When introducing a 
comprehensive pension reform bill to the Senate on March 13, 1970 (over four years before 
ERISA was enacted), Javits cited three reasons why the existing framework of fiduciary 
protections under state trust law was not sufficient in the pension context.  All of these reasons 
relate to conflicts between employer (or the employer’s agents) and employees and conflicts 
among employees.  First, he argued, “there is a very serious problem arising from the fact that at 
common law the definition of ‘trustee’ is quite narrow in scope, while in pension and welfare 
trust administration, the number of persons who handle and exercise control of the funds is much 
broader.”  Javits first goal was thus to protect beneficiaries by subjecting more of the service 
providers administering pension plans to fiduciary rules.  Second, he noted that trust law 
developed to deal with relationships involving a small number of beneficiaries.  He recognized 
the problems inherent in the pension context where each benefit fund might have thousands of 
participants and beneficiaries.  Simple issues such as regular communication regarding trust 
matters become complicated because of the sheer number of plan participants and the distance 
between fiduciary and beneficiary.53  Finally, Javits stated that trust law permitted exculpatory 
                                                            
53 Javits stated that at common law, “[t]hese trusts usually involve but a single settler and, at most, a relatively small, 
well defined class of beneficiaries. . . . Clearly, this body of traditional trust law, vast as it is, must be applied quite 
differently to employee benefit plans which are the product of collective bargaining and may cover thousands of 
employees of many different employers.”  S. 3589–Introduction to Employee Benefits Protection Act–
Administration Bill to Amend the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 91st Cong., Cong. Rec. 7278-79 




clauses that helped fiduciaries avoid responsibility for breaching their duties, and this did not 
provide the security needed for pension plan participants.54 
 
Court decisions permitting employee benefit plan administrators to opt out of their fiduciary 
obligations prior to ERISA show the need for codification of trust law in relation to pension 
plans.  Exculpatory provisions in trust documents were allowed by courts even where the trustee 
had duties to numerous people and a collective action problem made it difficult to argue that the 
provision was duly bargained for by all parties (Coffee 1989, fn 138).  In Collins v. Storer 
Broadcasting Co.,55 the court found that even if the defendant committee members were trustees 
administering the profit-sharing plan at issue, the exculpatory clause exempted them from 
liability except for “wilful misconduct” because the creator of a trust has the legal right to create 
such a provision in the trust documents.  Thus, trustees operating under a trust agreement with an 
exculpatory clause can be held liable only for an act “more than involuntary, inadvertent, 
negligent, mistaken, careless or accidental default . . . an intentional failure to do or not to do 
something required – an affirmative wrong.”56  Generally, exculpatory provisions in trust 
agreements limiting a fiduciary’s liability for negligence were upheld under common law unless 
they violated clearly stated public policy.57   
                                                            
54 Id. at 7278-79, 7285-86.  Ignoring the likelihood that savvy trustees could take advantage of those creating trusts, 
trust law historically permitted exculpatory clauses in trust formation documents that exempted trustees from 
liability for anything other than egregious conduct.  Collins v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 120 S.E. 2d 764, 769 (Ga 
1961). 
 
55 120 S.E. 2d 764, 769-70 (Ga 1961). 
 
56 Id. at 770 (internal citations omitted).   
 
57 Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc., 462 N.E.2d 996, 999-1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), aff’d 478 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1985); 





Prior to ERISA, exculpatory clauses had even been permitted for fiduciaries managing pension 
funds.  Specifically, in Morrissey v. Curran, 483 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1973), the court refused to 
hold two defendant trustees of the National Maritime Union of America’s pension plan for its 
officers liable for improper payments from the plan.  The trust agreement stated: 
 4.  The trustee shall not be liable for . . . any loss to, or diminution 
of the Fund, except due to their own wilful misconduct.  5.  The 
Trustees . . . shall be protected in relying and acting upon the 
opinion of legal counsel (including opinion of legal counsel who is 
or may be a trustee hereunder) in connection with any matter 
pertaining to the administration or execution of this Trust Fund. No 
Trustee shall be liable for any action taken or omitted by him 
unless such act or omission is the result of wilful misconduct, nor 
for the acts of any agent, employee, or attorney selected by the 
Trustees with reasonable care, nor for any act or omission of any 
other Trustee.58     
 
While another trustee’s “‘reckless indifference’ to his duty as a trustee” permitted liability 
against him, the exculpatory clause operated to release the two negligent fiduciaries from 
liability.59   
 
Javits and other pension reformers sought to prohibit fiduciaries from striking bargains relieving 
them of their traditional obligations under trust law.  As Javits explained, “Whatever the validity 
such provisions might have with respect to testamentary trusts, they are inappropriate in the case 
                                                            
58 Morrissey v. Curran, 483 F.2d 480, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1973).   
 
59 Id.  Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 provides, “A general 
exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution 
of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this 
section shall be void as against public policy.”  However, the court held that this language did not apply to a 





of employee benefit plans.  The large numbers of people and enormous amounts of money 
involved in such plans coupled with the public interest in their financial soundness, as expressed 
in the Act, require that no such exculpatory provision be permitted.”60  The idea that the parties 
should not be able to contract around fiduciary protections implicates the debate of the 
contractarians and the non-contractarians.  The mandatory nature of fiduciary protections under 
ERISA arguably removed this fiduciary law from the contract realm – if it was ever there at all.  
Fiduciary obligations were no longer merely default rules but instead became “universal 
mandatory minimum standards” (Coffee 1989, 1652).61 
 
Changes to existing trust law, including those discussed by Javits, were necessary to solve a few 
problems with the strict application of trust law to employee benefit plans.62  A tougher problem 
with the application of state trust law to large-scale pension plans was the conflict of interest 
between employers and employees, plan sponsors and participants.  Although all fiduciary 
                                                            
60 S. 3589–Introduction to Employee Benefits Protection Act–Administration Bill to Amend the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 91st Cong., Cong. Rec. 7285 (March 13, 1970). 
 
61 See Langbein 1997, 183 (ERISA turned the default rules of trust law into mandatory fiduciary obligations). 
 
62 See Varity, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996) (internal citations omitted): 
 
We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire story. After 
all, ERISA’s standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional 
determination that the common law of trusts did not offer completely 
satisfactory protection. . . . Consequently, we believe that the law of trusts often 
will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to 
interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties. In some instances, trust law will offer only a 
starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, 
the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from 
common-law trust requirements. And, in doing so, courts may have to take 
account of competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer 
employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative 
costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare 




relationships involve some conflict of interest because a trustee must act for the interests of 
beneficiaries even where they directly oppose the trustee’s interests, the trustee typically has not 
contributed any of the assets in the trust from his own pocket, nor is he paying to administer the 
trust.  This is the issue that makes Congress’ delegation risky and – according to some – requires 
that the government administer all pension funds.  Congress, including Senator Javits, believed 
that alterations to common law fiduciary protections at the time of codification could reduce the 
risk sufficiently to make delegation to these conflicted fiduciaries advisable, particularly since 
Congress had to balance the need to protect beneficiaries already participating in pension plans 
with the goal of encouraging the maintenance and growth of private pensions by employers. 
 
ERISA’s drafters sought to prevent fiduciary disloyalty and poor management because pension 
plan sponsors frequently created and administered plans for their own benefit instead of 
participants’.  Employers created benefit plans to shelter money from taxes or to invest in 
employer securities.  Sponsors rarely had rank-and-file employees’ well-being as their sole 
focus.  Sponsors traditionally had the ability to control plan documents and make investments 
that served their business interests.  For example, sponsors could amend plans at any time to cut 
or eliminate benefits, and they frequently invested pension funds in real estate the company 
wanted to purchase or in loans to the company that carried low interest rates.  Since sponsors 
were not required to disclose the plan’s investments, forcing disclosure of “prohibited 
transactions” required timely and costly litigation by plan participants who were often 





ERISA departs from trust law by allowing executives of the employer to serve as fiduciaries, 
even though trustees were traditionally professionals without any inherent conflicts of interest 
and employer representatives face inherent conflicts (Langbein 2003, 1327-28).63  The plan may 
also be administered by an insurance company hired by the employer to run the plan, resulting in 
another conflict of interest as the third party has an interest in pleasing the plan sponsor to retain 
the contract to administer the plan rather than pleasing the participants who have no say in the 
selection of the plan administrator (Langbein 2007, 1326).  Congress recognized that allowing 
the plan sponsor to retain control over plan administration was necessary to encourage plan 
formation by helping an employer keep costs down through its hiring or retention of lower cost 
parties to help administer the funds.   
 
But Congress believed that mandatory fiduciary obligations would prevent employers from 
acting in their own interest and force them all – everyone involved in running the pension plans – 
to act in the interests of plan participants.  Indeed, “ERISA’s fiduciary regime, which governs 
benefit denial cases, is also profoundly paternalistic.  Precisely because ERISA subjects every 
employee benefit plan to ERISA’s duties of loyalty, prudent administration, and ‘full and fair’ 
internal review of benefit denials, we can be certain that Congress preferred these protective 
principles of ERISA fiduciary law [to freedom of contract]” (Langbein 2007, 1329-30).64  
                                                            
63 “Nothing in section 1006 of this title shall be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from . . . (3) serving as a 
fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other representative of a party in interest.”  ERISA § 
1108(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 408(c)(3).   
 
64 Langbein (2007) takes issue with cases decided by Judge Posner that fail to acknowledge the inherent conflict of 
interest held by most ERISA plan administrators and instead argue that the relationship between administrator and 
participants is similar to that of any contractual parties standing on opposite sides of the table.  Instead, Langbein 




Congress thus explicitly incorporated fiduciary standards in ERISA to hold those who administer 
private pension plans accountable.   
 
The Lengthy Battle Over ERISA 
 
President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day, September 2, 1974 after over a 
decade of study and debate regarding how to safeguard private pensions.  Senator Jacob Javits, a 
key proponent of the legislation, said of the occasion, “[T]he pension reform bill is the greatest 
development in the life of the American worker since social security” (quoted in Wooten 2004, 
1).   
 
The question that is the focus of Professor James A. Wooten’s (2004) work on the political 
history of ERISA is how this legislation passed given the opposition of both employers and, 
frequently, organized labor.  Employers opposed increased regulation because of costs.  Many 
unions opposed legislation because they wanted the role of policing pensions and did not trust 
the federal government to provide for workers’ retirement income security (7-8).  Wooten argues 
that a new framework for pension policymaking (the “worker-security theory”) caused Congress 
to take on this historic legislation protecting retirement income and thereby increasing the cost to 
employers of providing pensions instead of ratifying the traditional view that private pensions 
were merely tools of employers to manage retention of their employees and alter at their will (the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
contractual parties and instead protect participants from the clear conflict of interest of plan administrators who 




“personnel theory”) (4).  Legislators risked the wrath of key interest groups and passed ERISA 
“because they believed it was the right thing to do” (8).   
 
One missing piece to the puzzle of ERISA’s passage, however, is why it took the form it did.    
Path dependence is one part of the answer.  Path dependence indicates that “timing matters” 
since policy decisions made early in the path, to provide tax incentives to spur the growth of 
private pensions for example, have a larger influence than those made later.  The conditions that 
resulted in the formation of initial policies may no longer exist, but the policies remain.  Path 
dependence assumes a significant amount of “institutional inertia” that continues policies put in 
place at an earlier time because of increasing returns – the concept that returns for remaining on 
a pre-existing path increase as time goes by, making it difficult to change course (Pierson 2000a, 
2000b; Hacker 2002, 52-55).65 
 
Even assuming that path dependence played a large role in the prominence of private pensions 
and the failure to expand Social Security to fill the gap in worker security identified, though, 
there were many different forms that the legislation could have taken.  The path that Congress 
took to hold administrators of private pensions accountable had many possible branches, 
                                                            
65 In part, ERISA took the form it did because Congress expected that only by permitting employers to manage 
private pensions would reform legislation pass.  As Professor Paul A. David writes in his 1985 article explaining the 
dominance of the QWERTY keyboard, “Intuition suggests that if choices were made in a forward-looking way, 
rather than myopically on the basis of comparisons among the currently prevailing costs of different systems, the 
final outcome could be influenced strongly by expectations.  A particular system could triumph over rivals merely 
because the purchasers of the [system] expected that it would do so” (335).  Just as these expectations caused users 
of typewriters to rally around “the wrong system,” expectations about the shape of successful legislation caused 
Congress to rally around a private pension system controlled by employers (336).  See also discussion of self-




including greater oversight of fiduciaries by a single, active and knowledgeable agency.66  Path 
dependence does not imply that the role of private fiduciaries could not have changed more 
significantly under ERISA or that Congress cannot use fiduciary standards to hold private actors 
accountable in many different ways. 
 
It would have taken a critical juncture to break with the past entirely, though, and separate 
employers from the administration of pension plans they sponsored, however, because they had 
been administering those plans for over half a century.  The concept of critical junctures elevates 
certain time periods above others in the historical path and shifts the focus from the more 
common policy inertia to how periods of dramatic change or potential change arise.  “In social 
policy development, critical junctures represent moments of political opportunity when 
significant new policy departures may be put in place or when the forces for change are strong 
enough to cut into the ongoing path-dependent development of an existing policy and alter its 
trajectory.”  Some sort of crisis can act as an “exogenous” shock to realign political players and 
develop a new path (Hacker 2002, 59-60, 303-11).  It took the collapse of pensions for thousands 
of Studebaker employees to pass a reform bill for private pensions at all – even one that left 
control in the hands of employers and arguably failed to hold them adequately accountable – and 
it would doubtless have taken a crisis affecting many more people to shift the public/private 
pension balance.   
 
                                                            




Congress then sought a device to make workers secure by controlling the behavior of the private 
actors to whom it was delegating responsibility for supervising workers’ retirement income 
security – while making a conscious decision to place control over worker pensions in 
employers’ hands.  The revised fiduciary regime it codified under ERISA was Congress’ attempt 
to hold employers accountable for the workers’ expectations.   
 
Prior to ERISA, employees had little recourse if employers reneged on those promises, and their 
reliance on those promises was frequently misplaced because employers changed or eliminated 
pension benefits.67  Employees lost all or a portion of their expected pensions when:  (1) plan 
managers “misuse[d] or [stole] assets” (“agency risk”); (2) the employees quit or were fired from 
employment (“forfeiture risk”); or (3) an employer failed to properly fund the benefit plan and 
faced hardship itself (“default risk”) (Wooten 2004, 3).68  My focus in the remainder of this 
chapter is on how Congress responded to agency risk under ERISA.69  Agency risk includes the 
possibilities that those who administer a pension plan will do a poor job of managing their 
obligations, use funds for self-interested purposes, or decline to pay benefits to which 
                                                            
67 Initially, courts viewed pension promises as “gratuitious, free-will gifts” and not contracts.  They permitted 
employers to alter or eliminate benefits even without specific reservations of rights in the plan documents.  Faced 
with increasing arguments that pensions were contractual promises to employees secured by years of service, 
employers began reserving their rights to amend plan benefits and limiting any legal claims to assets already 
contributed to the pension fund – not allowing employees to touch an employer’s separate assets.  Lengthy vesting 
provisions that were poorly understood by employees also caused many to lose pensions even after decades of 
service (Sass 1997, 187-89). 
 
68 Employers and some unions argued that different vesting and funding rules would make pension plans more 
expensive and force employers to provide less generous benefits or to eliminate the plans entirely.  Many legislators, 
however, argued that private pension funds needed to meet the government’s goals of worker security instead of 
employers’ goals (Wooten 2004, 9-10). 
 





participants are entitled.  While default and forfeiture risks typically relate to defined benefit 
plans, agency risk “is common to all employee benefit plans” – including 401(k) plans and 
welfare plans (Langbein 2003, 1323).  Much of ERISA prescribes specific funding, accrual, and 
vesting rules that are applicable to defined benefit plans – which have declined significantly in 
importance since the passage of ERISA.  ERISA’s fiduciary duties, however, remain of great 
import to today’s pension and welfare plans.  The legislative history of ERISA below 
emphasizes the incorporation of fiduciary standards under ERISA. 
 
Pre-ERISA Pension Regulation 
 
Private pensions developed beginning in 1875 to serve the interest of railroads in removing aging 
employees from the payroll by giving them income sufficient to retire (Gordon 1984, 2; Wooten 
2004, 20-21).  The problem of worker security in old age was first recognized when the move 
from the farm to the factory (and beyond the factory in the case of railroads) dislocated families 
that normally cared for their aging members (Wooten 2004, 20-21).  Few employers beyond the 
railroads and even few welfare capitalists in the 1800s, however, focused on pension plans 
because the attenuated promises of a distant pension did not reduce turnover or decrease 
unionization significantly (Sass 1997, 14-17).  With these early pension plans, employers 
“reserved the right to terminate the plan as a whole or any individual employee’s pension at any 





Tax incentives made pension contributions increasingly attractive for employers, particularly as 
key executives sought to shelter their earnings from taxes.  In 1919, the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue decided that a firm could deduct pension contributions made to a trust if the trust met 
certain indicia of independence from the employer (Wooten 2004, 25).  After 1921, employees 
who participated in defined benefit or defined contribution pension plans and those who were 
paid from an annuity that the employer purchased with an insurance company were all taxed 
only at the time they received the payments instead of when the initial contributions were made 
(25).  Finally, in 1926, the tax on pension trusts themselves was eliminated, which removed the 
bias that resulted when the trusts paid higher taxes on the pension money than the employees 
would have paid had they received the contributions directly as regular income (26).   
 
The Social Security Act of 1935 created a basic public pension program for workers based on 
years of service and wage rate, allowing private pension plans to cater to the highly 
compensated.70  Employers were left to fill the gap between Social Security payments (initially 
under the Old-Age, Survivors Insurance Program and later under the renamed Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program) and the amount employees wanted and needed for 
retirement.  Since higher wage earners expected larger pensions, private plans focused mainly on 
the highly paid by integrating Social Security benefits into their pension calculations (i.e., either 
excluding from participation or paying a reduced benefit to those who earned less than the 
                                                            
70 In reality, pension plans at the time of the Social Security Act did not provide pensions for many workers, and the 
Act affirmed the notion that private companies were not responsible for the retirement income of workers and need 
not sponsor pension plans that provided benefits to many outside the highest earning group of executives.  In 
addition to being poorly funded and actuarially unsound, lengthy age and service provisions meant that private 
pension plans at the time covered only a little over ten percent of wage workers and only five to ten percent of those 





maximum wages taxable under Social Security) (Wooten 2004, 27, 29).71  Because Social 
Security left employers to sponsor pensions mainly to retain key employees, focusing on the 
highly compensated served this interest (Sass 1997, 99-100).  Pension plans did not cover all 
employees (Wooten 2004, 30).72   
 
The growth of private pensions increased dramatically during World War II.  Substantial tax 
increases for individuals during World War II made pension plans the perfect tax shelter for 
highly compensated employees, who could defer income until retirement when their marginal tax 
rates were likely to be lower.  Corporations also used pension plans as a tax shelter after their 
corporate taxes increased and a tax was created for money retained by corporations from profits 
and not paid out as dividends (Wooten 2004, 29-31).  Finally, wage freezes during the war 
caused an explosion in the payment of “fringe benefits” such as pensions to compensate workers 
adequately (Javits 1981, 378).73  Up to 60 percent of plans in existence at the end of 1941 were 
created in the previous two years.  As top marginal tax rates reached 94 percent for individuals 
and 85.5 percent for corporations, this process accelerated (Wooten 2004, 32).     
 
                                                            
71 See generally Slusher (1998). 
 
72 Social Security also helped increase the number of outside consultants used by employers to manage pension 
plans.  To focus on highly paid employees, pension plans had to “integrate” their plans with Social Security benefits 
– offsetting benefits under their plans by the amount provided by the federal government.  Because calculating 
Social Security benefits was complicated, employers turned to outside experts for assistance (Sass 1997, 100).  See 
infra Chapter 3 for further discussion of who has historically helped administer pension plans. 
 
73 Wage controls designed to prevent wartime inflation due to shortages excluded fringe benefits such as pensions 





Pension coverage increased further to 11 million workers in 1960 (Wooten 2004, 34), largely due 
to the efforts of unions (Gordon 1984, 3-4).  Older workers were encouraged to remain with 
employers to support the war effort during World War II.  In addition, inflation during the war 
diminished the value of Social Security benefits, keeping these older workers in the labor force 
after the war (Wooten 2004, 34-35).  A Republican Congress hostile to public social welfare 
programs took control in 1947, making substantial increases to Social Security benefits that 
would motivate these older workers to retire unlikely.  Private pensions were the only tool 
available to move older workers out of the workforce.   
 
Michael Gordon, pension counsel to Senator Jacob Javits during the passage of ERISA, argued 
in his retrospective on the ten-year anniversary of the legislation that pension plan gains during 
World War II merely made up ground lost during the Great Depression.  Instead, union interest 
in negotiating pension benefits for their members with employers resulted in the greatest 
expansion of coverage (1984, 3-4).  The mineworkers’ push for an employer-financed fund to 
provide welfare and pension benefits resulted in Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act requiring 
joint administration of such funds by employer and union representatives and creating a system 
for the administration of large pension funds that received contributions from multiple employers 
(“multiemployer pension funds”) (4).  When the National Labor Relations Board announced that 
the Inland Steel Company should have bargained with the steelworkers’ union about a pension 
plan because it was a mandatory topic of bargaining74 and a federal appeals court agreed in 
                                                            





September 1948,75 newly empowered unions were encouraged to take worker retirement security 
into their own hands (Gordon 1984, 4; Wooten 2004, 35-36).  The expansion of pensions to 
collective bargaining agreements changed the political players in the game of pension regulation 
and the size of large private pension plans as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) union affiliates moved to obtain pensions for their 
members (Wooten 2004, 36-37).76 
 
Scandals Bring Calls for Reform 
 
The effort for pension reform began in the 1950s in response to high profile investigations into 
mismanagement by union officials (Sass 1997, 192).  Investigations were conducted at this time 
by subcommittees of the House Committee on Education and Labor, the House Committee on 
Government Operations, and a special committee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare.  Abuses found included embezzlement, excessive fees, and “ineptness” (Gordon 1984, 
6).  Pension funds were also frequently invested in assets of the employer – placing the 
employer’s needs above those of the workers (Wooten 2004, 44).  As a result of increasing 
reports of such self-dealing, in 1954, Congress enacted prohibited-transaction rules that 
                                                            
75 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1949). 
 
76 Unlike the CIO, the AFL affiliates focused on creating multiemployer pension plans covering thousands of 
workers to allow seasonal or other short-term employees to accrue pension credits and vest based on service to 
different employers in the same industry.  Unions frequently helped administer these plans.  Another difference with 
traditional single-employer pension plans was that with multiemployer plans, employers generally contributed a 
fixed amount and then administrators set the benefit level promised to workers – a less stable arrangement than 




attempted to ensure that such transactions would at least be on terms as favorable as the 
employer would enter into with an unrelated entity (45).     
 
The federal government moved to protect workers from pension misdeeds, but it moved slowly 
and continued to focus on increased reporting and disclosure to plan participants as the best 
method of oversight.  In January 1954, President Eisenhower called for a study of these issues, 
but it was not until January 1956 that he submitted legislation requiring benefit plans to report to 
the Department of Labor.  In May 1956, Senators Paul Douglas (D, Ill.), Irving Ives (R, N.Y.), 
and James Murray (D, Mont.) proposed a bill to have plans file annual reports with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Wooten 2004, 45-46).77  All proposals faced opposition from 
employers arguing that single-employer plans had not demonstrated a need for such restrictions 
and that agency jurisdiction should not lie with the Department of Labor (typically thought to be 
biased in favor of employees) but instead with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
or the IRS (47).78 
 
The McClellan hearings in the Senate further ignited public outrage over inappropriate (but 
frequently not illegal) behavior by pension plan administrators.  Starting in February 1957, the 
Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field chaired by 
John McClellan (D, Ark.) heard 270 days of testimony over two and a half years on the misdeeds 
                                                            
77 I use here the convention of Wooten (2004) to provide the political party and state of each congressman discussed 
given the long and tangled legislative history of ERISA. 
 
78 Six states also moved to regulate welfare and pension plans (Wooten 2004, 45-46).  As the narrative later 
discusses, in the early 1970s, the potential for conflicting state laws regulating pensions was again a powerful force 





of labor unions and employers.  The misdeeds of union officials received the brunt of public 
outrage (Wooten 2004, 47-48).   
 
Congress moved for new legislation – not to set forth specific rules for the administration of 
pension plans, but to require greater disclosure to participants of plan information so that 
participants could monitor plans for themselves.79  The Senate Labor Committee reported a bill 
in 1958 that placed jurisdiction for employee benefit plan monitoring with the Department of 
Labor and covered both single and multiemployer plans.  The legislation, however, dropped the 
idea of requiring plans to send information directly to participants in favor of requiring 
disclosure upon employee request (Wooten 2004, 47-48).  Still, the conservative Chair of the 
House Committee on Education and Labor, Graham Barden (D, N.C.), rejected the authority 
granted to the Department of Labor to monitor plans and punish anything but “willful 
noncompliance” with filing requirements.  Thus, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
of 1958 (“Disclosure Act”) was toothless from the start (48-49).   
 
The President’s Committee 
 
On March 28, 1962, after earlier leading the failed charge in the Senate to amend the Disclosure 
Act to allow the Labor Department to monitor compliance with the law, dictate the required 
filings from plans, and penalize theft and false disclosures criminally, John F. Kennedy created 
the President’s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds (“President’s Committee”) (Gordon 
                                                            




1984, 7-8; Wooten 2004, 77, 82, 84).  This cabinet-level committee was tasked with making 
recommendations on both public and private pensions (Wooten 2004, 84).  The committee was 
created in part to respond to two pages on pensions in a lengthy report issued in 1961 by the 
private, non-governmental Commission on Money and Credit created by the Committee for 
Economic Development in 1958.80  Money and Credit’s brief discussion of private pensions 
expressed concern about the agency risk associated with conflicts of interests and resulting poor 
investments by pension funds.  The report recommended that the federal government set forth 
standards for those administering pension funds along with stronger enforcement and increased 
disclosure (85).   
 
The President’s Committee included all of the powerful players in a new game of pension 
regulation – the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health, Education and Welfare, the Director 
of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Federal Reserve Board (Wooten 2004, 86).  Treasury officials sought to use the committee to 
create rules that forced pension plans to cover more low and moderate income workers and 
provide them with more generous pensions to qualify for the generous tax deduction.81  
Minimum vesting standards appealed to the committee’s sense of fairness because participants 
                                                            
80 The report was the result of a $1.5 million project by this organization.  Although President Kennedy favored the 
report and a summary of it was read into the Congressional Record by a New York congressman, it was not 
produced by the government.  “More on the Money-Credit Report.”  Research Reports.  September 18, 1961.  
American Institute for Economic Research.  Great Barrington, Mass.  Accessed March 20, 2013, 
http://www.aier.org/sites/default/files/publications/RR19610918.pdf.   
 
81 Forcing employers to cover non-salaried workers, providing for quicker coverage under pension plans and 
speedier vesting of benefits (vesting at the time did not have to occur before an employee was eligible to retire under 
the pension plan), and capping pension contributions on behalf of any particular individual would allow Treasury to 





promised a pension were frequently denied one as a result of lengthy vesting provisions (93).  
Similarly, the President’s Committee recommended new minimum funding standards that 
required pension plans to fund at least all benefits accrued during the year and amortize new 
benefits for past service within a period not to exceed 25 years.82  This helped allay the default 
risk that resulted when a plan terminated with insufficient funds to pay promised benefits (94-
96).   
 
But the President’s Committee skirted the issue of reforming fiduciary rules.  Although the 
report by the Commission on Money and Credit had fiduciary obligations as its focus for pension 
reform, the committee worried about appearing to target unions given the recent investigations.  
The committee even considered more lax fiduciary standards so that pension plans could be 
“flexible” when investing pension funds (Sass 1997, 198-99).    Investments were governed by 
state common law of trusts (as discussed above), the prohibited-transaction rules of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and the Disclosure Act.  Treasury argued that state trust law was insufficient 
because many pension trust agreements permitted investments that flouted state rules and 
enforcement of fiduciary standards was forgiving (Wooten 2004, 97-99).  In the end, the 
President’s Committee recommended only stricter self-dealing provisions in the tax code but no 
new fiduciary regulations otherwise.  Focusing on enforcement problems instead, the committee 
called for more disclosure of specific investments (99).   
 
                                                            
82 Collective bargaining agreements frequently negotiated benefit increases that included higher pensions for 
previously accrued, or earned, pension credits.  This sudden increase in pension liability for past service resulted in 




Initially tentative about their proposals, especially given President Kennedy’s contentious 
relationship with the business community, the President’s Committee issued an interim report in 
November 1962.  Kennedy then asked his Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy 
(“Advisory Committee”) to review it (Wooten 2004, 80, 101).  The Advisory Committee’s 
response in December 1963 (after Kennedy’s death) opposed the vesting and funding provisions 
recommended by the President’s Committee and argued that employers would not sponsor 
pension plans under these terms – hurting employees more in the long run than the current 
absence of regulation (80-81).  Unconvinced, the President’s Committee sent the report to 
President Johnson with only minor changes.  The controversial report languished until after the 
election despite the urging of Labor Secretary and President’s Committee Chair Willard Wirtz, 
and when the President released the report in January 1965, he did not support its suggestions 
(81).  Yet the committee’s final report, issued in January 1965, “became ‘the ‘bible’ in this field” 
(quoted in Wooten 2004, 80).83   
 
In the January 1965 report (“Wirtz Report”),84 the committee argued that agency risk for 
retirement funds was not an issue of a lack of “appropriate standards of prudence” but instead 
was a lack of proper enforcement mechanisms for the current fiduciary standards already 
established by trust law (73-74).  The committee emphasized the importance of disclosure, 
arguing that no one could seek to correct injuries done to plan participants if they were unaware 
                                                            
83 Another event increasing calls for pension reform around this time was the 1964 publication of The Future of 
Private Pensions by Merton Bernstein, which thoroughly catalogued the failures of private pensions to provide 
reliable retirement income to workers and recommended the expansion of Social Security (Gordon 1984, 8-9). 
 
84 President’s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs.  1965.  
Public Policy and Private Pension Programs: A Report to the President on Private Employee Retirement Plans.  




of those injuries.  The report called for amendments to the Disclosure Act to disclose plan 
investments in greater detail but recognized that “[d]isclosure is not necessarily sufficient in 
itself” (78).  Although recommending only further study of proper enforcement mechanisms, the 
committee did state that “it might be necessary to empower a regulatory agency to act as 
guardian for the collective interests of employees and their beneficiaries and, if necessary, to 
bring suit in [sic] behalf of the plan participants” (78-79).       
 
In August 1965, President Johnson created the Task Force on Labor and Related Legislation 
(“Task Force”) with Willard Wirtz as chair to craft legislative suggestions based on the 
committee’s report (Wooten 2004, 117).  The White House Task Force proposed broad 
legislative action, including on fiduciary protections (119).  One explanation for the sudden push 
for tighter fiduciary rules in spite of the committee’s refusal to address that topic in depth was 
the return of Senator McClellan to the scene with the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations under the auspices of the Government Operations Committee.  McClellan’s 
investigation into the actions of union officials administering pension plans demonstrated the 
inability of disclosure to sufficiently protect pension participants from fiduciary abuses (Gordon 
1984, 10-11).85  When the President’s Committee met again in April 1966, now with 
representatives from the Commerce and Justice Departments to take account of business 
                                                            
85 McClellan investigated the Allied Trade Council and Local 815 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
New Jersey unions.  His investigation found that George Barash, founder of the two unions, created a consulting 
organization that charged the pension funds excessive fees.  Barash then attempted to transfer millions from the 





opposition, Senator McClellan’s efforts resulted in immediate pressure to address fiduciary and 
disclosure rules (Wooten 2004, 120-21).86   
 
An interagency group of staffers assigned to move pension reform legislation forward addressed 
fiduciary obligations first.  The staffers used Senator McClellan’s bill (proposed in October 1965 
and crafted with the help of the Labor Department) as a model.  That bill employed the common 
law of trusts to codify fiduciary standards by amending the Disclosure Act, calling for fiduciaries 
to act “for the sole and exclusive” purpose of providing pensions to participants and to prevent 
conflicts of interest.  Individuals convicted of crimes could not be fiduciaries.  To enforce its 
mandates, the McClellan bill allowed participants and the Labor Department to sue to enforce 
rights and recover money, and it also created criminal sanctions for intentional violations of 
fiduciary obligations (Gordon 1984, 11; Wooten 2004, 121-22).  “This bill became the 
forerunner of the fiduciary provisions that ultimately were enacted in ERISA, even though it did 
not represent official policy of the Johnson administration at the time of its introduction” 
(Gordon 1984, 11).  Wirtz circulated a draft bill in August 1966 that cut back cumbersome 
agency oversight of individual plan actions and deleted some criminal sanctions but incorporated 
the basic idea that pension plans are trusts and administrators must adhere to specified fiduciary 
standards (Wooten 2004, 122-23).     
 
                                                            
86 Distraught that the abuses discovered by McClellan were not adequately dealt with by present laws, Senator Jacob 
Javits on the Government Operations Committee quickly introduced legislation to amend the Taft-Hartley Act to 
tighten fiduciary obligations for union-negotiated pension plans.  Participants and the Secretary of Labor would have 
enforcement rights in the federal courts.  The Labor Department worried about placing too much emphasis on 





After approval by the President’s Committee, Johnson submitted the Welfare and Pension 
Protection Act of 1967 to Congress.  The legislation was introduced by Ralph Yarborough (D, 
Tex), chair of the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee 
(Wooten 2004, 127-28).  Emphasizing the administration’s focus on fiduciary issues, 
Yarborough stated on the occasion: 
In order to assure ordinary care and prudence in handling the 
welfare and pension funds, persons managing the funds must be 
responsible as fiduciaries to the funds and the participants and their 
beneficiaries.  While the tax-exempt status of a fund may presently 
be lost by the trustees making prohibited transactions, no penalty 
either criminal or civil is imposed on the trustees. 
 
The extremely rapid growth of welfare and pension plans, coupled 
with uncertainty about the rights of the employees participating in 
them, have afforded opportunities for abuse.  Legal protection 
against such abuse has been dependent on State laws.  However, 
under many of these laws the extent to which persons handling 
such funds are bound by the responsibilities and standards of 
‘trustees’ is uncertain. . . .  
 
(quoted in Gordon 1984, 11, citing 113 Cong. Rec. 3924 (Feb. 20, 1967)).   
 
Javits Pushes Reform Ahead 
 
Stepping out front in the movement for pension reform, on February 28, 1967, Jacob Javits 
proposed the first comprehensive pension reform bill.  The Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 
1967 (S. 1103) included not just fiduciary standards and disclosure but also vesting, funding, and 
termination insurance that would protect participants from default risk (Gordon 1984, 12; 
Wooten 2004, 127, 129).  Javits was the highest ranked Republican on the Senate Committee on 




private pension system was deceptive, unsafe, and unjust” (Javits 1981, 378; Wooten 2004, 129).  
One important component of Javits’ bill was a commission that would monitor compliance with 
the legislation and monitor employee benefit plans more generally.  The bill would place its 
mandates within the labor laws and was therefore referred to the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare.  This was a sharp change from previous proposals and allowed Javits to avoid the rules 
requiring tax legislation to begin in the House of Representatives that empowered the House 
Ways and Means Committee (Wooten 2004, 130-31).87   
 
On January 11, 1968, the President’s Committee pushed Johnson for comprehensive pension 
reform after finally finishing its work, with neither big business nor unions firmly on board.  The 
key change to the committee’s recommendations was to put vesting, funding, and termination 
insurance within the purview of the labor laws instead of the tax code as Javits had done.  This 
would allow less busy congressional labor committees to take up the legislation and avoid the 
chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, who opposed pension legislation 
(Wooten 2004, 144-45).   
 
Fearful of business and union opposition, Johnson delayed.  Congress continued to push pension 
reform, however.  John Dent (D, Penn.), chair of the House General Labor Subcommittee and a 
representative of many Pennsylvania steelworkers, scheduled hearings on the administration’s 
fiduciary and disclosure legislation (which later died when Congress adjourned) and the bills by 
Javits and Senator Hartke (a Democratic Senator from Indiana, where the Studebaker pension 
                                                            
87 Javits’ comprehensive 1967 bill owed much to legislation in Ontario, Canada, that covered funding, vesting, and 




plan defaulted, who proposed termination insurance) (Wooten 2004, 145).  President Johnson 
remained cautious, though, and he had Willard Wirtz send the Pension Benefit Security Act (S. 
3421) to Congress on behalf of the Labor Department only (although many viewed it as an 
administration bill and business groups were outraged that they were not consulted).       
 
Richard Nixon’s election brought a more pro-business administration in 1969, and the impetus 
behind pension legislation came from Congress (Wooten 2004, 150).  In congressional hearings 
in 1968, members of the business community continued to oppose vesting and funding changes, 
termination insurance, and portability proposals, but they were more flexible on fiduciary 
standards and increased disclosure (152).  In September 1968, the House Education and Labor 
Committee reported a fiduciary and disclosure bill that compromised with the desires of big 
business.  Suddenly, reforms in this area seemed less threatening.  As Robert Lane of Mobil Oil 
stated in a letter to Commerce, “[M]ost of the shortcomings and problems which the Labor 
Department and some of our congressional friends have focused on are due substantially to a 
lack of understanding on the part of employees, and many times on the part of employers and 
unions, of the exact nature of the benefits and the conditions under which they can be paid under 
private welfare and pension plans” (quoted in Wooten 2004, 153-54).   
 
The Nixon administration thus focused on disclosure and sent the Employee Benefits Protection 
Act of 1970 to Congress on March 13, 1970 with labor jurisdiction as continued congressional 
hearings made the issue of pension reform popular (Wooten 2004, 155).  Widely publicized 




disclosure, however.  The shutdown of the Studebaker auto plant in South Bend, Indiana was the 
“focusing event” needed to bring about the passage of ERISA, with the large number of 
forfeitures helping to publicize shortcomings in pension promises made to employees (Wooten 
2001).88  Indeed, Javits himself called the Studebaker episode, where roughly 4500 workers lost 
the vast majority of their pension benefits, “[t]he most notorious and tragic examples of pension 
failure” (Javits 1981, 379).89   
 
Nevertheless, it took a publicity campaign by Javits to push legislators into action.  As the media 
publicized stories of pensions promised and lost after many years of hard work, leaving workers 
in dire straits, pressure for reform mounted.  In March 1971, Javits and Senate Labor 
Subcommittee Chairman Harrison Williams (D, N.J.) held sensational hearings (Wooten 2004, 
150-51).  “By packaging pension reform as comprehensive legislation, reformers could link 
‘sexy’ issues like fiduciary standards to measures like vesting and funding standards, which drew 
considerable opposition but not much support” (158).  Williams investigated United Mine 
Workers President Anthony Boyle’s abuse of his position as trustee for the union’s benefit fund 
                                                            
88 As noted above, the importance of time in the development of the welfare state, including the concepts of critical 
junctures and path dependence is discussed extensively by Hacker (2002), drawing on Pierson (2000a, 2000b).  
Lieberman (2002) adds the importance of examining ideas at these key moments in time to examine political change 
such as the enactment of ERISA.  Explaining ideational change, in combination with examining institutions, helps 
explain policy change. 
 
89 The explanation for how so many lost their promised pension benefits when Studebaker’s business declined is the 
underfunding of its pension plans.  Large firms like GM, Ford, and Chrysler (and the smaller firms like Studebaker 
that followed their lead) used pension underfunding to prevent labor unrest.  Unions recognized that significant 
benefit or wage increases had to be balanced against pension funding.  Any risk to the business interests of the 
company could bring about the collapse of the pension plan, and therefore pension funding was a bargaining chip 
(Sass 1997, 186).  IRS rules required vesting upon plan termination, but vesting was irrelevant without proper 
funding to pay for vested benefits (Sass 1997, 184-85).  Because regular benefit increases for past service were 
amortized over thirty years but retirees had first claim to benefits in the event of termination, unfunded benefit 






as well as pension funds more generally.90  As Gordon said, “[F]iduciary abuses . . . are 
relatively easy to grasp and lend themselves to graphic portrayal” (quoted in Wooten 2004, 158-
59).  Agency risk caught the public’s attention because it was easier to understand than forfeiture 
and default risks (Wooten 2004, 159).   
 
Javits and Williams also used dire statistics warning that few received their promised pensions to 
grab public attention.  Javits’ staff, including Michael Gordon (previously of the Labor 
Department) created a questionnaire on pension plans to gather information.  Williams’ 
subcommittee sent the questionnaire to 1500 pension plans in May 1970 (Wooten 2004, 159).  
Javits and Williams went public with the results of the questionnaire in March 1971, and the 
press publicized their questionable statistics indicating that most employees failed to receive 
their promised pensions (Wooten 2004, 161-67).  “The study found that in the sample of plans 
studied, which had lengthy service requirements, only 5 percent of the millions of employees 
covered since 1950 had ever received benefits, only 8 percent had qualified for benefits, and 
while most of these employees had only worked a very short period of time (less than 5 years), 
there were substantial numbers of workers who had longer periods of service and failed to 
qualify for benefits” (Gordon 1984, 15).     
 
The public attention brought President Nixon back into the arena of pension reform.  
Administration proposals in December 1970, however, focused on a vesting provision that 
                                                            
90 Javits and Williams used the circumstances surrounding the murder of Joseph Yablonski, Sr., unsuccessful 
candidate for the presidency of the UMWA to investigate President W.A. Boyle’s misuse of pension funds in 
connection with the union election.  Javits and Williams pushed for the Labor Subcommittee’s authority to include a 
broader investigation of pension funds, and they used this as a springboard for their very public pension campaign 




helped only older workers with at least a combined 50 years of age and service -- a small 
percentage of those who forfeited pension credit before vesting – and individual retirement 
accounts (IRAs).  The press protested that the proposals did little to ensure that pension promises 
were kept (Wooten 2004, 176).   
 
The Senate Labor Subcommittee worked hard next to draft legislation.  Its draft bill, finalized in 
February 1972, courted the AFL-CIO (still not on board with broad pension reform) by giving 
jurisdiction over plan compliance to an “independent agency . . . housed at the Department of 
Labor” (quoted in Wooten 2004, 178).  The AFL-CIO was dissatisfied, however, and did not 
want an agency supervising union actions, particularly if it was independent of the traditionally 
favorable Labor Department.  As staffers negotiated, the subcommittee continued to draw 
attention to the need for pension reform.  On May 1, it held hearings on plan terminations, 
traveling to cities around the country to hear stories with the press following (Wooten 2004, 178-
79).   
 
The House also focused on pension reform.  On May 8, John Dent’s subcommittee released an 
interim report, and the Ways and Means Committee focused on IRA legislation.  Although 
business representatives were feeling the public pressure for reform and coming around to the 
administration’s proposed vesting rule, opposition in the House required action in the Senate 





On May 11, 1972, Williams and Javits introduced the Retirement Income Security for 
Employees Act, S. 3598.  The new bill placed jurisdiction for pensions within the Labor 
Department instead of an independent body and attempted to address the needs of multiemployer 
plans.  Javits and Williams now settled down to the task of negotiating legislation instead of 
public rhetoric.  Ralph Nader’s decision to take up the pension cause for the left allowed the 
Senators to move to the center and appear ready for reasonable compromise (Wooten 2004, 180-
81).91  On September 13, the day after NBC broadcast “Pensions: The Broken Promise”, the 
subcommittee reported the bill with amendments that included shortened transition periods.  On 
September 15, the committee reported the bill with few changes (183-84).   
 
With administrative backing, however, Senate Finance Committee Chair Russell Long took up 
the jurisdictional fight.  The bill was referred to the Finance Committee, and Long prepared to 
delete all but the fiduciary and disclosure provisions before reporting the bill.  Although Javits 
and the press decried Long’s action, the bill died as the legislative session closed.  Long 
responded that the stricken provisions dealt with matters traditionally within the jurisdiction of 
the tax committees and needed to start in the House Ways and Means Committee (Wooten 2004, 
186-87).92  The public reacted swiftly and sent letters to Congress to express their outrage over 
                                                            
91 Ralph Nader’s plan, modeled after TIAA-CREF retirement plans for professors, advocated turning all pension 
plans into SEC-licensed mutual funds that invested contributions and provided retirement annuities to retirees, 
allowing for immediate vesting and portability.  Nader said the bill proposed by Williams and Javits, on the other 
hand, was merely the result of a “curious pension coalition of industry and organized labor” (quoted in Gordon 
1984, 21).  
 
92 Javits, however, argued that the jurisdiction issues were simply an excuse because Long favored employers and 
his brand of “populism demanded that government, rather than private pension plans, assume prime responsibility 
for retirement.”  Indignant, Javits spoke on the floor of the Senate, saying, “It will take a magician to demonstrate 




Long’s actions.  “[A] broad consensus had formed behind the comprehensive reforms adopted by 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare” (Gordon 1984, 24).   
 
Legislation Finally Gains Momentum 
 
Moving quickly on its legislative priorities in 1973, the Democratic leadership in Congress 
attempted to control wayward committee members like Long (Wooten 2004, 192).  Williams and 
Javits immediately introduced S. 4, which was identical to S. 3598 as reported by the Labor 
Committee the previous year.  Javits discussed the connection between Congress’ institutional 
competence and its need to pass pension reform.  Williams held brief hearings starting on 
February 15, and he and Javits had fifty consponsors for the bill.  The subcommittee reported the 
bill on March 5.   
 
Knowing that he had to act quickly or labor jurisdiction of pension reform would go forward 
without his input, Senator Long established a Subcommittee on Private Pension Plans and named 
as chair a sponsor of S. 4 and Labor Committee member.  On March 13, Lloyd Bentsen 
introduced the Finance Committee’s own draft bill, S. 1179, and accepted the idea of tighter 
vesting and funding standards as well as termination insurance (Wooten 2004, 194).  The 
Finance Committee bill placed these provisions within the Internal Revenue Code as 
requirements for tax qualification of pension plans.  The bill did not address disclosure, which 
the committee left to the Labor Committee (196). 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
happened is not unusual.  It has happened before in American history, where a rather myopic point of view on what 





In the House, John Dent introduced two bills and planned hearings.  The divide among unions 
about pension legislation put Dent in a bad position, though.  Ways and Means Committee Chair 
Wilbur Mills held hearings on tax reform, including pension issues, but pension reform was not 
at the top of his committee’s agenda (Wooten 2004, 196-97).   
 
The Senate also dawdled as jurisdictional conflicts continued.  On May 21, the Senate Finance 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Private Pensions began hearings.  Areas of conflict involved 
termination insurance and which agency would have oversight.  Concerns focused on expertise 
and whether tax penalties or a court order after a lawsuit by the Labor Department would be 
more effective to enforce the legislation (Wooten 2004, 201-02).   
 
As the federal government wrangled over details, the states took up pension reform.  Wisconsin, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania 
considered measures, and New Jersey enacted the Private Nonvested Pension Benefits Protection 
Tax Act.  When a plant closed, the statute taxed an employer in the amount of pension accruals 
forfeited by unvested employees with at least fifteen years of service.  However, this did not 
solve the problem of forfeitures since the plans lacked funding and still might not be able to pay 
vested participants their benefits.  The potential for a patchwork of different state regulations of 
pension plans finally brought business to support federal regulation.93  Yet it appeared that the 
                                                            
93 According to Wooten (2006, 1-2), “The desire for federal preemption was a key factor—perhaps, the key factor—
in creating the coalition that pushed ERISA through Congress.”  The desire to avoid the involvement of the states in 




Finance Committee’s proposals as part of the tax code would not preempt state regulation, and – 
in an ironic twist – only the Labor Committee could help the business community (Wooten 2004, 
204-05).   
   
After the Senate Finance Committee agreed to general principles in executive session, it moved 
to draft a revised bill, and consideration of the Labor Committee’s S. 4 on the floor was 
postponed until September.  Finance agreed to substantially similar proposals on participation, 
vesting, and funding, but placed jurisdiction over termination insurance in a new body 
administered by Labor, Treasury, and Commerce (Wooten 2004, 206).  In addition, the Finance 
Committee sought to keep jurisdiction over fiduciary self-dealing in the tax domain with an 
excise tax.  Reporting S. 1179 presented again the issue that revenue measures had to originate in 
the House, and it was proposed that the pension bill be attached to H.R. 4200, a two page bill on 
military pensions.  But which bill to attach?  If compromise meant revisions to the Finance bill, 
the Finance Committee would choose representatives for the conference committee, and Javits 
and Williams would lose control of the legislation.  Regardless, any bill attached to H.R. 4200 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
passed in New Jersey in May 1973 was of particular concern.  Drafted in response to the closure of the Raybestos-
Manhattan Company plant in Passaic, New Jersey, the bill taxed companies closing factories and used that tax to 
pay pension benefits to those who worked long years but had not yet vested in their pensions prior to the shutdown.  
“Cahill Signs Pension-Safety Bill For Those Whose Plants Close,” New York Times, May 11, 1973, 84.  The tax 
was:  
 
equal to the total amount of nonvested pension benefits of such employees of the 
employer who have completed 15 years of covered service under the pension 
plan of the employer and whose employment was or will be terminated because 
of the employer’s ceasing to operate a place of employment within this State and 
whose nonvested pension benefits have been or will be forfeited because of such 
termination of employment . . . 
 
“The Private Nonvested Pension Benefits Protection Tax Act.”  Sec. 3, Ch. 124, Laws of 1973.  Approved May 9, 
1973.  Although even Governor Cahill recognized that private pension reform was “a subject which can best be 
treated properly at the Federal level,” he “intend[ed] to do all within my power to help solve this perplexing 




would head to Wilbur Mills and the Ways and Means Committee – and an uncertain fate (207-
09).   
 
On August 21, 1973, the Senate Finance Committee reported S. 1179, a 240-page bill.  On 
September 18, the Senate committees had reached a compromise.  Gaylord Nelson, head of the 
Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Private Pensions and also a member of the Labor 
Committee proposed two amendments – amendment 496 on vesting, funding, fiduciary 
obligations, portability, termination insurance, and enforcement and amendment 497 on tax 
issues not discussed in the Labor bill.  Vesting and funding were placed in the tax code, but 
insurance would be under the Department of Labor in a body called the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation.  The amendment gave the Department of Labor enforcement authority in 
spite of dual codification in Treasury and Labor (Wooten 2004, 212-13).  To enforce fiduciary 
rules on self-dealing, the IRS could use excise taxes and the Labor Department could pursue the 
fiduciaries in court.  After years of reform efforts, Senators debated only for two days on the 
compromise.  It was then passed unanimously as a 300-page addition to revenue bill H.R. 4200.     
 
The action then shifted to the House.  Under the House rules, H.R. 4200 had to be referred back 
to the Ways and Means Committee.  Worried about losing labor jurisdiction, Dent’s 
subcommittee revised and reported H.R. 2 on September 20, only one day after the Senate passed 
H.R. 4200.  On October 2, the Education and Labor Committee reported H.R. 2.  Among other 
differences between H.R. 2 and H.R. 4200, H.R. 2 gave jurisdiction to the Labor Department 





Bogged down in trade legislation and with Wilbur Mills absent for health reasons, Ways and 
Means under Chairman Al Ullman (D, Ore.) nevertheless moved quickly to pass pension reform 
in the war for jurisdiction in the House.  Ullman asked for written comments instead of holding 
hearings and planned for executive sessions.  Although House rules allowed committees to 
combine two bills on the floor, Ullman delayed any compromise and instead went to work on a 
bill identical to H.R. 4200 without the military pensions, while the Speaker held H.R. 4200.  
Congressmen criticized the quick schedule on such a lengthy and complicated bill (Wooten 
2004, 223-25).  Although Ullman signaled areas of compromise, the Labor Committee pushed to 
send H.R. 2 to the floor before Ways and Means finished its work, and tempers flared. 
 
As Ways and Means worked on a bill, the House postponed working on H.R. 2 until December 
and then until January 1974 when the fight over jurisdiction continued (Wooten 2004, 227-28, 
231).  Finally, after the AFL-CIO agreed to joint tax and labor jurisdiction over participation, 
vesting, and funding standards, Dent and Ullman reached a deal that gave both Treasury and 
Labor enforcement powers (232-33).   
 
On February 4, 1974, Ullman introduced the Ways and Means bill, and on February 14, 1974, 
Dent introduced a new bill that tracked the Ways and Means bill more closely.  Dent’s new bill 
included sweeping language to preempt states from regulating employee benefit plans and 
termination insurance (Wooten 2004, 234).  Under the rule created, the Labor Committee’s bill 




(237).  H.R. 2 passed 376 to 4, and the Senate substituted its previously passed bill, H.R. 4200, 
for H.R. 2 as the legislation moved to conference (240). 
 
Amidst the fallout from the Watergate scandal, the conference committee set to work creating 
legislation from two bills that reached nearly 650 pages with members of four committees bitter 
after the long fight to reach this point (Wooten 2004, 242).  In fact, the House would only allow 
its labor conferees to address topics in Title I of its H.R. 2 and Ways and Means conferees to 
address topics in Title II of its version of H.R. 2 – attempting to force Senate conferees to the 
House model (243).  As the work of committee staffers proceeded into May without any official 
committee meetings, House Labor Committee staff Russell Mueller explained the problem this 
way:  “[T] he House’s objectives were to set up minimum standards to make pension reform 
technically sound, while the Senate wanted to draft ‘the perfect plan’ for everyone” (quoted in 
Wooten 2004, 245).   
 
On May 15, the conference committee had its first official meeting (Wooten 2004, 246).  During 
nineteen meetings, the committee settled all major differences (249).  The Labor Department and 
IRS would have joint jurisdiction over many aspects of participation, vesting, and funding, 
including the prohibited transaction rules (250-51).  The main difference between the House and 
Senate bills on fiduciary standards related to the definition of “fiduciary.”  The House definition 
included not only those who managed plan assets but anyone who had discretionary authority 
over plan administration.  The staffers recommended the broader House definition, and the 





After a dramatic expansion of the proposed preemption clause left states with the inability to 
pass laws that even “relate to” employee benefit plans, the committee and staff’s work was 
nearing an end (Wooten 2004, 265, 267).  The House passed the revised legislation unanimously 
on August 20, 1974, and the Senate followed on August 22 (269).  At the behest of Senator 
Javits, President Ford signed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act on Labor Day, 
September 2, 1974 (269-70). 
 
At the time of ERISA’s enactment, “there was great uncertainty about how the legislation would 
play out in practice” (Wooten 2004, 242).  Or, as one newspaper article stated prior to passage, 
the legislation “is not as good as it could be and should be.  But it is probably the best piece of 
legislation that can, as a practical matter, be enacted now.”94  After years of opposition by big 
business and unions, the passage of any legislation was miraculous, but that legislation was a 
compromise.  ERISA attempted to balance security for workers with freedom for employers to 
decide the terms of compensation – including pension benefits – for their employees.95  Even the 
legislators who enacted ERISA recognized its limitations.  Immediately following enactment, 
Senator Javits stated, “Congress has made an auspicious beginning with the enactment of the 
pension reform bill but there still remains a great deal to do if we are to promote a more 
                                                            
94 “Pension Bill Can Be Improved—Later,” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1974, B6 (“Ralph Nader, for one, has called 
the final version a ‘terrible disappointment.’”).  Commentators criticized the legislation for succumbing to pressure 
from both business and labor and not mandating more stringent protections of workers, such as stricter vesting terms 
and funding of past service liabilities. 
 
95 As Michael Gordon (1984, 23) said, “In short, the bill . . . represented middle-of-the-road reforms, doing just what 





satisfactory private retirement system—one that will enable every American, after his or her 
productive years, to look forward to a retirement with freedom from anxiety and economic want 
(Gordon 1984, 25).96  In the end, Congress delegated significant discretion over private pensions 
to employers and their representatives and relied on ERISA’s fiduciary standards and judicial 
enforcement of those standards to reign in the inevitable slippage between its pension reform 
goals and the behavior of these private actors.   
 
ERISA’s Fiduciary Rules 
 
ERISA requires every covered plan to “provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or 
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the 
plan.”97  In addition, ERISA states: 
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he 
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he 
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct 
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such 
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has 
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan. . . .98   
                                                            
96 Quoting from Address by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Briefing Conference on Pension and Employee Benefits, New 
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University and Federal Bar Association, Washington 
DC (Sept. 19, 1974). 
 
97 ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 
98 ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  As the conference committee explained, “Under this definition, 
fiduciaries include officers and directors of a plan, members of a plan’s investment committee and persons who 
select these individuals.  Consequently, the definition includes persons who have authority and responsibility with 
respect to the matter in question, regardless of their formal title.  The term ‘fiduciary’ also includes any person who 
renders investment advice for a fee and includes persons to whom ‘discretionary’ duties have been delegated by 





Fiduciaries are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties, which provide that: 
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—(A) for the 
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and 
their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims; (C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it 
is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in accordance with the 
documents and instruments governing the plan . . .99 
 
ERISA’s test of who is a fiduciary is a “functional” one – the work done for a plan by the person 
determines whether he or she is a fiduciary rather than the title or lack of title assigned to the 
party.  An example given by the Department of Labor is illustrative.  A plan may employ a 
person as a “benefit supervisor.”  If that benefit supervisor only calculates how large of a benefit 
to pay a participant based on the formulas set forth in plan documents and a superior has final 
authorization to confirm the benefit, then the benefit supervisor is not a fiduciary.  If the person 
with the title “benefit supervisor” instead has final approval to determine the benefit amount of a 
participant when there is a disagreement as to how much the participant is entitled to under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisers to employee benefit plans (other than investment 
advisers) may not be considered as fiduciary functions, it must be recognized that there will be situations where such 
consultants and advisers may because of their special expertise, in effect, be exercising discretionary authority or 
control with respect to the management or administration of such plan or some authority or control regarding its 
assets.  In such cases, they are to be regarded as having assumed fiduciary obligations within the meaning of the 
applicable definition.”  Highlights of the New Pension Reform Law, Text of Joint Explanatory Statement of 
Conference Committee, at 124-25 (1974). 
 





plan documents, the person is a fiduciary.100  Courts have found a member of a company’s board 
of directors and insurance agents with authority to amend plan documents or manage fund 
investments to be fiduciaries (Sacher 2000, 625-26).101  Persons who merely perform 
administrative functions for the pension plan and have no discretion regarding management of 
the plan are not fiduciaries.102 
 
ERISA’s broad definition of fiduciary allows for the “fractionalization of trusteeship” (Langbein, 
Stabile, and Wolk 2006, 516).  While the commonly accepted definition of “trustee” is “the 
person holding property in trust,” reflecting the notion of one person or entity managing the trust, 
ERISA’s more complex definition allows management of the pension trust to be dispersed to 
numerous individuals and entities.  With the vast sums of money involved in large pension plans, 
they frequently outsource management to the actuaries, consultants, or insurance companies who 
design the plan; several financial services companies who manage the investment of plan funds; 
a bank who safeguards the funds; third party administrators who decide claims and make 
payments; and lawyers, accountants, and actuaries who handle other daily administrative needs 
of the plan (Langbein Stabile, and Wolk 2006, 516-17).  Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk’s well-
known pension law text book explains that “[b]y defining fiduciary status so broadly, ERISA 
                                                            
100 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-3 Q. 
 
101 Citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993):  “ERISA, however, defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms 
of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan.”  See also Langbein, Stabile, 
and Wolk (2006, 511). 
 
102 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2 Q (explaining that “a person who performs purely ministerial functions such as the 
types described above for an employee benefit plan [which include determining eligibility to participate in the plan, 
calculating benefits, and making recommendations to others regarding plan administration] within a framework of 




allows plan designers to have considerable flexibility in allocating plan functions, while still 
preserving the protective principle that persons exercising material discretion must be 
responsible as fiduciaries for their conduct” (2006, 511). 
 
To enforce ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, Congress authorized both criminal and civil penalties.  
The statute provides for civil action by both plan participants and beneficiaries or the Secretary 
of Labor.  ERISA created a private right of action as follows: 
A civil action may be brought – (1) by a participant or beneficiary 
– . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. . . . (3) by a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
(i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan.103 
 
This private litigation remedy was another protection of participants’ rights through a review of 
fiduciary actions in the federal courts. 
 
Of course these fiduciary protections would not have been necessary without Congress’ act of 
delegation to private actors.  In Chapter 3, now that the reader understands the course of pension 
regulation and reform, I will focus more narrowly on Congress’ basic decision to delegate to 








                                                                                                                                                                                    
CHAPTER 3 
THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY:   
DECISION TO DELEGATE TO PRIVATE ACTORS 
 
After addressing above how Congress delegated to private fiduciaries under ERISA, questions 
remain about who those fiduciaries are and why Congress was willing to give them extensive 
power.  Regardless of the private fiduciary’s previous de facto dominance and control over 
employee pensions, with ERISA Congress formally recognized and approved of the fiduciary’s 
power over private pensions.104  This legislative anointment is the focus of my dissertation, and 
there is great import to Congress’ formal approval of private fiduciaries – even if Congress at the 
same time enacted protections to control the behavior of fiduciaries and monitor their 
compliance with fiduciary duties.  
 
Employers had not only inertia on their side when pressuring Congress to delegate power to 
private actors but also great expertise acquired over decades in the complex field of pension 
management.  Executives and consultants understood not only the details of accrual, vesting, and 
funding, but also the idiosyncrasies of private plans amended regularly in response to a changing 
economy and worker demands.  Unless Congress intended to demand uniformity and simplify 
private plans, it would be difficult for the government to more closely supervise such diverse 
plan terms.  Reformers were unable to authorize the resources necessary to compete with the 
insider knowledge and substantial apparatuses already built by employers.  
                                                            




Who Administers Pension Plans 
 
Employers have relied on third parties to administer pension plans since their inception.  Many 
early pension plans were administered by insurance companies.  Because pension plans managed 
by insurance companies held up well during the Great Depression, insurance companies saw 
their market share of total pension coverage rise from 3.6 percent in 1930 to 16.3 percent in 
1940, encompassing 700,000 plan participants (Sass 1997, 146).  This growing business was less 
profitable than expected, however, due to lower than expected mortality and interest rates.  
Insurance companies, therefore, curtailed new business just as the tax increases of World War II 
increased the demand for private pensions (147).   
 
After the war, interest rates rose and once again made group annuity pension plans profitable, but 
other players had arrived.  The insurance carriers managed to repeal the tax on pension 
investments made by insurance companies instead of trust companies by 1961 (Sass 1997, 162-
63).  However, “[t]he inability to invest in equities thus came to be a central barrier to insurance 
company success in the pension field” because they could not offer sufficient rates of return on 
employer funds (166).  By January 1963, insurance companies gained the right to create separate 
pension accounts that invested in equities and were now able to compete with trust companies 
(167), but insurance companies had lost their dominance and insured less than ten percent of 





Changing risk preferences and economic conditions directed pension plans away from insurance 
companies as more plans self-insured.  With basic retirement pay guaranteed by Social Security, 
participants were willing to tolerate more risk in their supplemental private pension plans (Sass 
1997, 150-51).  The additional cost of pension insurance and its inability to adjust to changed 
economic circumstances, such as increasing interest rates and thus inflation, also pushed 
employers away from insurers and towards the stock market.  Nor did annuity contracts allow 
employers to alter their pension funding obligations depending on tax provisions or the 
company’s cash flow needs (151-53).  Finally, the Revenue Act of 1942 eliminated the 
advantage insurers had by no longer allowing companies to deduct the full cost of insurance 
premiums.   
 
Most large corporations were already administering their own pension plans in trust form during 
the Depression and World War I.  They were helped by, at a minimum, an actuary, a bank 
trustee, and often an investment advisor.  During the war, banks aggressively grew their pension 
business, advertising record-keeping and plan payment services.  Banks referred their plans to 
outside firms for plan design and actuarial consulting (Sass 1997, 154-55).105   
 
Because self-insured pension plans needed to know the price of future benefit obligations, they 
often turned to insurance brokers (who later became pension consultants).  These brokers began 
designing plans and offering actuarial services instead of merely connecting plan sponsors with 
the services of insurance companies.  Many firms that formed in this manner, such as Towers, 
                                                            
105 The availability of actuarial services was limited, however, in the middle of the century since there were few 




Perrin, Forster & Crosby, the Wyatt Company, and the Martin E. Segal Companies, are still the 
main players today (Sass 1997, 156-58).     
 
Pension consultants helped plan sponsors design pension plans to suit their needs.  They made it 
possible to direct most of the funds to the highly compensated -- adjusting benefit accruals, using 
final salary in benefit calculations, and integrating plans with Social Security.  Flexible vesting 
and funding schedules were developed as well to adjust to employers’ cash flow needs.  And 
none of these plan features needed to be actuarially sound since the federal government had yet 
to regulate the security of pension promises.  Consultants frequently fiddled with actuarial 
assumptions such as mortality rates, retirements, future wages, and interest rates to justify 
increased or decreased pension contributions desired by sponsors (Sass 1997, 160-61).  Pension 
consultants decried:  
Any course of action which leads to a stronger company, better 
able to weather occasional financial reverses, and to meet 
competition, may enhance the security of the employees as a 
whole, regardless of the current effect on the level of pension 
contributions . . .  
 
(quoted in Sass 1997, 162).   
 
By the early 1960s, most mid to large-sized companies sponsoring pensions already self-insured 
– leaving the pension industry to provide the remaining investment and actuarial services.  While 
insurance companies provided both of these services “under one roof”, trust companies and 
actuarial consultants provided only their respective services (Sass 1997, 168).  As the complexity 




(169).  Sponsors also began to prefer the “unbundling” of services to make switching investment 
managers easier and to prevent the conflict of interest that resulted when an asset manager was 
paid based on the amount of assets controlled while that same institution designed the plan and 
therefore the amount of assets it would control (171).  In addition, customized pension plans 
arose as the sizeable liabilities of pension plans were integrated more broadly into companies’ 
financial planning and senior executives instead of human resources personnel took over 
management of pension plans within the corporations (172-73).     
 
The decline of the insurance company as an integrated pension manager left employees less 
secure in their pensions at a time when pensions assumed greater importance due to increases in 
life expectancy and earlier retirements.  Prior to ERISA, the numerous and decentralized 
provision of pension services through separate actuarial and legal consultants and investment 
managers left employees far less secure, particularly if these service providers lacked 
responsibility and accountability for the plan decisions they made (Sass 1997, 177-78).    
 
Why Congress Delegated to Private Actors In Spite of Pension Scandals   
 
As discussed above, pension reform advocates like Senators Javits and Williams used salacious 
tales of misdeeds by pension managers to garner press coverage for their crusade and create 
widespread public support for pension reform – rather than focusing on the more complex and 
less attention-getting details of pension accrual, vesting, and funding rules.  After years spent 




did they approve of the delegation of such vast authority over private pensions to these same 
fiduciaries?  In truth, Javits and Williams (and other congressmen who passed ERISA) believed 
that fiduciary breaches were few and far between and that most pension plans were managed 
responsibly.  Once the momentum for pension reform had virtually ensured legislation, Javits 
and Williams were able to strike a conciliatory tone and make clear that their earlier focus on the 
harm done by fiduciaries was merely a strategy designed to provoke public outrage.  These later 
comments help explain why Congress was willing to delegate authority to these private figures 
after years of hearings and public statements regarding fiduciaries behaving badly.   
 
Although pension reform advocates discussed complex issues like accrual, vesting, funding, and 
even termination insurance, they focused on publicizing the misdeeds of fiduciaries to avoid 
discussing individual stories of woe that seemed less broadly applicable and to dramatize the 
story about private pensions by creating a villain.  Benefit forfeiture by individuals because of 
accrual and vesting rules was less appealing to the public than stories of fiduciary incompetence 
and graft that affected entire pension plans.  Accrual and vesting rules applied to all pension plan 
participants, but the harshness of their application differed depending on the number of years 
worked before the forfeiture and the age of the employee at the time of forfeiture.  Most workers 
who forfeited pension credits were young and would go on to earn pensions elsewhere, 
complicating the expectation of public outrage at tails of forfeiture.  In addition, because the 
employment history of each worker forfeiting pension credit was different and records were 





When discussing the need for fiduciary reform at hearings of the Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held in July 1968, Senator Javits “refer[red] to a 
horror case” investigated by the Government Operations Committee, Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations and asked that their report dated June 30, 1966 be included in the records of 
these hearings on pension reform.  That report examined the impropriety of George Barasch, 
founder of two New York/New Jersey unions, the Allied Trades Council (related to the AFL-
CIO) and Local 815 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.  As a lifetime trustee of the 
employee benefit funds of these unions, Barasch maintained the ability to harm plan participants 
even though he was no longer in power at the unions.  He used roughly $4 million in benefit 
funds to create “research foundations” in Puerto Rico and Liberia.  In another example of 
Barasch’s malfeasance, the primary pension plan for the two unions paid pension benefits of 
$120,030 from 1960 to 1964 but paid $338,427 in administrative expenses during this time 
period to a not-for-profit corporation run by Barasch and his brother-in-law.  Barasch and his 
associates also borrowed substantial sums from the benefit funds and offshore entities and made 
a substantial profit from investing those sums.106 
 
Jimmy Hoffa is another prime example of the ability to make pension malfeasance sensational 
and bring the public into the quest for reform.  President of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, he ran the Central and Southern States Pension Fund (CSPF) with threats of strikes if 
he did not get his way.  The result was that 75 percent of the fund’s assets were lent to 
                                                            
106 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103, S. 1255, Day 1, Before the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 167-209 (1968) (statement of 
Senator Jacob Javits).  Evidence showed that any management trustees helping to administer the benefit funds acted 
as merely a “rubber stamp” for Barasch’s actions and that employers contributing to the benefit funds were 




commercial enterprises run by friends and colleagues of Hoffa and other trustees at reduced 
rates, and some of these loans were risky.  In addition, loan fees may have been kicked back to 
Hoffa, and loan proceeds may have been used to purchase political and legal influence (Sass 
1997, 180-83).107   
 
Javits and Williams went one step further and engaged in a campaign to rally the public behind 
pension reform – even if it meant rallying the public behind the fiduciary straw man.  They 
publicized fiduciary breaches by holding hearings around the country in New York, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, and Minneapolis.  The stories they heard from those who came to discuss their own 
pension failures focused on the mundane issues of accrual and vesting.  As Javits said, “It was 
heart-rending to hear these men and women recount how they had depended on their pensions, 
had worked hard to earn a comfortable retirement, had lived for that day in many cases – only to 
find the pension snatched away almost at the last minute of the last hour, for some reason that 
most of them really did not understand” (Javits 1981, 381).  Yet the stories the Senators fed back 
to the public through the press focused on pension fund theft and unsavory pension plan 
administrators.     
 
Given the comparative scarcity of pension participants harmed by fiduciary breaches compared 
to participants who forfeited benefits due to lengthy vesting provisions, discussion of fiduciary 
                                                            
107 See Gordon (1984, fn 39); US v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 394 U.S. 310 




mismanagement is vastly overrepresented in news coverage of the time period.108  Many 
examples of the investment of pension funds in employer securities to benefit employers and not 
participants are cited.109  Other examples include conflicted decision makers110 and excessive 
management fees.111  In one case, officers of a holding company used pension funds to purchase 
stock in the holding company to prop up its value – while simultaneously selling their own stock 
in the company.  The fund eventually lost $1.6 million on the stock.112  The media also 
overemphasized the problem of fiduciary mismanagement by union officials,113 particularly 
                                                            
108 Even some newspaper articles admitted that most pension plans were being appropriately managed.  See “Urged: 
Tighter Rules on Pension Funds,” U.S. News & World Report, April 12, 1971 (“Private studies in recent years have 
indicated that most funds are soundly based and adequately financed.”); Kessler, Ronald, “Lapses by Huge Pension 
Funds Bring Huge Cries for Greater Control,” Washington Post, November 24, 1970 (“The majority of pension 
funds are run fairly and prudently.”). 
 
109 See Kessler, Ronald, “Lapses by Huge Pension Funds Bring Huge Cries for Greater Control,” Washington Post, 
Nov. 24, 1970 (“Many bankers and pension administrators believe pension funds that invest heavily in the stock of 
the fund’s own company present opportunities for conflict-of-interest and place employees in double jeopardy: if the 
company becomes bankrupt, the pension assets are worthless.”); Lardner, Jr., George, “Pension Plan Study Reveals 
Big Majority Gets No Benefits,” Washington Post, April 1, 1971 (citing examples from the Senate pension study 
initiated by Javits and Williams including a “Midwestern cable corporation with $900,000 or 5 [sic] percent of its 
$1.7 million in pension fund assets invested in securities of the company”); Strong, James, and Ronald Koziol, 
“Retirement Dreams Become Tragedies in ‘Pension Hoaxes’,” Chicago Tribune, March 21, 1971 (citing examples 
from fiduciary breaches in Labor Department records, including a Chicago trustee who invested $250,000 – 69 
percent of the pension fund’s assets – in the company’s preferred stock, an investment that declined in value to 
$13,500). 
 
110 See Lardner, Jr., George, “Pension Plan Study Reveals Big Majority Gets No Benefits,” Washington Post, April 
1, 1971 (citing examples from the Senate pension study initiated by Javits and Williams including a “major oil 
company in Oklahoma whose president is both trustee of its $62.2 million pension plan and a director of the bank 
where the funds are deposited”). 
 
111 See Shabecoff, Philip, “Pension Plan Plans Scored by Study—Panel in Study Finds Few Workers Get Any 
Benefits,” N.Y. Times, April 1, 1971 (citing examples from the Senate pension study initiated by Javits and 
Williams including a cable company in the Midwest noted above as being over-invested in employer securities 
which “also spent a third more on costs to operate the plan than it did on benefits”); “What You Should Know About 
Your Pension,” excerpt from Harvest Years, Apr. 1971 (citing example where one corporation had five trustees run 
its 16 pension and profit-sharing plans, and they were paid $300,000 in fees in addition to the $130,000 paid to an 
outside company for investments and plan administration services). 
 
112 “What You Should Know About Your Pension,” excerpt from Harvest Years, April 1971. 
 
113 Kessler, Ronald, “Lapses by Huge Pension Funds Bring Huge Cries for Greater Control,” Washington Post, 




given that only approximately seven percent of retirement plans were administered jointly by 
unions and only one percent solely by unions.114 
 
In response, the public bombarded their Congressmen with letters demanding reform.  Javits 
(1981, 381) explained that “with business groups opposed, and organized labor divided, the most 
important support came from the people and the press.  We received thousands of letters from 
victims who volunteered to testify [at upcoming hearings by the Senate Labor Committee].  In 
one two-week period in 1972 my office received twenty thousand letters of support for pension 
reform.”   
 
Without rallying the public around the broadly applicable and easy to understand issue of 
fiduciary mismanagement, there would have been no mass public support for pension reform.  
Only by stoking public outrage on this “narrow problem” could Javits and Williams insist on 
pension reform on their terms to satisfy the public.  The fact that those terms included vesting 
and funding reform was always the plan.  They needed the ammunition to insist on 
comprehensive reform and found it in the overwhelming response of the public to their publicity 
campaign. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
loans which the article claims occurs too often because “[i]t’s disloyal for a union member to question his officers 
about pension money).  In perhaps one of the best examples of sensational coverage, a newspaper article touted how 
“loose control of pension funds” resulted in murder.  Strong, James, and Ronald Koziol, “Retirement Dreams 
Become Tragedies in ‘Pension Hoaxes’,” Chicago Tribune, March 21, 1971 (“Two members of a painters’ union 
local in San Francisco, Dow Wilson and Lloyd Green, were killed by trustees to cover thefts from union pension 
funds.”). 
 
114 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103, S. 1255, Day 1, Before the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 268 (1968) (statement of 





The hearings that Javits and Williams held via the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in July and October of 1971 followed a similar path to 
their hearings around the country – listening to tales of forfeiture due to strict plan rules on 
accrual and vesting and then focusing disproportionately on tales of mismanagement, conflict of 
interest, and outright theft.  The July hearings allowed pension participants to convey their 
stories of hardship, and they focused mainly on those who lost their expected pensions through 
strict accrual and vesting rules.  In October, however, the hearings focused on pension plan 
administrators who used pension funds for their own purposes instead of acting in the best 
interests of employees.  Testimony repeatedly returned to the issue of trustees investing pension 
funds in employer securities and real estate connected to the employer’s business.115  The focus 
on conflicts of interest included a discussion regarding how overvaluation of the pension fund’s 
real estate investments allowed a company to reduce its required contributions to the fund to pay 
for pension benefits.116  When questioned whether these investments resulted in conflicts of 
interest for the pension plan trustees, some executives/trustees denied the existence of any 
conflicts.  At one point, Javits’ pension counsel, Michael Gordon, asked Robert G. Zimmerman 
of F.W. Woolworth Company, “Do you see any possible conflict of loyalty which might arise by 
virtue of the fact that the retirement committee, which consists of members of the board of 
                                                            
115 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 
1, Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 521-22 (Oct. 
1971) (questioning J. Godfrey Butler, Senior Vice President of D.C. Transit System, Inc. regarding why the 
company’s pension fund has a $2.3 million mortgage on property owned by the company).  
 
116 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 2, 
Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 707 (Oct. 1971) 
(questioning William L. Bland, Assistant Secretary at Genesco regarding the company pension fund’s investment of 




directors of the Woolworth Co., would be responsible ultimately for making a decision about 
unloading Woolworth’s properties if that necessity should ever arise?”  Mr. Zimmerman 
responded, “I don’t see any conflict at all.”117 
 
Yet examples like Hoffa were few and far between.  Most pension funds were run conservatively 
to maximize the funds available for participants (Sass 1997, 183).  In fact, the United Auto 
Workers, who negotiated the failed Studebaker pension plan, helped run the plans they 
negotiated with integrity.  They even liberalized vesting procedures in contracts with Ford and 
struck Chrysler over pension plan funding.  Studebaker thus represented more systemic issues 
with the pension system than occasional fiduciary breaches (Sass 1997, 183-84).   
 
At the 1971 Senate Labor Committee hearings, Javits himself acknowledged that the true 
problem with the pension system was not fiduciary malfeasance.  As Javits stated on July 27, 
1971: 
It would be comforting, in a way, to find that the widespread 
disappointments in the pension field are simply the products of 
fraud, theft and criminal activity, because then all we have to do to 
solve the problem is ‘catch the thieves’ – not provide for a system 
which would really deliver on the sound and highly desirable 
pension plan idea.  Not that there are no thieves in the pension 




117 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 1, Before 
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 773 (Oct. 1971). 
 
118 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 1, Before 




Continuing his efforts to move pension reform beyond fiduciary protections to pass 
comprehensive legislation, Javits added later that day: 
[T]here are all too many who believe that the inequities in the 
private pension system are caused by dishonest and corrupt 
individuals and that all that is necessary is to establish strong 
federal standards of fiduciary responsibility.  I yield to no one in 
my concern over assuring the honest, loyal and prudent 
management of welfare and pension plans, but I can guarantee to 
this Committee that the vast majority of these funds are run 
honestly and faithfully, and that enactment of fiduciary standards 
alone would barely touch on the really serious and pervasive 
deficiencies in the private pension system.119   
 
Javits even went so far as to reassure the fiduciaries questioned heatedly in October 1971 that the 
Committee was concerned with the lack of regulation of pension plans and not with painting all 
fiduciaries as unethical -- at least at this point in the process.  To Jack F. Whitaker, President of 
Whitaker Cable Company, whose pension fund invested over $1.2 million in the company’s own 
building, Javits explained: 
My only point is that, in the absence of any regulation in this field 
– this is all I am pointing out – it is possible for an employer 
contributed pension fund to buy a building of the employer himself 
for a big piece of assets of the pension fund, and I do not think this 
is desirable, in the interests of the workers or in the interests of the 
pension funds.  It does not mean that there is anything that is 
immoral or culpable about you.  I want to make that very clear.  I 
am just pointing out that this is the end result. . . . I just want you 
to understand that there is no accusation, no question of moral 
fault, or anything else.120 
                                                            
119 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 1, Before 
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 86 (July1971) (Testimony 
of Senator Javits, Ranking Republican Member of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Prepared for 
delivery to The House General Subcommittee on Labor Hearing on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation, 
Wednesday, April 28, 1971). 
 
120 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 1, Before 





Javits goes on to again repeat how there is no “moral fault” here – although the pension fund’s 
tax exempt status was revoked by the IRS and the executive was also a director of the bank that 
administered the pension plan.    
   
Senator Javits’ closing statement to the 1971 Senate Labor hearings makes clear that he was not 
looking to alter the traditional framework that allowed company executives to serve as pension 
fund trustees.  Instead, he wanted only to add regulation to constrain fiduciary actions.  Javits 
claims, “As every first year law student knows, it is a time-honored legal principal that ‘no man 
can serve two masters.’ . . . The massive use of tax-free funds set aside for employees as if they 
were an adjunct to the corporate treasury or to serve the interests of company officers is 
incompatible with a fiduciary’s obligation.  It is deplorable to assert before this committee that 
this sort of thing is in the employees’ interests because the investment is sound.”  Yet Javits 
believed that additional regulations would allow fiduciaries to no longer “serve two masters” and 
presumably think entirely of the interests of participants when making decisions for the pension 
fund.  He was “confident that this subcommittee will take the action that is necessary to see to it 




121 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, Day 2, Before 
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 878, 880 (Oct. 1971) 




Why Congress Delegated to Private Fiduciaries Instead of the Bureaucracy 
 
As discussed in my Introduction, many scholars have examined why Congress delegates 
authority at all.  Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), however, examine the question of when 
Congress decides to delegate authority to the executive branch and when it instead drafts detailed 
legislation itself and leaves little discretion for other policymakers.  Using a “transaction cost 
politics” approach, they find that legislators make policy when “political benefits” to themselves 
exceed “political costs”; where costs exceed benefits, legislators delegate.   
 
My argument here, however, is that the framework for analysis is not merely whether legislators 
make policy or delegate to the executive.122  Instead, legislators can also choose to delegate to 
private actors and use administrative procedures and the courts to supervise those actors just as 
they use those methods to supervise executive agencies.  Thus, while Congress may delegate less 
to the executive during divided government (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 135), as during 
Nixon’s second term when ERISA passed, there are competing concerns.123  Epstein and 
O’Halloran theorize that Congress will delegate more to the executive in a highly technical, 
complicated area such as pension regulation with few particularized benefits to claim credit for 
providing through legislation (230-31).  Given the competing tendencies to delegate less to the 
executive under divided government and more given the complexity of private pensions, the 
                                                            
122 Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) do include in their models the federalist concept of delegation to the states, local 
governmental entities, and the courts as a way to avoid delegating to the executive (153-54, 156-67).  This is a small 
part of their analysis, however, and their focus is on whether the locus of policymaking remains in Congress or is 
delegated to the executive branch. 
 
123 See Krent (1990) for an argument that congressional delegations outside of the federal government, which may 




question needs to be answered if this is precisely the type of situation in which legislators 
delegate more to private actors.  After all: 
Structural choices have importance consequences for the content 
and direction of policy, and political actors know it.  When they 
make choices about structure, they are implicitly making choices 
about policy.  And precisely because this is so, issues of structure 
are inevitably caught up in the larger political struggle.  Any  
notion that political actors might confine their attention to 
policymaking and turn organizational design over to neutral 
criteria or efficiency experts denies the realities of politics. 
 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 153, quoting Moe 1998, 268).   
 
When debating pension reform, Congress faced overwhelming pressure to delegate to private 
actors.  In fact, the above legislative history indicates that the only way comprehensive pension 
legislation could pass was through delegation to private actors.  Not only did congressional 
democrats (and indeed all congressmen) want to avoid giving President Nixon the type of power 
that he would gain if the bureaucracy more closely supervised private pensions and perhaps 
adjudicated any disputes regarding those pensions, but Congress had to contend with the status 
quo.   
 
Employers had spent decades running their pension plans as they saw fit.  Leaving substantial 
authority in their hands was the only way to avoid outright rebellion.  In addition, employers had 
another important advantage:  expertise.  Their accumulated experience in administering private 
pensions meant that they understood the funding, accrual, and vesting issues better than 
Congress and had the loyalty of an industry of actuaries and investment managers.  This made 




content to allow employers significant discretion, then, while at the same time attempting to 
reign in the outlandish abuses that had been well-publicized. 
 
As the next chapters evaluate enforcement of these fiduciary protections and resulting 
accountability, it is important to recognize that the design of the accountability regime for 
ERISA plan administrators incorporates not only fiduciary duties but enforcement of those duties 
by agencies and courts.  Any failure of fiduciary standards to hold employers accountable for 
supervising private pension plans then can be attributed either to the failure of fiduciary duties as 
an accountability mechanism when the government delegates to private actors or to the failure of 















THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER ERISA 
 
In 1922, Roscoe Pound wrote that “[w]ealth in a commercial age is made up largely of promises” 
(Langbein 2004, 53, quoting Pound 1922, 236).  The primary impetus behind ERISA was to 
ensure that employers honored their promises to pay pension benefits to employees, and any 
evaluation of enforcement and accountability must incorporate this goal.  ERISA permits 
executives and agents of the employer to serve as fiduciaries124 but includes a broad definition of 
fiduciary to ensure that they act in the best interests of participants and beneficiaries instead of 
the employer.  Anyone who has discretion to manage the plan or its assets or “has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan” is a 
fiduciary and subject to ERISA’s enforcement provisions.125 
                                                            
124 ERISA § 408(c), 29 U.S.C. 1108(c) (“Nothing in section 1106 of this title shall be construed to prohibit any 
fiduciary from— . . . (3) serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other 
representative of a party in interest.”). 
 
125 ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  As the conference committee explained: 
 
Under this definition, fiduciaries include officers and directors of a plan, 
members of a plan’s investment committee and persons who select these 
individuals.  Consequently, the definition includes persons who have authority 
and responsibility with respect to the matter in question, regardless of their 
formal title.  The term ‘fiduciary’ also includes any person who renders 
investment advice for a fee and includes persons to whom ‘discretionary’ duties 
have been delegated by named fiduciaries.   
 While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisers to employee 
benefit plans (other than investment advisers) may not be considered as 
fiduciary functions, it must be recognized that there will be situations where 
such consultants and advisers may because of their special expertise, in effect, 
be exercising discretionary authority or control with respect to the management 
or administration of such plan or some authority or control regarding its assets.  
In such cases, they are to be regarded as having assumed fiduciary obligations 





James Q. Wilson (1989, 25-26) wrote that successful bureaucracies, or organizations, focus on 
tasks and not on goals.  Goals can be hard to pin down, and there is frequently disagreement 
about what the goals are from the start.  In the case of government bureaucracies, there is 
disagreement about goals within Congress and between Congress and the President.  Focusing on 
tasks thus allows bureaucracies to move forward and take decisive action, but it may not lead 
directly to a clear “end” even if the goal or goals as understood are taken into account when 
performing tasks.   
 
ERISA complicates the achievement of the goal of protecting promises to workers further 
because of a contradictory (at times) goal and an overwhelming complexity.  Encouraging 
employers to voluntarily offer pension benefits to their employees means protecting workers 
without overly burdening employers with regulations.  Incentivizing employers to create and 
maintain pension plans is therefore a competing goal.  And the complexity of pension regulation 
and enforcement because of both the expertise required to plot a course towards the goal and the 
coordination required by the overlapping jurisdiction of two government agencies makes 
meeting the goal of worker protection more difficult.  Complexity makes it harder to predict that 
the tasks performed are in fact a means to achieve the end and that there is a united path towards 
the goal, even if the effort to protect workers is made.   
 
Taking the competing goal of encouraging employers to offer pension benefits as a given, this 
chapter focuses on how the added complexity of concurrent and overlapping bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               





jurisdiction under ERISA and insufficient resources for enforcement made it impossible for the 
bureaucracy to achieve the goal of protecting workers.  The bureaucratic agencies with 
enforcement responsibilities failed to ensure political accountability for meeting the goal of 
worker protection (which even critics agree was at a minimum one main purpose of the 
legislation).  This chapter and the next serve as a reminder that the execution of laws can undo 
congressional bargains. 
 
The Triumph of ERISA’s Private Litigation Remedy 
 
With respect to enforcement of pension reform legislation, Senator Javits wrote: 
I think a single agency is required for the purpose and it will be a 
very difficult task to regulate the operation of the employee benefit 
plans sufficiently to assure legitimate expectations of employee 
participation while avoiding undue and unnecessary interference in 
the operation of these plans.  Overregulation or unnecessary 
regulation would be worse than none for it would defer the 
installation and improvement of these much-needed programs.  We 
have to steer between frustrated expectations for pension plan 
members growing out of no regulation and frustrations caused by 
overregulation which will deter the employer from instituting a 
pension plan.126   
 
Despite the consensus among most pension reform advocates that a single bureaucratic agency 
was preferable to fragmented bureaucratic jurisdiction, Congress (for the reasons discussed 
below) placed principal responsibility for enforcing the statute with two existing bureaucratic 
                                                            
126 Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Hearings on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103, S. 1255, Day 1, Before the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 210 (1968) (statement of 




agencies rather than creating a single agency to regulate pensions and perhaps even adjudicate 
disputes.127   
 
Given the extent of the authority Congress was delegating to employers as fiduciaries, Congress 
faced an important question when deciding who would enforce the bargain reached to better 
protect workers against abuses:  (1) the bureaucracy – and if so, which agency, (2) the courts, or 
(3) both.  In the end, Congress split regulatory authority between the Department of Labor and 
the Internal Revenue Service to resolve conflict between congressional committees, bureaucratic 
agencies, and interest groups.  The result was that neither agency became a policy leader – 
leaving the bulk of the ERISA enforcement responsibilities to the courts and to the participants 
themselves who would initiate lawsuits in the absence of bureaucratic enforcement.  Before 
turning to an account of why redundancy failed under ERISA, I will review the literature’s recent 
focus on the benefits of redundancy to show why it was not effective in this case. 
 
 Redundancy – Friend or Foe? 
 
Beginning in 1969 with Martin Landau’s article, the literature on redundancy in government has 
fought back against the notion that redundancy is wasteful and inefficient.  To counter the 
modern movement to reduce “duplication and overlap” (349) in government as was being done 
in private firms, Landau theorized that such efforts would instead harm public administration.  
                                                            
127 As discussed further below, participants and beneficiaries were authorized under ERISA to file lawsuits to 
enforce their rights under the statute, and the courts have sole adjudicative power under ERISA to resolve disputes 




While touting the redundancy built into our government’s system of checks and balances, 
Landau argues, “If there is no duplication, if there is no overlap, if there is no ambiguity, an 
organization will neither be able to suppress error nor generate alternate routes of action.  In 
short, it will be most unreliable and least flexible, sluggish, as we now say” (356). 
 
In the context of service delivery, duplication signifies that two agencies “both provide the same 
services through identical systems” (Miranda and Lerner 1995, 196, citing Lerner 1986, 336).  
Duplication, while costly, reduces the probability of a system failure as long as the redundant 
parts function independently (so that if one fails the other will not fail as a result) (Lerner 1986, 
350).  While more important to the reliability of mechanical or security systems, for example, 
duplication and its corresponding increase in reliability can help ensure sufficient social service 
delivery.   
 
Overlap means that the agencies “have a different core set of activities, but also produce some of 
the same services” (Lerner 1986, 336).  This latter category fits the example of the relationship 
between the Department of Labor (DOL) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under ERISA.  
Laundau’s discussion of overlap and precisely how it results in increased reliability in biological 
organisms is considerably more nebulous (350-51).   
 
In addition to reliability and flexibility, scholars argued that competition among government 
agencies has efficiency benefits just as it does in the private sector (Bendor 1985, 33; Miranda 




effects of an agency’s monopoly jurisdiction because bureaucrats have greater information about 
the cost to produce the required services and supposedly seek to maximize their budgets instead 
of providing services more efficiently.  Competition can also improve the quality of services 
provided (Miranda and Lerner 1995, 198).   
 
The primary criticisms of redundancy are that it is inefficient, may result in regulatory gaps 
assuming a zero-sum budget game, and that it makes assigning responsibility for an error or 
problem difficult (Bendor 1985, 28-30).  The most relevant concern for my work is that 
redundancy decreases accountability in organizations.  “Overlapping jurisdictions make it 
difficult to place blame when things go wrong” (Streeter 1992, 106-07).  As Wilson (1989, 274) 
has said regarding redundancy in bureaucracy, while redundancies are not necessarily bad, “[t]he 
problem, of course, is to choose between good and bad redundancies.”    
 
Law professor Michael Doran (2011, 1858) argues that redundancy in retirement-security 
programs enacted by Congress (including ERISA) is a reflection of “the distributive costs and 
informational benefits associated with administrative redundancy.”  Instead of having one 
program for older Americans under the jurisdiction of one congressional committee and one 
bureaucratic agency, Social Security, Medicare, and the other tax expenditure and regulatory 
programs were enacted and are monitored by different committees and different agencies.  
Responsibility for ERISA is divided among four congressional committees and two agencies 
(three if you include the insurance program run by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) 




older Americans are very well taken care of (that reliability factor discussed above), it is more 
likely that congressional committees with ties to different agencies are simply trying to gain 
power over an issue of great importance to many of their constituents.  ERISA allows the Senate 
Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees and the House Ways and 
Means and Education and Workforce Committees to control over $6.3 trillion in private pension 
money.128  But by fragmenting authority over retirement-security programs, Congress is able to 
take advantage of the specialized knowledge of the different committees and agencies (1861-62).  
The balance of distributive costs and informational benefits is difficult to quantify, but my 
dissertation measures instead the accountability costs.  
 
My argument is that the overlapping jurisdiction of the DOL and IRS over private pension plans 
prevented the DOL (or a new agency with sole jurisdiction over private pensions) from assuming 
the leadership role it would otherwise have assumed over protecting promises made to workers 
using ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.  To give an analogy, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot 
down over Iraq in a friendly fire incident because each F-15 pilot patrolling the area did not 
confirm the identity of the helicopters but instead thought the other pilot had done so (Carroll 
2004, 955, citing Sagan 2004).  The overlapping jurisdiction over private pension regulation left 
each agency regulating ERISA assuming the other would step up.  The leadership failure left the 
courts to establish a unified pension policy through private litigation to which the agencies were 
not a party, and it did not further the goal of protecting workers.   
                                                            
128 Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs.  U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits 





The Death of the Single Agency Proposal 
 
Because pension rights were litigated rarely prior to ERISA as a result of the large costs involved 
and the small potential recovery, reform advocates argued that “you need an agency to enforce 
these private rights, or a union.”  But which agency?129  The Department of Commerce was 
viewed as favorable to business, while the DOL supposedly sided with workers.  The IRS 
already helped regulate the tax qualification of pension plans.   
 
The debate over where to place enforcement authority within the bureaucracy embroiled 
congressmen, their committees, and their business and labor constituencies for years.  Their 
inability to agree on where to locate enforcement duties doomed the proposal of a single, 
powerful agency regulating private pensions and consequently enhanced the significance of the 
private litigation remedy.130   
                                                            
129 Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on Private 
Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 992-95 (1974) (statement of Frank Cummings).  Cummings asserted that the Internal 
Revenue Service could not be an enforcement agency because:     
 
[i]t isn’t equipped to enforce private rights.  Only the Labor Department is, 
which, after all, enforces private rights all the time.  For example, if you don’t 
pay time and one-half for overtime, you go to the Labor Department and the 
Labor Department says “do it” and it goes into the court and the judge says “do 
it.”  So, if you want to protect private rights, you have to create private rights 
and you have to create an agency that will enforce those private rights. 
 
Id. at 848.  While unions and the Democrats who traditionally represented them favored enforcement by the 
Department of Labor, employers favored the Securities and Exchange Commission or Internal Revenue Service 
since the Department of Commerce lacked expertise in the area.  See Wooten (2004, 47).  
 
130 Controversy over which part of the bureaucracy should have oversight of pension regulation began in the decades 
prior to ERISA’s enactment as momentum for pension reform built.  Legislation to force increased and more 
accurate disclosure from plans was gutted prior to passage because of disagreement over the location and extent of 
enforcement powers.  An Eisenhower bill from January 1956 required pension plans to report to the DOL, the 





When Senator Javits introduced the first comprehensive bill for pension reform, the Pension and 
Employee Benefit Act of 1967, he proposed a single agency with oversight – “an independent 
commission that would have jurisdiction over the new regulations as well as most existing 
federal oversight of employee benefit plans.”131  Drawing on recent pension legislation in 
Ontario,132 Javits’ “United States Pension and Employee Benefit Plan Commission” would have 
included five members appointed by the President with the advice and counsel of the Senate.133  
Among the duties of the Commission were “to promote the establishment, extension, and 
improvement” of pension plans and to register or decline to register plans.134  As part of those 
duties, the Commission had the power to inspect the books and records of pension plans and 
broadly “to require any such administrator, employer, insurer, trustee, or other person to furnish, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Senate, however, provided that pension plans would register and file reports with the SEC.  Employees would 
receive summaries of plan terms, and the SEC could penalize incomplete or inaccurate disclosure with fines or 
imprisonment.  In the end, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 placed oversight within the DOL 
but denied automatic disclosure to employees and eliminated penalties for false statements, omissions, and even 
embezzlement.  Thus, the legislation denied the DOL “the investigative and enforcement authority it would need to 
implement the law” (Wooten 2004, 45-49, 121-22). 
 
131 Wooten (2004, 129-30, 177) (Senator Williams called in February 1972 for “the centralization in one agency of 
all existing as well as prospective regulation of private pension plans.”).  The President’s Committee’s report also 
introduced the possibility of a central pension agency.  “As suggested by the Commission on Money and Credit, it 
might be necessary to empower a regulatory agency to act as guardian for the collective interests of employees and 
their beneficiaries and, if necessary, to bring suit in [sic] behalf of the plan participants.”  President’s Committee on 
Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs.  1965.  Public Policy and Private 
Pension Programs: A Report to the President on Private Employee Retirement Plans, at 78.  U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
 
132 See copy of Ontario legislation, The Pension Benefits Act of 1965; correspondence from Allen E. Kaye to Frank 
Cummings, Mar. 7, 1966; correspondence from R. M. Gaby to Allen E. Kaye. Mar. 21, 1966; correspondence from 
Laurence E. Coward to Allen E. Kaye, Mar. 24, 1966, Box 92, Folder Pension Reform – Pension Background – 
1965-1970, Series 4, Subseries 3, Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections. Department, Frank 
Melville, Jr. Memorial Library, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, N.Y. (“Javits Collection”). 
 
133 S. 1103 § 3(a), 90th Cong., Cong. Rec. 4654 (Feb. 28, 1967).   
 




in a form acceptable to the Commission, such information as the Commission deems necessary 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether this Act and regulations of the Commission hereunder 
have been or are being complied with.”135   
 
As Javits himself stated, “My [1967] bill also would have established a U.S. Pension 
Commission, analogous to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to supervise the complex 
and technical aspects of pension plans” (Javits 1981, 380).136  Javits’ 1967 bill envisioned a 
single regulatory body because he thought it necessary to “respond effectively to the inevitable 
shocks in its economic environment and shifts in the power, and interests, of its various 
constituents.”  He wanted to take power over pensions from its jurisdiction in the IRS, DOL, 
SEC, and Social Security Administration, and give it to a unified commission, as well as adding 
domain over a new portability program (Sass 1997, 211).  Indeed Javits was “convinced that a 
single agency is required” to manage the delicate task of safeguarding employee pensions while 
promoting the maintenance and growth of private pensions by employers (Gordon 1984, 13-14, 
citing 113 Cong. Rec. 4650-4653 (Feb. 28, 1967)).     
 
Although those working on pension reform had assumed that all vesting, funding, and 
termination insurance proposals would amend the tax code, Javits and his staff placed all 
elements of his bill under the labor laws to avoid the powerful and hostile House Ways and 
                                                            
135 Id. at § 4(b). 
 
136 See Gordon (1984, 13-14).  Javits’ proposal also called for this independent pension agency to supervise a new 
portability program in which participants could accumulate small pension credits from various employers into a 
single pension.  Difficulties in administering this portability program such as how to deal with inflation while not 
making these government-backed pensions more generous or secure than private pensions caused the proposal to fail 




Means Committee and instead give jurisdiction to the Senate Labor Committee (Wooten 2004, 
129-30).  Thus began a lengthy battle between congressional committees with jurisdiction over 
labor matters and those supervising taxation.  The single agency proposal fell victim to the 
jurisdictional dispute. 
 
As soon as Javits proposed a single agency to administer pension reform, opposition to the idea 
arose.  A memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget (“BOB Memo”) dated September 8, 1967 
explains that even without “thorough study” of current and prospective pension regulation, “[i]t 
does not appear feasible to vest all functions relating to pension plans in a single agency” and 
“[i]t does not appear feasible to vest the new functions, or the existing functions which may be 
separable, in a new agency.”137  The BOB Memo argued that a single agency was unworkable 
because pension functions already performed by existing agencies were tied to their core 
missions.  For example, the IRS determination of qualification for tax deductions was related to 
basic tax administration.  “Similarly, Labor’s functions with respect to bargaining rights and 
overtime rate computations with respect to pension plans do not appear separable from its 
broader role in those areas.”138  No explanation of why these tasks could not be performed by a 
different agency is given.   
 
The BOB Memo finds problems with creating an independent agency to administer and enforce 
pension regulation – or as much as can be separated from existing agencies:   
                                                            
137 Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, Howard Schnoor to Mr. March, 
Organization for private pension plan program, Sept. 8, 1967, at 2, Box 119, Folder Pension Reform: Inter-Agency 






Such an agency, even with the broadest possible program now 
envisioned, would be small and isolated from the major policy-
making agencies of Government.  It would have little chance of 
access to the President, and problems could develop in trying to 
develop its programs in the context of related programs affecting 
the labor force and income maintenance in other agencies.139   
 
The Johnson administration task force considering pension reform opposed bureaucratic 
consolidation for practical reasons.  Representative Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, opposed many of the reforms proposed.  Focusing on substantive reforms 
in areas such as vesting and funding, the task force wanted to avoid Mills by drafting a bill under 
the jurisdiction of labor committees in Congress and enforced by the DOL.  This made 
consolidation of the IRS’ current pension duties impossible at the time (although Mills and 
congressional tax committees later become involved in pension reform) (Sass 1997, 212). 
 
For the next several years, Javits continued to push for a single agency to enforce ERISA within 
the bureaucracy.  On May 14, 1969, he again introduced legislation that sought to “establish an 
SEC-style agency” that would have oversight of new pension standards and “any existing 
regulatory standards dealing with pension and welfare plans that now rest in other Federal 
agencies.”140  Recognizing the deep divisions even among those involved within the pension 




140 Javits Seeks SEC-Type Agency to Oversee $100-Billion Private Pension Plans; Bill Protects Against Last-Minute 
Pension Forfeiture After Long Service, May 14, 1969, Box 121, Folder Pension Reform: Pension Legislation – 




of dealing with problems in the pension field; there are other approaches which can and should 
be explored.”141 
 
Further study of the structure of pension regulation emphasized the political difficulties of 
consolidating enforcement within a single agency while acknowledging its benefits.  The 
Secretaries of Labor and Commerce on April 14, 1969 charged a Joint Task Force with 
reviewing the “‘security’ issues of vesting, funding, insurance and portability.”  The Task Force 
included in its resulting report a chapter that examined potential routes of administration and 
enforcement for pension reform legislation.  Specifically, it looked at the questions:  (1) “Should 
all pension plan activities of the Federal government be vested in a single agency?” and (2) 
“Assuming that pension regulatory functions should be consolidated in a single agency, should 
that agency constitute a new independent regulatory agency?”142   
 
The Task Force concluded that a single agency should administer and enforce all pension 
regulation.  Among the benefits of the single agency concept noted were easing the burden on 
employers administering pension plans, reducing duplication, and achieving coordinated pension 
policy to safeguard pensions while also encouraging the expansion of private pension plans.  “A 
single agency, possessed of all the expertise and experience available, would be able to focus in 
                                                            
141 Quoted in id. 
 
142 Written Report from Joint Labor/Commerce Task Force review of pension security, Preface and Table of 
Contents to Administration & Enforcement chapter, Box 137, Folder Pension Reform:  Pension Benefit Security 




the most efficient and flexible way on the complex and dynamic aspects of the private pension 
system.”143       
 
The Task Force acknowledged that the real question was not whether the federal government’s 
regulation of pensions should be consolidated in a single agency but instead whether such an 
action was “feasible.”  Jurisdiction over pension issues was already fragmented because it 
involved the IRS, DOL, SEC, National Labor Relations Board, Department of Justice, and 
assorted other agencies applying their rules to pension plans.144  It might not be possible to avoid 
IRS and SEC interaction with pension plans, for example, because their missions touched on the 
conduct of plans (as the BOB Memo had noted).  If all pension matters could not be brought 
under one roof, the benefits of consolidation could not be fully achieved.145   
 
                                                            
143 Id. at 3. 
 
144 Id. at Administration & Enforcement chapter, 2-3.  The report notes that current jurisdiction included:  (1) the 
IRS management of tax qualification of plans and employer deductions; (2) the DOL enforcement of wage and hour 
laws that are affected by pension credits and gathering of labor statistics; (3) the SEC’s application of rules to plan 
investments and information gathering on the same; (4) the NLRB’s oversight of the Taft Hartley’s provisions on 
whether pension plans penalize union members and are fairly bargained; (5) the enforcement by the DOJ of a 
section of the Taft Hartley Act dealing with improper use of benefit funds for purposes not benefiting employees; 
and (6) the application of EEOC, HUD, and DOD regulations to benefit plans.  Id. at 2-3, 5-27. 
 
145 Id. at 3-4.  The report cites Javits’ seeming concern over the difficulties of implementing a single agency 
proposal: 
 
It may be that the entire scope of Treasury operations affecting pension plans 
should be transferred to the Commission.  And yet, such determinations as the 
manner of integrating pension benefits with social security benefits and the 
determination of reasonable levels of compensation obviously have an important 
impact on Federal revenue considerations.  Similarly, the extent to which 
regulations of pension plan investments is now performed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission warrants careful consideration as to what functions, if 
any, should be transferred to the proposed Commission.   
 




Most of the DOL’s pension functions, such as enforcement of disclosure standards, were found 
capable of transfer and consolidation, but it was more difficult to transfer all IRS duties to 
another agency.  Functions such as determinations that plans met qualification standards and the 
gathering of data on pension plans could be consolidated, but concerns of tax evasion, 
discrimination by pension plans in favor of highly compensated employees, and allowable 
deductions by employers and exclusions of trust income from taxation by pension plans related 
to the IRS’ tax policy mission.146  The report concluded that “centralization to the maximum 
feasible extent”147 was still worthwhile given the benefits that would result.   
 
The Task Force then considered which agency should administer and enforce pension regulation 
– an existing agency and, if so, which one, or a new, independent agency.  Although the IRS was 
perhaps the best qualified to handle complex pension matters, “the public interest factor [of 
pension reform] transcends revenue considerations.”148  At the SEC, the mission to regulate 
securities might force labor and pension issues to a subsidiary role despite the SEC’s experience 
handling disclosure, investments, and fiduciary law.  While pension regulation did not clash with 
any preexisting core agency mission at the DOL, the report noted that a decision to consolidate 
regulation at the DOL would result in backlash from employers.149 
 
                                                            
146 Id. at 5-14, 17-20, 27-28.  The need for the Secretary of Labor to use the value of employee benefits as a 
component in the prevailing wage rates used to set the minimum wages was not readily subject to consolidation, 
though.  Id. 
 
147 Id. at 28. 
 
148 Id.  
 




Uncertain which existing agency should have primary responsibility for pensions, the Task Force 
addressed the advantages and disadvantages of creating a new, independent body.  Although 
independent agencies are typically thought to have greater political independence from the 
President (and thus have greater continuity of staffing at high levels), be more bipartisan, and be 
more efficient since they are focused on the statute they administer, the Task Force found no 
clear support for these supposed advantages.  Similarly, the evidence was inconclusive on the 
supposed disadvantages of independent agencies, including that the President cannot control 
them or coordinate their policies, they are more readily subject to capture by the industries they 
regulate, and they have trouble juggling administration and enforcement with long-term policy 
coordination.  The Task Force concluded by refusing to take a position on whether consolidation 
within an existing agency or the creation of a new agency was preferable, noting that political 
factors should influence the choice.150  The fact that this group agreed that consolidation within a 
single agency was best but could not agree on which agency should have primary power to 
administer and enforce pension laws indicates how sensitive the issue was and how difficult the 
task of consolidation would be. 
 
Ironically, however, labor put the final nail in the coffin of Javits’ proposal for an independent 
agency with oversight of pension regulation.  Javits attempted to gain the support of labor by 
placing that independent agency within the DOL in a draft bill proposed in February 1972 
(Wooten 2004, 178).  He did this in spite of arguing earlier that his U.S. Pension and Employee 
Benefit Commission, should have jurisdiction over pension regulation (including tax 
                                                            




qualification) instead of the Department of Labor.151  The AFL-CIO, however, rejected his 
proposal.  After years of government scrutiny of labor actions, including hearings focusing on 
pension misdeeds by union leaders, the organization did not want to empower another 
government agency to investigate unions.  If any agency was such power, it would need to be the 
DOL – the traditional friend of labor – not an independent and unknown power within that 
agency (Wooten 2004, 178).152 
 
Javits was forced to advocate instead for consolidation of pension regulation within the DOL 
instead of an independent agency.  The congressional testimony of Frank Cummings, Javits’ 
Chief of Staff, is illustrative of Javits’ position that an independent commission was best but 
given the lack of support for that idea, the DOL should manage as much ERISA enforcement as 
possible.153  Cummings argued that an independent, SEC-like commission was the best answer 
for pension reform (as he helped Javits argue for years) because it could consolidate pension 
expertise and place all regulation under one agency for “one-stop service.”154  His key point here 
                                                            
151 See Hearing on S. 3421, S. 1024, S.1103, and S. 1255 Before S. Subcomm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th 
Cong. 210 (1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (“I think that the question of whether the Commission should run 
it or the Secretary of Labor should run it is a substantive difference, perhaps of a major character.”).  
 
152 As Wooten (2004, 178) writes, “Labor leaders ‘feel they must have ‘their man’ in the Cabinet to protect them 
against the possibilities of extreme action . . . .’  The same concern led the AFL-CIO to demand Labor Department 
oversight of pension regulation.  An ‘independent agency . . . housed at the Department of Labor’ would not do.  
The idea had to go and did.” 
 
153 Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans, 93d 
Cong. 87-154 (1974) (statement of Frank Cummings).    
 
154 Written Report from Joint Labor/Commerce Task Force review of pension security, Administration & 
Enforcement chapter at 28, Box 137, Folder Pension Reform:  Pension Benefit Security Issues and Options 1969, 




is the importance of consolidating all pension expertise in one agency to strengthen bureaucratic 
regulation: 
If the pension thrust of the IRS really has such extensive expertise, 
there is no reason why the personnel of that branch could not be 
transferred, en masse, to such a commission.  If there is expertise 
in the Bureau of the Labor Department which now administers the 
Disclosure Act, the personnel of that branch could be transferred 
there, to such a Commission.  With a corps of personnel like that, 
drawn from the IRS, the Labor Department, and perhaps also from 
the SEC, the Justice Department and from State Agencies 
preempted by federal law, I would doubt very much that any great 
additional bureaucracy would be needed.155 
 
The same results could not be achieved merely by consolidating such expertise within an existing 
agency such as the IRS or DOL because they were already devoted to their core missions and 
would not give the same attention and resources to pension regulation.156 
 
Yet, given that “no one seemed interested” during the years Javits pushed for the independent 
commission and there was “no evidence of increasing interest in it now,” any consolidation of 
pension regulation needed to take place within the IRS or DOL.157  Only the DOL was qualified 
to respond to employee complaints since the IRS – not used to responding to complaints from 
workers – offered merely the remedy of tax penalties or disqualification for the pension plan.  
This would present the employee the equivalent remedy of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s 
face since the plan would then be less able to pay the employee pension benefits because its 
                                                            
155 Id. at 28-29. 
 






assets would be diminished by increased taxes on earnings and tax penalties.158  This left the 
DOL as the best of the “half-loaf” options.159   
 
Congressional hearings held immediately prior to the passage of ERISA indicate the ongoing 
dispute over regulatory jurisdiction.  While Javits and other reform advocates affiliated with 
congressional labor committees as well as unions160 thought the DOL should have as large a role 
                                                            
158 Id. at 25-29.  “The IRS is not essentially an investigating and enforcing agency. . . . Indeed, if a pension 
participant were to go to the IRS and complain . . . he would only be cutting his own throat.  The most he could 
accomplish would be to disqualify the plan, and if he did so, he would be, in effect, reducing his own pension.”  Id. 
at 25. 
 
159 Influential pension scholar Merton Bernstein argued against “half-loaf” pension reform as “legislation that is 
inadequate and less than can be attained.”  Rebutting the argument that the legislation could be enhanced in the 
future, he asserted, “Pension reform factors are approaching a critical mass.  Once legislation results, that mass will 
be dissipated.”  Second Panel Discussion on Private Pension Plan Reform, Vesting and Funding Provisions; 
Termination Insurance; Portability; and Fiduciary Standards: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on 
Private Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 33 (1973) (statement of Merton Bernstein).   
 
160 Testimony by union representatives for the United Steelworkers of America and the United Auto Workers shows 
that they preferred jurisdiction within the DOL to the IRS.  Similarly, a summary of AFL-CIO testimony provides 
that it:  
 
Urges that the Department of Labor administer the pension plan requirements, as 
in S. 4.  Considers pension plans to be an integral part of the collective 
bargaining process.  Suggests that placing the administration in an agency whose 
primary interest is in collection of taxes may place the agency in a conflict-of-
interest situation in relation to policing any funding standard because the more 
rapidly a pension plan funds, the less it pays in taxes.  Maintains that regulatory 
supervision under the IRS hinges on an employer’s self interest in obtaining tax 
deductions.  Feels that this is a very weak enforcement mechanism from the 
viewpoint of the beneficiaries.  Considers possible IRS solutions to 
noncompliance to not really protect the interests of beneficiaries because if the 
plan’s tax exemption is removed or the plan terminated, this does not help the 
beneficiaries.   
 Asserts that better administration would occur if a single agency were 
to be responsible for both enforcement and reporting. 
 
Digest of Testimony on Proposals for Private Pension Plan Reform Before the S Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on 
Private Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 35-36 (1973); see Hearings before S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private 




as possible, employers, their interest groups,161 and members of congressional tax committees 
favored primary IRS jurisdiction because they viewed the DOL as biased in favor of employees.   
 
The testimony of Senators Javits and Williams before the Senate Finance Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Private Pension Plans shows not only the ongoing jurisdictional dispute over 
pension regulation within the Senate but also how Javits and Williams hedged and left the door 
open for significant IRS involvement because it was politically expedient.162  Senator Javits 
stated that employers’ primary motivation for maintaining pension plans is to improve employee 
morale and “employee relations”, elements of the DOL’s mission.163  Among the other reasons 
cited why IRS administration was inappropriate was that half of pension plans were collectively 
bargained, tax penalties were insufficient, only the DOL jurisdiction would provide the necessary 
preemption of state law to ensure coordinated policy, and – most importantly – that the primary 
                                                            
161 A summary of testimony on the proper administering agency and enforcement for pension legislation shows that 
the American Bankers Association and the Chamber of Commerce believed that the IRS should have jurisdiction 
because of its expertise and impartiality.  Interestingly, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) felt that 
“regulatory functions in the pension area performed by the various departments and agencies of government should 
continue under their respective jurisdictions and should not be centralized in one agency, thus preserving the 
technical expertise required.” Digest of Testimony on Proposals for Private Pension Plan Reform Before the S 
Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 35-36 (1973).  Perhaps not incidentally, the NAM’s 
position was also likely to (and did in fact) continue the existing inefficiency and uncoordinated regulation of 
pension promises. 
 
162 See Hearings before S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 1075-1108 (1973) 
(remarks of Sen. Javits and Sen. Williams). 
 
163 Id. at 1084.  Senator Williams added, “Now it just seems to me that we have reached a point where pension 
legislation most clearly falls within the stated purpose in the law of the Department of Labor as a Department ‘to 
foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States and to improve their working 
conditions and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.’  This is intimately part of the job of 
benefit protection and, historically, that part of the workers’ arrangement with his employer has been watched over 




mission of the IRS is collecting revenue through taxes and pension regulation would suffer from 
the IRS’ need to focus on its core mission.164   
 
When members of the Senate Finance Committee questioned whether Javits and Williams 
believed that there was any role for the IRS in pension regulation, they relented and agreed to 
some form of IRS involvement.  As Javits said: 
Again . . . this doesn’t denigrate the interests of the tax authorities 
nor their interest in the deductions which are taken for payment to 
pension plans.  They have a vital interest.  We don’t challenge that 
at all.165 
 
When trying to define exactly the ongoing role that they foresaw for the IRS in pension 
regulation, however, Senators Javits and Williams ran into trouble.  As Senator Williams 
admitted, “this is not finally formed in my mind” – even after many years of work on the 
issue.166  Senator Javits added that the IRS would have a role in determining reasonableness of 
compensation for purposes of discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees as well 
as enforcing eligibility and vesting standards “for tax purposes only.”167   
 
                                                            
164 Id. at 1085, 1091 (“Senator, we believe very strongly that the weight of administrative judgment is for 
administration in the Labor Department because, while you are absolutely right about the fact that IRS is doing more 
than they did, the fact is that it is still their primary jurisdiction to collect taxes and punish evasion and define people 
who evade.  This represents such an enormous range in which they must operate, that pension plan supervision 
would only be one item.”); see Wooten (2004, 205), explaining that it was uncertain whether the IRS’ 
implementation of the power to tax could include preemption of state pension regulation while the DOL’s control of 
the employment relationship through Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce allowed for such preemption. 
 
165 Hearings before S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans, 93d Cong. 1087 (1973) (remarks of Sen. 
Javits and Sen. Williams). 
 
166 Id. at 1094-95. 
 




Having conceded a necessary role for the IRS in areas like eligibility, vesting, and funding, 
Senators Javits and Williams then faced questions about the problem of dual – and potentially 
conflicting – jurisdiction in these areas if the DOL also regulated here.168  This is the question 
not fully resolved as the parties fought over jurisdiction and reached a compromise that involved 
duplication, overlap, and conflict. 
 
Yet more complex institutional issues beyond multiple committee jurisdiction were also at play 
in the decision of legislators to delegate broad discretion to private fiduciaries with weak, 
fragmented supervisory authority in the executive instead of a powerful superagency.  Late 1972, 
the period prior to the passage of ERISA, was a time where congressional power was at an all-
time low.  After Congress adjourned, President Nixon impounded funds to reduce government 
expenditures – refusing to spend the money.  On December 18, 1972, Nixon ordered bombing in 
North Vietnam without consulting Congress (Wooten 2004, 191).  Without the fall of Nixon to 
the Watergate scandal and the decline in power and prestige of the presidency, Congress may not 
have had the ability to finally pass pension legislation that delegated authority to private 








The Inability of the Bureaucracy to Enforce ERISA 
 
The administration and enforcement regime put in place under ERISA divides responsibility 
between the DOL and the Department of Treasury (mainly the IRS).169  Pensions historically fell 
within the purview of the IRS because plans needed to be qualified for favorable tax treatment.  
They also related to the DOL’s mission of worker protection and compensation as pensions are 
considered deferred wages. 
 
Turf battles within Congress and the bureaucracy resulted in the political compromise of 
overlapping – and frequently conflicting – jurisdiction (Klimkowsky 1984, 83).170  Indeed, even 
while the Conference Committee was resolving the final details of dual administration of ERISA 
by the DOL and IRS, many doubted that the statute could be effectively enforced in the planned 
manner.  As staff members noted, “While recognizing the staffs have made a valiant effort to 
resolve the jurisdictional problem, some staff members believe the proposed solution falls short 
of eliminating the inevitable complexities, costs and inequities which will result from dual 
jurisdiction and enforcement.”171 
 
                                                            
169 A newly created agency – the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation – also administered the statute’s insurance 
program, but its involvement is not relevant to this discussion.  See Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk (2006, 90).  
 
170 “When President Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day 1974, the administrative apparatus charged with 
implementing the new law reflected the ambiguity concerning the proper jurisdictional sphere for the law and 
continued congressional rivalry over turf” (Klimkowsky 1984, 83). 
 
171 Staff Comments Relating to Jurisdictional Matters, undated, Box 128, Folder Pension Reform Leg. House/Senate 




After the passage of ERISA, it quickly became clear that dual jurisdiction needed to be sorted 
out for the agencies to implement ERISA.  The impracticalities of the IRS and DOL issuing 
regulations together slowed the process of implementation (Klimkowsky 1984, 84).  By 
executive order, President Carter issued Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.172  The IRS gained 
exclusive control over participation, vesting, and funding (among other areas), while the DOL 
governs fiduciary management and disclosure and prohibited transactions.  The DOL and IRS 
also share control over decisions regarding whether a plan meets the exclusive benefit rule 
(Klimkowsky 1984, 95; Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk 2006, 91).  This plan completed the 
transition away from the previous notion that the DOL would have primary control of pension 
regulation. 
 
Early conflicts within the DOL after ERISA’s passage also prevented effective administration 
and enforcement of fiduciary obligations.  DOL leaders could not even agree on an internal 
structure for pension regulation.  For three years and under five different administrators, the 
agency struggled with whether to house ERISA responsibilities under a new Assistant Secretary 
or under the existing Labor Management Services Administration that administered the Welfare 
and Pension Plan Disclosure Act but had other primary responsibilities.  After three years, the 
DOL finally decided upon the Office of Pension Benefit Welfare Programs reporting to the 









Effective administration and enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities at the DOL was also 
hampered by the complexity of ERISA and the agency’s lack of resources.  Policy analyst 
Beverly Klimkowsky (1984, 88) noted in a paper prepared for the Senate Special Committee on 
Aging on the tenth anniversary of ERISA: 
As one of the most complex laws Congress ever passed, ERISA 
suffers from having an unclear mandate.  Multiple jurisdiction is a 
major example of congressional indecision being papered over and 
left to the administrators to sort out.  Some of ERISA’s provisions 
(e.g., paperwork) are too specific, leaving administrators with little 
flexibility.  Many other provisions were so vague that over 100 
regulations needed to be issued. 
 
The DOL lacked financial and manpower resources initially to administer this complex statute.  
The IRS had many pension experts on staff already because of its previous work in the area, but 
the DOL lacked expertise and experienced higher turnover (Klimkowsky 1984, 88-89, 93).   
 
Although the Reorganization Plan allocated tasks more efficiently between the IRS and DOL and 
aided administration greatly, enforcement was still an issue of concern.173  The IRS and DOL 
maintained control over enforcement in their respective areas of ERISA, making coordinated 
pension policy difficult to achieve (Klimkowsky 1984, 96).  The Secretary Labor has the power 
to file or intervene (in most circumstances) in civil lawsuits related to its areas of administration 
and also assess civil penalties.174  The Secretary of Labor can also investigate conduct that may 
constitute a violation of ERISA’s title I by reviewing books and records and interviewing the 
relevant people where “reasonable cause” to believe there has been a violation exists or where 
                                                            
173 See Klimkowsky (1984, 84, 98), stating, “ERISA enforcement constitutes the weakest link in implementation . . 
.” 
 





the plan gives consent.175  No plan, however, can be forced to provide its books and records to 
the DOL more than once in a 12 month period unless such “reasonable cause” to believe there 
has been a violation exists.176  The DOL engaged in few enforcement activities until a lengthy 
and involved matter with the Central State Teamsters Plan, and the DOL’s problems with 
internal organization left overall enforcement inadequate.   
 
After a critical report by the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) in 1977, the DOL announced 
that it would use the significant case theory to guide its enforcement efforts – requiring regional 
audits of large pension plans.  The significant case theory was controversial, however.  What 
constituted a large plan in one region might not in another.  In addition, the strategy left the many 
participants in small plans unprotected.  The Solicitor’s Office was also overwhelmed and unable 
to respond to all proposed cases.  When Reagan took office, however, personnel at the DOL 
changed and the significant case strategy ended.  Other strategies of emphasizing criminal cases 
and more centralized enforcement were attempted (Klimkowsky 1984, 97). 
 
Since that time, reports on DOL enforcement of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions have routinely 
been critical.  The GAO’s January 1989 report to the House Ways and Means Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Oversight found that the DOL’s enforcement efforts had a limited reach.177  By 
                                                            
175 ERISA § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1134(a); see Lewis, Rumeld, and LeBeau (2012, § 3-13). 
 
176 ERISA § 504(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1134(b); see Lewis, Rumeld, and LeBeau (2012, § 3-13). 
 
177 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/HRD-89-32, Pension Plans: Labor and IRS Enforcement of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act 3-4 (1989).  During the period examined, fiscal years 1985 to 1987, the DOL only 




1994, the GAO noted improvements made by the DOL in enforcement but still had substantial 
recommendations for change in its report entitled Pension Plans: Strong Labor ERISA 
Enforcement Should Better Protect Plan Participants.178  Of the 117 cases referred to the DOL 
Solicitor’s Office for civil litigation or to the Department of Justice for criminal litigation, only 
38 lawsuits were filed.179   
 
Recent problems found with DOL ERISA enforcement include a lack of plan audits and 
resources for proper enforcement.  After once again noting significant problems in 2002, the 
GAO (which now stood for the Government Accountability Office) issued another report in 
January 2007 finding protection of participants still inadequate.180  The DOL still did not have an 
accurate picture of ERISA noncompliance and therefore could not properly target its 
enforcement efforts.  The DOL did not conduct routine plan audits or risk assessments like other 
agencies and was focused on problems identified by plan sponsors, participants, or other 
agencies.  Finally, although it had recruited more skilled personnel needed to administer the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
pension plans.  Only one in four plans investigated were cited for ERISA violations, and the number was one in five 
for the first eight months of fiscal year 1988.  The DOL found 574 fiduciary violations in 1987.  Id. 
178 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/HEHS-94-157, Pension Plans: Stronger Labor ERISA Enforcement Should 
Better Protect Plan Participants (1994).  Area office enforcement staff had grown from 266 to 365 from 1986 to 
1993.  By program year 1993, the number of investigations closed was 2,998 (although 1,480 of these cases had 
been opened to test computer targeting programs that were still in the exploration stage).  While the DOL managed 
to recover $183 million for plans and “impact” 72,199 plans and 21 million participants in 1993 with its focus on 
“significant issue” cases, only 303 cases resulted in a monetary recovery, only 125 had fiduciary results (fiduciaries 
were removed, fiduciaries were forced to diversify plan investments or discontinue a particular investment, or other 
administrative practices were altered ) and only 187 cases had nonfiduciary results (changes were made to comply 
with reporting and disclosure or bonding requirements).  Id. at 5-6.   
 
179 Id. at 5-6.  The report recommended reviewing the amount of resources focused on the “significant issue” 
strategy, focusing more on targeted computer programs, and increasing the use of penalties.  Id. at 14-15. 
 
180 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-22, Employee Benefits Security Administration: Enforcement 





complex statute, the DOL had a high attrition rate for related personnel.181  By fiscal year 2005, 
the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor litigated only 178 of the 258 ERISA civil cases referred by the 
DOL’s Employee Benefit Security Administration (“EBSA”).182  As the report summarized: 
EBSA is a relatively small agency facing the daunting challenge of 
safeguarding the retirement assets of millions of American 
workers, retirees, and their families. . . . EBSA’s ability to protect 
plan participants against the misuse of pension plan assets is still 
limited, because its enforcement approach is not as comprehensive 
as those of other federal agencies, and generally focuses only on 
what it derives from its investigations.183 
 
The importance of enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions is clear from ERISA’s legislative 
history.  Yet Congress has never provided funding or authorization sufficient for the DOL to 
audit plans on a regular basis as the SEC and banking agencies do to enforce regulations in their 
sectors (Klimkowsky and Lanoff 1985, 96-97).  Given the current economic climate and push for 
deficit reduction, it is highly unlikely that the executive agencies will soon be given the resources 
necessary for proper enforcement.184   
 
Data from EBSA show how anemic current levels of enforcement are within the bureaucracy.  
The data relate only to penalties assessed from 2000 to present in closed cases where pension 
                                                            
181 Id. at 2-4.  The DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (“EBSA”) had a ratio of personnel to 
regulated plans/entities of 1:8,000 as compared to 1:3,000 for the IRS and 1:9 for the SEC.  Id. at 10. 
 
182 Formerly called the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration.  Id. at 11.   
 
183 Id. at 28. 
 
184 See Getman (1994, 476), arguing, “Complex statutes are inevitably difficult to enforce.  Enforcement of a statute 
of this magnitude and complexity requires a major bureaucracy.  The need for this type of bureaucracy, however, is 
arising at a time when public opinion is strongly opposed to governmental expansion. . . . It would be difficult to 
reconcile today’s hostility toward increasing bureaucracy with the need for the expanded bureaucracy required to 





plan responses to ERISA’s annual form 5500 filing requirement were late, insufficient, or 
nonexistent.185  In 2011, there were 683,647 pension plans according to 5500 filings (including 
single employer and multiemployer, defined benefit and defined contribution).186  Yet there were 
only 401 penalties assessed for filing deficiencies with respect to the annual form 5500.  (See 
Table 4.1.)  As Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter indicates, there are few actions overall even to 
enforce the basic filing requirement.   
 
And when penalties are assessed for filing deficiencies, they are the financial equivalent of a slap 
on the wrist.  In 2011, pension plan assets totaled over $6.3 trillion, but 88% of penalties 
assessed were below $50,000.187  (See Table 4.1.)   
 
Years after the passage of ERISA, there are still calls for a single agency to administer the statute 
and its amendments.  As one article noted, “A review of fiduciary enforcement, in particular, 
indicates that the Department of Labor cannot enforce ERISA; the IRS does not enforce ERISA; 
and coordination in this area does not function well” (Klimkowsky and Lanoff 1985, 90).188  Its 
                                                            
185 “The dataset consists of closed cases that resulted in penalty assessments by EBSA since 2000. This data 
provides information on EBSA’s enforcement programs to enforce ERISA’s Form 5500 Annual Return/Report 
filing requirement focusing on deficient filers, late filers and non-filers.”  U.S. Department of Labor Data 
Enforcement.  Data Catalog.  Available at http://ogesdw.dol.gov/views/data_summary.php. 
 
186 Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs.  U.S. Department of Labor Employee Benefits 





188 Klimkowsky and Lanoff (1985, 90) blame problems with enforcing the statute on Congress for setting an 




authors argued that the only hope for proper enforcement of the statute and coordinated 
policymaking is a single agency with jurisdiction over private pension regulation (91, 94).189   
 
The current insufficient bureaucratic enforcement of ERISA has left private litigation as the main 
enforcement mechanism.  Policy analyst Beverly Klimkowsky (1984, 84) wrote on the tenth 
anniversary of ERISA that “ERISA implementation has not reached the mature stage of 
implementation in which the administering agencies act as powerful players in the policy 
process.”190  The same remains true today, and the courts have picked up the policymaking 
mantle.   
 
Because of the lack of procedural safeguards and the conflicted nature of ERISA fiduciaries, the 
courts are not supposed to be policymakers when deciding claims under ERISA but instead 
merely “interpreters of contractual entitlements.”191  As discussed in Chapter 5, however, they 
                                                            
189 Klimkowsky acknowledges the difficulties of bureaucratic consolidation under ERISA while still arguing in 
favor.  On the one hand, Klimkowsky and Lanoff (1985, 91, 94) write, “As ERISA was written, DOL and the IRS 
shared responsibilities jointly, as opposed to having divided responsibilities, necessitating intensive coordination 
between the two agencies if the law was to be implemented.  Because political compromise rather than ease of 
administration dictated the administrative structure of ERISA, severe management problems surfaced as soon as 
managers attempted to implement the new law.”  But Klimskowky (1984, 101) notes the problems facing the idea of 
consolidation after ERISA’s enactment (many of which helped doom the idea initially): 
 
The structure and leadership of a new agency would be open to much debate and 
possible disagreement which could kill the idea entirely.  It might not be 
possible to wrestle pensions away from the IRS entirely, since the issue remains 
very much a tax issue.  Also, it is critical that interest be aroused on the Hill 
before anything can be accomplished.  Few if any legislators have appeared to 
accept the mantle of leadership from ERISA’s founding fathers. 
 
190 Klimkowsky notes that pension policy was largely being influenced by groups that do not regard “the fulfillment 
of the promise for a private pension as [their] sole or primary concern” (1984, 84). 
 




have in practice made pension policy to an extent not predicted by Congress at the time of 






Closed cases that resulted in penalty assessments under EBSA’s programs to enforce ERISA’s 
Form 5500 Annual Return/Report filing requirement. 
 










2000 91 26 4 5 126 
2001 127 85 15 3 230 
2002 57 37 4 12 110 
2003 73 18 5 7 103 
2004 202 58 27 11 298 
2005 218 93 45 15 371 
2006 259 164 89 14 526 
2007 303 123 103 6 535 
2008 203 98 48 5 354 
2009 284 138 62 6 490 
2010 146 90 19 0 255 
2011 221 173 5 2 401 
2012 198 164 3 4 369 
2013 133 88 8 3 232 




192 “The dataset consists of closed cases that resulted in penalty assessments by EBSA since 2000. This data 
provides information on EBSA’s enforcement programs to enforce ERISA’s Form 5500 Annual Return/Report 
filing requirement focusing on deficient filers, late filers and non-filers.”  U.S. Department of Labor Data 





THE FAILURE OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER ERISA 
 
ERISA provides for civil action by both plan participants and beneficiaries in addition to the 
Secretary of Labor.  The statute created a private right of action as follows: 
A civil action may be brought – (1) by a participant or beneficiary 
– . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. . . . (3) by a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
(i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan.193 
 
For the 12-month period ending March 31, 2013, there were 7,946 ERISA cases filed in the 
federal district courts according to a report from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on 
the composition of the courts’ caseload.  In only 110 of those cases was the federal government 
the plaintiff.194 
 
When creating private litigation remedies, Congress is aware that the courts may not always 
enforce the legislation as expected or desired.  “It is in the nature of statutory interpretation that 
the interpreter, whether judicial or administrative, will frequently be called upon to make policy” 
(Farhang 2008, 821-23).  In the absence of strong bureaucratic enforcement of ERISA, however, 
the judiciary has become the central pension policymaking institution in the United States.  
                                                            
193 ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
 
194 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics.  Caseload Statistics 2013.  Table C-2, Cases Commenced, by Basis of 





Many legal scholars have argued that the courts have used this position in ways not intended by 
“ERISA’s language, legislative history, or purposes” (Conison 1992, 4-5).       
 
When examining congressional delegation to bureaucratic agents, political scientist Mathew 
McCubbins (1999, 30) noted conditions under which delegation fails and becomes abdication: 
Principals may lack an effective check because their agent has 
expertise that the principals do not possess or because of 
conflicting interests among the principals.  Where delegation 
occurs under such conditions, agents may be free to take any action 
that suits them, regardless of the consequences for the principals.  
Delegation then becomes abdication. 
 
In the case of pension regulation, Congress delegated authority over the administration of private 
pensions to fiduciaries.  The courts were supposed to supervise that delegation through a private 
right of action made increasingly important after bureaucratic failings, but they both lack the 
expertise necessary to control fiduciary administration and have conflicting interests in judicial 
efficiency.  While Congress intended for the courts to fill gaps in the statute and create common 
law to implement ERISA, many legal scholars argue that federal common law regarding ERISA 
benefit claims directly contradicts congressional intent (Conison 1992, 7).195  The result is 
judicial abdication in the enforcement of ERISA’s mission to safeguard benefit promises made to 
workers and the failure of legal accountability under ERISA.     
   
                                                            
195 Conison (1992, 7) also discusses legislative history that suggests Congress preempted state law on benefit claims 
as too restrictive because state courts “strictly interpret the plan indenture and are reluctant to apply concepts of 




Private Litigation Remedies:  “The American Way?” 
 
In correspondence with the author, law professor John Langbein wrote, “I do not accept the 
implication that had there been a single agency, it would have substituted for the private cause of 
action. . . . Private causes of action are the American way, our default preference for structuring 
enforcement.”196  He refers to the work of legal historian John Witt (2004), who traces the 
“experimentation in accident law” that resulted in our workers’ compensation system.  Witt 
argues that “powerful traditions in American law limit the ability of our legal institutions to 
develop innovative solutions to new problems” (209).  One of the traditions he cites is the “deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” (209). 
 
And yet Witt’s tale of accident law is precisely one in which, at a critical juncture, workers gave 
up their freedom to pursue their own day in court in favor of an administrative remedy to better 
protect themselves from harm.  The parallels between this critical moment for accident law and 
the development of ERISA are clear.  What is not clear is whether this was a moment where 
experimentation and a solution other than the traditional private litigation remedy could have 
won out or if the pull of traditions was too strong.  This question has implications for the future 
of private pensions as well.  Those who believe that the moment for change in the private 
pension system has passed need wait only until the issue comes to the forefront again as 
retirement incomes stagnate or decline.   
                                                            





Political scientist Sean Farhang studies the decision by Congress to develop private litigation 
remedies that effectively call on private individuals to enforce the statute passed through the 
courts.  He shows that the presence of divided government – a Republican president and 
majority-Democrat Congress – during the passage of ERISA likely influenced Congress’ 
decision to enact a private litigation remedy.197  Over 90% of litigation enforcing statutes is 
litigated by a diverse group of private individuals acting in their own interests but also carrying 
out a larger public service by enforcing the statute for all those affected.198    
 
Farhang argues that Congress consciously uses a statute’s “private enforcement regime” to 
regulate in addition to, or instead of, typical regulation by the bureaucracy.  Congress can alter 
the amount of litigation that will be brought under the statute – manipulating burdens of proof, 
liability standards, and other factors to reach its desired level of enforcement through private 
litigation (Farhang 2009, 3-4).199  Using the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a case study,200 Farhang 
                                                            
197 Farhang (2008, 821) finds that divided government, typically measured by a president of one political party in 
office with a Congress dominated by the other political party, results in increased “incentives to mobilize private 
litigants.”  A majority Democratic Congress and interest group lobbying in the area of legislation, conditions 
associated with the passage of ERISA, are also associated with the inclusion of private litigation remedies in 
legislation.     
 
198 Farhang (2008, 822-23) uses the model of rational behavior from the law and economics literature that specifies 
that a litigant will file a lawsuit whenever her expected monetary value (EV) is positive, where EV is equivalent to 
the litigant’s expected monetary benefit in the event of victory (EB) multiplied by the probability that the litigant 
wins her case minus the costs to the litigant of bringing her case (EC).  In other words, a litigant brings a lawsuit 
where EV = EB(p) – EC, and EV is positive.  Congress can alter incentives with tools such as damage caps or 
multipliers, shifting attorney’s fees and court costs to the losing side, and setting the burdens of proof for the 
plaintiff.   
 
199 Farhang (2009, 7-8) addresses arguments that the decision to litigate is also based on noneconomic concerns such 




argues that Congress attempted to manipulate incentives to bring private litigation to address a 
problem noted in a study by the Federal Courts Study Committee that “the monetary stakes in 
[employment discrimination] cases may be so small . . . that, even with the potential to recover 
attorneys’ fees, claimants sometimes find it difficult to litigate in Federal court because they 
cannot find counsel to take their cases.”201  This is the same quandary that existed for pension 
plan participants immediately prior to the passage of ERISA.    
 
Although Congress is aware that judges’ ideology influences their decisions in these cases, it 
controls the rules of the litigation game as noted, though courts have control over rule 
articulation.  Regardless of the risks involved when trying to institutionalize the legislative 
bargain struck, divided government frequently makes the courts a better avenue of enforcement 
than the bureaucracy when Congress seeks to circumvent a president of the opposing party (825-
26).202    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
information to assess the value of litigation under the statute.  He acknowledges that these additional variables may 
dilute Congress’ ability to manipulate the amount of litigation to enforce a statute.   
 
200 As Farhang (2009, 9-12) notes, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is an excellent case study on the point of whether 
and how Congress manipulates the private enforcement regime to enforce a statute through private litigation because 
it took an existing right and altered its enforcement through the courts in clear rebuke to the Supreme Court’s efforts 
to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in court.   
 
201 In the legislative history for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the House Report spoke of “encouraging citizens to act 
as private attorneys general,” while the Senate report again spoke of the need to provide additional incentives for 
attorneys to bring discrimination cases.  Id. at 12-13. 
 
202 Indeed, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, courts began to operate more frequently to “handle a problem 
unsatisfactorily resolved by another branch of government” and make policy “independent of Congress and the 
bureaucracy” (Horowitz 1977, 6).  As divided government took over and hyperpartisanship increased, it paved the 




As Congress has tinkered with incentives for private litigation and viewed plaintiffs as a 
cohesive group to be manipulated based on Congress’ desired behavior for a larger population, 
the facts and circumstances of each individual plaintiff have taken a lesser role for courts as 
well.203  This has allowed judges to focus not on the misery of an individual who has worked 
hard and been denied some contemplated pension benefit, but instead on the effect that the 
decision might have on the maintenance of a pension system managed by private employers who 
are still viewed as bestowing some sort of extra benefit on employees by maintaining a pension 
plan – the last vestiges of an outdated and overruled turn of the common law.     
 
Pension Lawsuits Prior to ERISA 
 
Prior to ERISA, employees faced many obstacles when challenging the pension decisions of 
employers in the courts.  Consider the testimony of Frank Cummings, Chief of Staff to Senator 
Javits during the passage of ERISA, before the Senate Finance Committee on June 4, 1973 
regarding the problems faced by a participant seeking to litigate against a pension plan.204   
 
Cummings started his discussion at the point when a hypothetical participant tells a potential 
lawyer that “they owe him a pension” or “they are misusing the money in the pension fund.”  
The first of several problems facing the lawyer was to figure out who “they” are – what 
                                                            
203 See Horowitz (1977, 7):  “The individual litigant, though still necessary, has tended to fade a bit into the 
background.  Courts sometimes take off from the individual cases before them to the more general problem the cases 
call up, and indeed they may assume—dubiously—that the litigants before them typify the problem.”  
 
204 Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans, Part 




corporate entity employs the participant, who are the trustees, which bank holds the money, 
which insurance company (perhaps) funds the plan, and which unions and officers are involved.   
 
The next question is what jurisdiction’s law to apply and whether a single court has jurisdiction 
over all of the relevant parties.  The individuals and entities that make up the less than cohesive 
“they” in question may be located in several different states, and the plan documents may not 
have a choice of law provision.   
 
The final question is what legal claim the participant will assert and whether participants and 
their lawyers will have an adequate incentive to litigate.  If the lawyer argues misuse of funds by 
the plan, the recovery will go to the pension fund and not the individual plaintiff.  The plaintiff 
gets nothing except a more well-funded pension fund.  If the plaintiff sues to recover his pension, 
the value of the lawsuit is the net present value of one pension.  In either case, the benefit 
recovered, if any, will likely be too small to motivate most lawyers to tackle the complexities of 
pension law.  Only in the event of a class action lawsuit, which is typically organized and 
financed by a larger entity (such as a union), does the potential recovery justify the costs and 
uncertainties of litigation for prospective lawyers.   
 
With great foresight, Cummings concluded: 
In short, private lawsuits, under existing law, do not provide a 
meaningful remedy for the employee in most pension cases.  What 




which will get this whole matter out of the area of ordinary, garden 
variety, litigation, which simply does not work.205 
 
As Cummings made clear, private litigation remedies did not sufficiently protect employees prior 
to ERISA.   
  
Pension Promises as Gratuities   
 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and lasting until the middle of the twentieth century, 
courts viewed pensions as gratuities (i.e., gifts) to be altered or withdrawn freely by 
employers.206  Plan documents for pensions also limited an employer’s legal liability to 
employees, and courts found that offering pensions to employees created no judiciable rights 
(Heinsz 1972, 282; Stein 1986, 138).207  For example, in McNevin v. Solvay Process Co.,208 the 
plaintiff sued to recover $52.54 from a pension fund established by his employer.  The court 
found that the amount credited to his “account” under the plan by his employer was a gift 
completed only upon “actual payment” and that the employee had no vested right to the money 
until payment.  In the governing documents, the employer had reserved the right to determine 
whether its employees were entitled to the “gift”, and the court refused to review that decision:   
                                                            
205 Id. at 995; see id. at 847 (“You can’t sue for a pension today.  Even if the plan owes it to you, you can’t sue 
unless someone is backing you or unless you have a class action.  The legal fee for the first day of the lawsuit would 
exceed the amount of recovery.”).   
 
206 The gratuity theory was followed in cases until the 1950s.  See Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk (2006, 134):  
“Because the plan authorized the employer to revoke promised pension benefits at will, those promises were treated 
like a promise to make a gift in the future, which is unenforceable until the gift is actually completed.  (Notice the 
similarity to the common law doctrine of employment at will.)” 
 
207 See Stein (1986, 138), stating that the majority rule for early pension promises was that they were “more akin to 
charity than to earned wages” and reviewing representative cases and relevant treatises.   
 




It seems to me that the scheme by which this fund is created is 
simply a promise on the part of the defendant to give to its 
employees a certain sum in the future with an absolute reservation 
that it may at any time determine not to complete the gift, and if it 
does so determine, an employee has no right of action to recover 
the sum standing to his credit on the books of the pension fund.209 
 
Courts that denied participants their pensions emphasized the voluntary, non-contributory (i.e., 
entirely employer funded) nature of the plans.210  The gratuitous nature of these plans and the 
reservations of the employer’s right to amend or cancel the terms at any time meant that 
employees’ and retirees’ pension benefits never vested.211  Even in cases where the employer and 
the court acknowledged that the employer’s pension promises benefited the employer through 
improved employee morale and increased tenure based on the promise of a pension, courts 
                                                            
209 Id. at 8.  See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1944) (“The company was within its 
rights in providing that the pensions awarded under the plan were gratuities. . . . By the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the company and administered by the Board of Pensions [an entity set up and controller by the 
employer], the company only obligated itself to pension such employees as the Board of Pensions, in the fair 
exercise of the power conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the benefits of the plan.); Fickling v. 
Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935) (Although the plaintiff argued the existence of an implied contract, 
the cessation of his disability pension payments was not actionable because the payments “amounted to no more 
than a gratuitous arrangement by the company for the payment, at its option, of pensions to old employees. . . . [and] 
was ‘expressly’ made subject to denial, suspension, or permanent discontinuance by the company at any time.”).   
 
210 See Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 307 F.2d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“Here, the Pension 
Plan voluntarily established by the appellee Union required no contribution from Neuffer or any other participant, 
and none was made.  The Union could properly prescribe, as it did here, conditions on payment of pension benefits 
reasonably related to the Union’s welfare.”); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1954) (“These provisions say that the defendant is paying the entire cost of the plan; that the payments are 
voluntary; that no contractual relationship is intended or created between the defendant and its employees.”); 
Umshler v. Umshler, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) (“The uncontroverted evidence shows that the pension 
plan of defendant railroad company is wholly voluntary.  All the benefits are paid out of the corporate treasury. No 
pension fund is provided, nor were any contributions required of or made by defendant Umshler or any other 
employee and, so far as the record shows, all the expense of the administration of the plan is borne by defendant 
railroad company.”). 
 
211 See Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 104 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954) (“[I]t seems well settled in 
other jurisdictions that a pension plan which is purely voluntary on the part of the employer and to which the 
employee makes no contribution, is not an enforceable contract, but a mere gratuity, in which the employee has no 
vested right until he begins to receive benefits thereunder.”); Kravitz v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 160 
N.Y.S.2d 716, 719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (“The donor of a gift has the right to fix the terms and the objects of his 
bounty.  The terms of the Retirement Plan give no vested rights to others than those specifically provided for. . . . 
The most that may be said for plaintiffs is that each enjoyed an inchoate gift.  This never ripened into a vested 




refused to find that pension promises constituted a binding contract.212  Some courts even 
recognized that pension promises were a form of deferred compensation but still denied claims.  
As the New York Court of Appeals stated when denying former employees access to funds set 
aside in a retirement and profit sharing plan: 
There were some references in the testimony that a portion of the 
funds would otherwise have been distributed as bonuses, and in 
that sense the members were contributors.  However, bonuses were 
gratuities which might or might not be distributed at the pleasure 
of the Board of Directors of the Company.  It cannot be gainsaid, 
we think, that the benefits conferred on the Members of the Plan 
were tantamount to gifts, and the Company had the right, as the 
donor, to fix the terms and limitations of the gifts.213 
 
As a federal appeals court noted in denying pension benefits:  “No statute then in force required 
of the company the assumption of the burden which it took upon itself in providing for pensions 
for its employees.  It therefore had the right . . . to condition its bounty in such manner as it saw 
fit.”214   
 
                                                            
212 See Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 883 (“Defendant concedes that an employer receives a benefit from instituting a 
pension plan by way of increased stability of employment and in the greater security and contentment of its 
employees and that it is largely for this reason it instituted and presently maintains such a program.  It does not 
follow, however, that where a pension plan is placed into effect the employee thereby acquires a vested right to have 
the plan kept in effect.”). 
 
213 Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 195 N.E.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1963).  But cf. Schofield v. Zion’s Coop. Mercantile 
Inst., 39 P.2d 342 (Utah 1934).  In Schofield, the court found that a contract did exist providing the retirees with a 
vested pension that could not be reduced.  The terms of the pension plan stated that the purpose of the plan was to 
“encourage long and faithful service” and that after such service an employee would be entitled to a pension in the 
amount stated in the plan.  Id. at 344-45.  The court held that this the pension acted as an inducement for the 
plaintiffs to continue their employment, and after their long service and the determination that they had met the 
terms required for the pension, no modification of the contract was possible by the employer.  Id. at 345.  The lack 
of equivocation and plan language carefully stating that the pension promised was a gift that could be modified or 
withdrawn at any point distinguishes this case from the bulk of pension claims during this era, however.   
 




While pension law subsequently advanced beyond viewing pension promises as gratuities, the 
voluntary nature of our private pension system remains.     
 
Pension Promises as Contracts 
 
Although in the decades prior to ERISA’s enactment most courts ruled that pension rights were 
contractual and not gratuities,215 “employees fare[d] no better under this theory than they did 
under the gratuity theory” (Heinsz 1972, 283-84).216  Most judges believed that they had no 
choice but to strictly construe the terms of pension plans that were drafted by and to favor 
employers.217   
 
Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,218 highlights the evolution of pension 
jurisprudence from viewing pensions as gratuities to contracts.  The district court initially 
approved the defendant union’s actions forfeiting a retiree’s pension and terminating payments.  
                                                            
215 See Heinz v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 237 F. 942, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1916), for an early example of the 
recognition of contractual rights to a pension. 
 
216 See Stein (1986, 138-39), finding trend in case law towards recognition of unilateral contract rights through 
pension plans by the 1930s and stating that “some courts, faced with the argument that employees who were 
promised pensions just might have given some consideration—namely, their labor—found more satisfactory legal 
doctrines to deny many dissatisfied employees their pensions most of the time.”  One dissenting judge protested a 
circuit court decision upholding an employer’s termination of a retiree’s pension, writing, “I am unwilling to 
endorse the employer’s brutal treatment of a pensioner who served it for most of his mature life.  We open ourselves 
to the charge that judicial concern for individual rights in this jurisdiction is confined arbitrarily and capriciously to 
criminal cases.”  Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 307 F.2d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, 
dissenting). 
 
217 See Wallace v. Northern OhioTraction & Light Co., 13 N.E. 2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (“To hold 
otherwise, is to become involved in a discussion of purely ethical questions with no pertinent rule of law or related 
principle in equity to form a standard for our conclusion.”). 
 




It held that there were “none of the essential elements of a contract” and it would not construe 
the terms of a “voluntary, non-contributory plan strictly against an employer.”  Since the 
employer reserved its rights to modify the plan and to determine eligibility and forfeiture under 
the terms of the plan, the union was within its rights to suspend payments.219  The appellate 
court, while still siding with the employer, found that the terms of the pension plan did create a 
valid contract between the employee and the union.  Any vested rights created by the plan were 
subject to reasonable conditions placed on the continued receipt of a pension, however, and the 
court “nevertheless enforces reasonable contracts.”220  The strongly worded dissent, on the other 
hand, affirms that a pension is now considered a contractual form of deferred compensation and 
not a gratuity but disagrees with the result reached by the majority.  Since the employer drafted 
the contract, it should have been strictly construed against the union.221   
 
Under the “unilateral contract theory”, a pension contract was created when the employer offered 
a pension plan and the employee accepted employment or remained on the job based in part on 
that pension – relying on the promise of a future pension and presumably accepting some 
decrease in current wages.222  To qualify for a pension, the employee had to satisfy the terms set 
                                                            
219 Id. at 700.   
 
220 Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 307 F.2d 671, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1962).   
 
221 Id. at 674-75. 
 
222 See Heinsz (1972, 283-85); Stein (1986, 138-40); see also In re Schenectady R.R., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 
1950) (holding that promised pensions were a part of the consideration for employees’ labor under the collective 
bargaining agreement and that, like wages, vacation pay, and other benefits, pensions were “a part of the reward for 
his effort”); Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (“[W]here the employer has a pension plan 
and the employee knows of it, continued employment constitutes consideration for the promise to pay the pension.  
The pension is considered to be deferred compensation.”); Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 32 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858, 




forth in the pension plan’s governing documents – none of which he had any say in.  Then, he 
had to hope he was not laid off from his job and that the employer remained financially sound.223   
 
In Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Jones,224 for example, a Texas appellate court found that the defendant 
employer could not terminate the plaintiff’s pension because he had been committed to a state-
run mental facility.  Quoting the trial court decision, the appellate court found: 
That the offer made under said pension system was an inducement 
to the company’s employees to remain in its service and render to 
it the long continued faithful service, giving their entire time to its 
service, as required, in order to reap the benefits offered under said 
pension system, and that the rendering of the long continued 
faithful service of its employees as required by it, was a benefit to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
is doubtful if defendant arbitrarily could have refused payment as the plan was not merely a benefaction but a 
contract supported by plaintiff’s consideration of continued services under the plan and his acceptance of other 
obligations under it.”).  Compare Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E. 2d 878, 880 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937) 
(“During these years [the employee] was led to believe that two per cent of his earnings would be paid him when the 
company considered him more favorably in the position of a pensioner than as an employee receiving a full salary or 
wage.  The appellant has made its election.  It has concluded that he has reached the point of industrial old age. . . . 
He, however, cannot be in good faith and justice denied the alternative held out by the employer as an inducement, 
for more than a quarter of a century, to continue service with the appellant.”) and Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 
194 N.E. 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (refusing to allow the company to avoid its contractual pension obligation by 
firing an employee arbitrarily at age 65 because its pension promises were “a daily inducement to continuation of 
service and to exertion to satisfy”), with Bos v. U.S. Rubber Co., 224 P.2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s claim that his discharge at age 60 violated his pension contract because he had no right to retire under the 
plan at age 60 and receive a pension).   
 
223 See Heinsz (1972, 283), noting that even if an employee was able to “survive the hazards of job changes, layoffs, 
mergers, or business failures, and . . . meet all of the conditions of the employer’s pension plan, the insurance 
contract or trust indenture, or the collective bargaining agreement, he may still be denied his pension.”  In Gallo v. 
Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909 (E. D. Pa.), aff’d per curiam, 250 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1956), the plaintiff sued 
to receive early retirement pension benefits after relying on a booklet issued by the company which failed to 
mention that the employee needed the company’s consent to retire early and receive the pension to which he had 
contributed for years.  Setting aside a jury verdict that ruled that the plaintiff’s reliance on the booklet was 
reasonable, the court held that the booklet could not replace the tripartite contract between the employee, the 
employer, and the insurance company guaranteeing the pension benefits – a contract the plaintiff had never seen.  Id. 
at 912. 
 





the railroad company, and that the offer and acceptance by 
performance constituted a mutual consideration.225 
 
The court was careful to note, however, that the pension promise only became a “binding 
contract” after the employee had continued his employment with the employer until retirement 
and officially been awarded a pension.   
 
Finally, in a mistake not likely to be repeated by savvy employers following the case, the 
company failed to include an unconditional reservation of its right to terminate pension payments 
at any time in the plan documents, instead only reserving the right to cancel payments due to 
gross misconduct by the former employee.226  Thus, many employees who forfeited their 
pensions still remained unprotected by the contractual framework.  
 
Even if an employee remained with his employer until retirement, an employee could still be 
denied his pension based on decisions by those administering the pension plan.  Employers 
created boards composed of their executives to administer pension plans, including the power to 
decide whether an employee qualified for a pension.227  Their decisions sometimes had harsh 
consequences for employees.228  For example, in Menke v. Thompson,229 a federal appellate court 
                                                            




227 Outside of pension plans for unionized employees under collective bargaining agreements (which make up a 
small percentage of all pension funds today), employees are typically not represented on these boards. 
 
228 See Wallace v. Northern OhioTraction & Light Co., 13 N.E. 2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937) (company could 
abandon its pension plan and any employees or former employees who had not yet qualified for a pension were not 
entitled to any benefits – no matter how close they were to qualifying for a pension); Heinsz (1972, 283-84) (“For 
example, boards have been allowed to disqualify employees whom they concluded did not meet physical disability 




affirmed the denial of a pension to an employee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company from 
1886 to 1932.  Any person who voluntarily left employment, even for a day, was denied a 
pension under the terms of the plan, and Menke went on strike in July 1922 and did not return 
until October 1922.230  Although the company argued that the pensions were gratuities, the court 
found that even under the unilateral contract theory, Menke was not entitled to his pension.  The 
terms of the plan gave the Board of Pensions nearly unbridled discretion to interpret (and amend) 
the rules of the plan and decide eligibility for a pension.231  The Board’s decision was final “‘in 
the absence of fraud or such gross mistakes as imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest 
judgment.’  The burden of proof . . . was upon the appellant here, and, to sustain such a showing, 
the evidence ‘must be more than a mere preponderance, it must be overwhelming.’”232 
 
Courts occasionally achieved equity in individual cases of hardship through other legal theories 
while leaving the general practice of deference to employers in place.  Courts relied on the quasi-
contractual theories of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment to temper the worst injustices 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
229 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944). 
 
230 Id. at 787-88.   
 
231 Id. at 790-91 (“[T]he company only obligated itself to pension such employees as the Board of Pensions, in the 
fair exercise of the power conferred upon it, determined to be eligible to receive the benefits of the plan.”).   
 
232 Id. at 791 (internal citations omitted); see Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 80 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 
(denying appellant a pension after he worked for his railroad employer for approximately 34 years because his 
voluntary separation of less than a year in the middle of his employment violated the plan’s eligibility terms even 





visited upon individual pension claimants.  Those theories were, however, applied narrowly and 
infrequently.233  Section 90 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts provides: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.234   
 
Even when courts utilized quasi-contractual theories to protect workers’ rights, the holdings were 
limited and did not affect the overwhelming legal bias in favor of employers.  In Lucas v. 
Seagrave Corp.,235 the court used unjust enrichment and quantum meruit to reject a harsh 
enforcement of the pension contract.  Lucas involved the purchase by Seagrave of another 
company’s assets and an assumption of its liabilities under a non-contributory pension plan.  
After consummating that transaction, Seagrave terminated 30 of the 65 employees of the 
                                                            
233 Compare West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 225 P. 2d 978, 982-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that repeated promises 
made by management to the plaintiff that confirmed he would receive a pension according to the company’s 
customary policy as he understood it may state a claim for promissory estoppel where they induced him to remain 
on the job – even though the plaintiff’s understanding of the company’s policy was incorrect) and Hunter v. 
Sparling, 197 P. 2d 807, 815-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (finding in plaintiff’s favor where he retired and received 
roughly half of his promised pension because even if a contract had not existed, the gift would be enforceable under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel since the plaintiff knew about the pension promise and rejected other offers of 
employment in reliance on the promise of a future pension), with Sbrogna v. Worcester Stamped Metal Co., 234 
N.E.2d 749 (Mass. 1968) (denying claim of unjust enrichment where all of the plaintiffs’ previously-purchased 
retirement annuities were cancelled by the defendant employer when they went on strike after the expiration of their 
union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer) and Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 117 
N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954) (holding that the employer’s pension plan constituted an unenforceable gratuity 
and rejecting plaintiff’s theory of promissory estoppel because “there is no fraud, no intent to deceive and no 
detrimental change of position” by the employee). 
 
234 An example that the Restatement gives of the concept is: 
 
A promises B to pay him an annuity during B’s life.  B thereupon resigns a 
profitable employment, as A expected that he might.  B receives the annuity for 
some years, in the meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good 
employment.  A’s promise is binding. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). 
 





company it acquired.  The plaintiffs (terminated employees) contended that Seagrave terminated 
them to avoid making future contributions to the pension plan since forfeited pension credits 
could be used to cover those obligations.236   
 
The plaintiffs in Lucas alleged that the accrued pension contributions were compensation for 
services already rendered, and they were therefore entitled to recover the value even if they did 
not meet the terms of the pension contract.  Although the court discussed how participants 
generally did not have vested pension rights unless they had strictly met the terms of the plan, the 
court “found no decision which has ruled directly on the assertion of a quasicontractual right of 
recovery of pension benefits on the basis that such benefits are essentially a form of 
compensation.”237  Instead, relying on cases about collective bargaining agreements where 
pensions were held to be a component of wages, the court found that as an employee approaches 
retirement age, pension accruals “may even overshadow his cash wages as consideration for his 
services.”238  Although noting that “present decisions apparently give no weight or recognition to 
the existing and accepted characteristic of pension plans as a mode of employee compensation,” 
the court found theory rooted in quasi-contract for protecting these workers who left employment 
involuntarily when terminated by an employer allegedly attempting to avoid its obligations while 
retaining the value of the unpaid services of the workers terminated.239 
 
                                                            
236 Id. at 340. 
 
237 Id. at 343. 
 
238 Id.  
 




While the Lucas case may seem to be an example of judicial activism at its best, the procedural 
posture of the case is a motion for summary judgment.  Thus, in the end, all the court does is to 
deny defendant’s motion and allow that plaintiffs in such an egregious set of circumstances may 
have a claim in quasi-contract if they can develop the facts to support their theories – a difficult 
endeavor.240  More importantly, the plaintiffs must prove that the employer acted in bad faith by 
terminating the employees because simply dismissing an employee nearing retirement who had 
not yet vested in his pension rights would not be actionable under this theory since the employee 
was found to have assumed such a risk.  As the court stated: 
[I]t seems harsh to assert that employees assume knowingly the 
risk of all contingencies which might prevent their recovery of 
benefits; as if the plan were a negotiated contract agreed upon 
through arm’s length bargaining.  It hardly seems equitable to 
apply the literal contract language, which may not have been 
inserted to cover such a situation, to uncritically rule that 
employees bear the risk of a group termination which may not 
have been contemplated by the contract or the actuarial 
expectations upon which the plan is funded.  Such a literal 
enforcement of plan provisions may defeat rather than foster plan 
purposes.  This approach seems particularly unjustifiable where 
there may be indications of bad faith or where the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment is invoked.241 
 
 
Thus, even after courts acknowledged that employees had contractual rights with respect to 
pension promises, few courts were willing to deviate from enforcing strictly contracts written 
                                                            
240 Id. at 346 (“At this stage of the record it is not clear whether the facts of the instant case justify such a recovery.”) 
 





and enforced by employers to meet their needs – leaving workers with little recourse.242  As two 
law students presciently wrote in a journal article on the eve of ERISA’s passage: 
In view of the many possible ways employees can lose their 
benefits, it would seem logical and desirable as a matter of public 
policy for the courts to strive to safeguard the rights of pension 
plan participants. . . . [T]he courts have not attempted to achieve 
this aim. . . . [T]he courts’ strict interpretation of pension plans, the 
paucity of available legal theories to support recoveries by 
employees, and the hesitancy of the courts to utilize those few 
theories that have been accepted, have vitiated the potential of the 




242 Some advocates for pension reform in the years in the years leading up to the passage of ERISA argued that 
courts should use a theory of deferred wages to adjudicate pension disputes.  The germs of the theory can be seen in 
the Lucas case discussed above but are fundamentally derived from cases holding that pensions are considered 
wages for the purpose of collective bargaining.  See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. 
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (“While, as the Company has demonstrated, a reasonable argument can be made that the 
benefits flowing from such a plan are not ‘wages,’ we think the better and more logical argument is on the other 
side, and certainly there is, in our opinion, no sound basis for an argument that such a plan is not clearly included in 
the phrase, ‘other conditions of employment.’”); “Consideration for the Employer’s Promise of a Voluntary Pension 
Plan” (102-03).  This theory holds that when an employer contributes to a pension plan on an employee’s behalf, 
these contributions are wages withheld and the employee’s property.  As a result, the employee’s right to the funds 
vests immediately when they are withheld, and he does not forfeit this property even if terminated for cause.  
Coleman and Herlands (1973, 478-79) (quoting Senator Williams:  “Pensions are not gratuities, but earnings saved 
and deferred to retirement.  They represent compensation which the employee would have received in his paycheck 
had he not belonged to a pension plan.”).  While many argue that a theory of deferred wages presents itself in the 
cases under the contractual framework because deferred wages form a basis for finding the consideration necessary 
for contract formation, this theory takes a leap to immediate vesting not found in the case law.   
The theory of deferred wages does have its problems, although it at least respects the importance of pension 
promises.  First, when focusing on the defined benefit plans more prevalent at this time, pension benefits are based 
on a formula that emphasizes earnings late in a career and years of service – reducing the value of pension benefits 
accrued for much of an employee’s earlier service and stacking the deck for work in later years.  Second, the goal of 
private pensions is to help workers maintain quality of life during retirement.  Treating pension accruals as wages 
may result in a feeling that employees should have the right to spend the money now instead of engaging in the 
always difficult process of delayed gratification.  Pension portability would help solve the temptation to treat 
deferred wages as current wages, however.  Id. at 467, 479. 
 





Conflating Delegation to Private Actors with Delegation to Bureaucratic Actors 
 
The analogy of private fiduciaries to agency bureaucrats by federal courts reviewing the 
decisions of fiduciaries under ERISA demonstrates the blurring of the line between delegation to 
government officials and delegation to private actors.244  The “vast majority of ERISA cases are 
simple benefit claim disputes in which a federal judge is reviewing the decision of a plan 
fiduciary.”245  Under ERISA, making determinations of a participant or beneficiary’s benefits is 
a fiduciary function because “a person is a fiduciary with respect to the plan to the extent (i) he 
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.”246  
The courts are authorized to review such determinations because ERISA provides that a 
participant or beneficiary may sue “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to 
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan.”247  Most pension participants or beneficiaries therefore seek the assistance of 
the courts to resolve benefit claims and are mainly concerned about fiduciary decisions that deny 
them all or part of the benefits to which they believe they are entitled.  Because of this point, I 
                                                            
244 See Langbein (2007, 1331-33) for a discussion of this analogy and a review of key cases. 
 
245 Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk (2006, 649).   
   
246 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). 
 





will focus on how the courts have abdicated their role to supervise fiduciaries in deciding benefit 
claims, although the same can be said of many other ERISA claims decided by the courts.248   
 
In the landmark case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,249 the Supreme Court ruled that 
the standard of review for courts reviewing an ERISA fiduciary’s administrative decision is de 
novo, meaning that the court should review all evidence without giving any deference to the 
fiduciary’s decision.  However, the Court then created an enormous legal loophole that ERISA 
fiduciaries drove right through by holding that if the plan documents reserved the fiduciary’s 
right to exercise its discretion to determine benefit claims, then the fiduciary’s decision would be 
reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard.  This standard provides that 
unless the fiduciary’s decision was clearly arbitrary and capricious, then the court cannot 
overturn the original decision – even if the judge believes that another decision is proper.  Bruch 
permits the exception to eat the rule since nearly all plans now contain reservations of rights that 
lead to the more lax standard of review.  This arbitrary and capricious standard grants the same 
deference to ERISA fiduciaries as to decision makers in executive agencies.250 
                                                            
248 Law Professor Jay Conison (1992, 32-33) notes the importance of ERISA benefit claims and calls them the 
“bottom-line” of ERISA.  In his view, benefit claims are first in ERISA’s hierarchy because “[u]nder ERISA, there 
is nothing else to protect.”  Vesting, accrual, and funding standards, as well as remedial provisions for fiduciary 
breaches are all designed solely to ensure that participants and beneficiaries receive the benefits to which they are 
entitled.   
 
249 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 
250 Discussing the cases prior to Bruch that mandated an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, Conison (1992, 
48) writes that “courts in ERISA cases appreciated the irony of applying an approach whose main effect was to 
facilitate defeat of benefit expectations.  Because the approach was perceived as well established, however, courts 
were reluctant to make any substantial changes.”  He then systematically undermines the Court’s attempt to justify 
deferential review through assumptions that benefit claims are a form of judicial review and that trust law governs 





Some courts have compared ERISA fiduciaries to executive branch administrators without fully 
acknowledging the implications of such an analogy.  Judge Easterbrook, for example, compared 
administrators at a company that manages a large portion of disability benefit plans covered by 
ERISA (which applies to most disability and health benefit plans in addition to pension plans) to 
administrative law judges at the Social Security Administration who determine eligibility for 
Social Security disability benefits.251  In considering whether to apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review to UNUM Life Insurance Company in light of its interest in 
keeping costs down, Easterbrook noted that each benefit claim has little impact on a large 
company’s balance sheet, its employees do not necessarily share its self-interest, and its clients 
want to maintain good relationships with their employees and would not want benefit claims 
summarily denied.252  Adding to these factors that UNUM passes along the costs of benefit 
claims to employers (though imperfectly) through experience rating (i.e., increased employer 
costs to reimburse third parties administering benefit plans for retrospective benefit payments), 
Easterbrook concluded, “Thus we have no reason to think that the actual decision makers at 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
also Bogan (2009, 147), arguing that contract law and not trust law should govern ERISA benefit claims, making 
summary deferential judicial proceedings inappropriate.   
 
251 See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have 
held that courts may treat welfare benefit plans just like administrative law judges implementing the Social Security 
disability-benefits program.”) (citations omitted); Langbein (2007b, 1330-33). 
 
252 See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981 (“We have no reason to think that UNUM’s benefits staff is any more ‘partial’ 





UNUM approached their task any differently than do the decision makers at the Social Security 
Administration, and ordinarily deferential review is the order of the day.”253    
 
As Judge Diane Wood noted in her dissent, however, the analogy between decision making by 
ERISA fiduciaries and that of the Social Security Administration is improper because of a lack 
of safeguards to protect those whose benefits are in question.  She argued: 
Most importantly, the SSA is a public agency, whose decisions are 
subject to the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, while 
ERISA plan administrators are private sector actors subject to 
regulation under the ERISA statute.  A host of federal 
constitutional rights and statutory rights combine to assure 
procedural regularity in the case of public agencies that are not 
available to those who attack private action.254 
 
The absence of these procedural safeguards for ERISA fiduciaries deciding benefit claims makes 
the analogy of ERISA fiduciaries to agency decision makers inappropriate.255   
 
                                                            
253 Id.; see Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (“While the [arbitrary and capricious] 
standard is perhaps more commonly associated with appellate court review of administrative findings, deference is 
likewise due when a district court reviews the action of a private plan trustee. Here, as in other contexts, the standard 
exists to ensure that administrative responsibility rests with those whose experience is daily and continual, not with 
judges whose exposure is episodic and occasional.”).  For an argument that Judge Easterbrook inappropriately 
combines “rulemaking” and “administrative adjudication” under a category of judicial deference to agencies that he 
terms “delegation”, see Bogan (2004, 21).  Bogan argues that because Congress did not delegate the adjudicative 
function under ERISA to any executive agency, the function belongs with the federal courts and not private 
fiduciaries.     
 
254 See Perlman v. Swiss Bank Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 985 (7th Cir. 1999) (Wood, D., 
dissenting). 
 
255 Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Social Security Administration is a 
public agency that denies benefits only after giving the applicant an opportunity for a full adjudicative hearing 
before a judicial officer, the administrative law judge. The procedural safeguards thus accorded, designed to assure a 






ERISA’s required claims procedures, discussed further below, are insufficient in several ways 
when compared with the procedural safeguards available under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”) and to Social Security claimants, for example.  Within the Social Security 
Administration, an Administrative Law Judge presides over an administrative trial where the 
claimant can present evidence and subpoena and cross-examine witnesses.  When federal courts 
hear an appeal, the claimant has already had an opportunity to be heard in the trial.256  Yet courts 
use the same arbitrary and capricious standard to review the ERISA benefit claims even though 
participants have not been heard by a neutral decision maker, been permitted discovery or had 
the chance to cross-examine witnesses at trial.257   
 
Nor do ERISA fiduciaries necessarily have the expertise that agency administrators possess to 
justify greater deference.  Fiduciaries, particularly executives of the employer appointed to help 
administer the plans and contain costs, frequently lack basic ERISA knowledge or legal or 
accounting training to prepare them for their duties.  They may have no knowledge of legal rules 
of evidence or other procedures to make sure they have investigated benefit claims sufficiently 
(DeBofsky 2004, 739). 
 
Under the APA, agency decisions made without the hallmarks of substantive or procedural due 
process are subject to de novo review by courts (DeBofsky 2004, 739-40).  Yet decisions by 
                                                            
256 Bogan (2004, 26-27); DeBofsky (2004, 738). 
 
257 Bogan, (2004, 28); DeBofsky (2004, 738-39) (“Although the ERISA claim regulations provide many of these 
guarantees, the most crucial protections are denied ERISA claimants. . . . Such claims are not presented to an 




ERISA fiduciaries that lack such safeguards receive the same deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review. 
 
Other federal courts have also cautioned against the analogy between ERISA fiduciaries and 
executive agencies because of the conflict of interest that fiduciaries face between acting for the 
exclusive benefit of participants and to preserve the assets of employers funding pension plans or 
third parties insuring ERISA welfare plans.  In Bruch, the Court acknowledged that “if a benefit 
plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, 
that conflict must be weighed as a “factor[] in determining whether there is an abuse of 
discretion.”258  Courts have been unsure how exactly conflicts should alter their review of benefit 
claims, and in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, the Supreme Court did not clarify its 
answer substantially.259  Instead, the Court reiterated that the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review applies when an employer or insurer that decides benefit eligibility must also pay 
approved claims out of its own pocket.  As a circuit court wrote regarding the problem of 
applying administrative law in the ERISA context:      
Use of the administrative agency analogy may, ironically, give too 
much deference to ERISA fiduciaries.  Decisions in the ERISA 
context involve the interpretation of contractual entitlements; they 
‘are not discretionary in the sense, familiar from administrative 
law, of decisions that make policy under a broad grant of delegated 
powers.’  Moreover, the individuals who occupy the position of 
                                                            
258 Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187, cmt. d (1959)).   
 
259 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (confirming that courts need to weigh different factors 
when reviewing benefit claims, and conflict of interest is only one, although it carries more weight “where 
circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision” and less weight “where the 
administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy”); see Kennedy (2001); 




ERISA fiduciaries are less well-insulated from outside pressures 
than are decisionmakers at government agencies.260 
 
This conflict of interest is one not typically faced by decision makers at executive agencies.261 
 
Because of the lack of procedural safeguards and the conflicted nature of ERISA fiduciaries, 
they are supposed to me mere “interpreters of contractual entitlements.”262  Continuing to treat 
fiduciaries as bureaucrats, courts have instead required that participants and beneficiaries first 
pursue their claims through the ERISA plan’s internal grievance procedures (referred to as the 
exhaustion requirement) prior to seeking review in the federal courts.   
 
Section 503 of ERISA provides: 
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee 
benefit plan shall – (1) provide adequate notice in writing to any 
participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan 
has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, 
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, 
and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose 
                                                            
260 Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
261 When it sponsors a defined benefit pension plan, to take a classic ERISA example, an employer assumes the risk 
of paying a stated amount to workers and their beneficiaries in the future.  If, for example, the stock market 
underperforms and the money set aside by the employer is insufficient to pay the required pension, the employer 
will need to contribute more money.  If, on the other hand, the employer can find a way to deny a claim for pension 
benefits, then it will not have to contribute as much to the pension plan.  Benefit claims therefore directly affect the 
employer’s finances, and because high-level employees or third parties hired by the employer administer pension 
plans and owe their employment to the plan sponsor, they have a conflict of interest when deciding benefit claims.  
See Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk (2006, 652-53) (noting that “because ERISA § 408(c)(3) allows management 
officers to serve as plan fiduciaries, ERISA all but invites conflicts of interest in plan administration”). 
 
262 Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
ERISA sought to limit freedom of contract to protect pension participants, and they deserve a fair judicial hearing to 





claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the 
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.263 
 
The text above does not require that a claimant exhaust the plan’s review process prior to seeking 
review of the benefit determination in the courts.  Yet courts have held exhaustion of a plan’s 
internal administrative remedies to be mandatory with very limited exceptions.264  In effect, the 
courts have required that claimants petition the very administrator(s) who initially rejected their 
claims prior to seeking any assistance from the courts. 
 
Courts have relied on ERISA’s text and legislative history to justify requiring exhaustion of 
internal remedies prior to seeking recourse in the courts.  In ERISA’s requirement that benefit 
plans have internal claims procedures for participants who want to petition the plan to review its 
decision to deny benefits, the courts have found that Congress intended them to be used for all 
benefits claims.265  Courts relied on Congress’ supposed concern with efficient resolution of 
ERISA claims – favoring efficiency over correcting flawed decisions.266  According to one 
                                                            
263 ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133. 
 
264 DeBofsky (2004, 732); Conison (1992, 21-22); Langbein, Stabile, and Wolk (2006, 754-56).   
 
265 Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) (“It would certainly be anomalous if the same good reasons 
that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to provide administrative remedies for 
aggrieved claimants did not lead the courts to see that those remedies are regularly used.”). 
 
266 Makar v. Health Care Corp. of Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted) 
(“Congress’ apparent intent in mandating these internal claims procedures was to minimize the number of frivolous 
ERISA lawsuits; promote the consistent treatment of benefit claims; provide a nonadversarial dispute resolution 
process; and decrease the cost and time of claims settlement.”) (emphasis added); Taylor v. Bakery and 
Confectionary Workers, 455 F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (internal citations omitted) (“Tied to these inter-
fund claims procedures was Congress’ awareness of the potential costs of pension reform, and it sought to ‘strike a 
balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within reasonable limits.’  Congress was 
particularly concerned with outlining a private insurance system that would operate efficiently, thereby increasing its 





district court, it is in the best interests of both employers and employees that costs of 
administering benefit claims be minimized: 
If claimants were allowed to litigate the validity of their claims 
before a final trustee decision was rendered, the costs of dispute 
settlement would increase markedly for employers. Employees 
would also suffer financially because, rather than utilize a simple 
procedure which allows them to deal directly with their employer, 
they would have to employ an attorney and bear the costs of 
adversary litigation in the courts.267 
 
The courts even justified the exhaustion requirement as a burden that Congress had placed on 
fiduciaries to review their actions and efficiently enforce the plan’s provisions.268  “In short, 
Congress intended plan fiduciaries, not the federal courts, to have primary responsibility for 
claims processing.”269   
   
Contrary to the rule adopted by the courts, the legislative history indicates that requiring claims 
procedures was merely to provide another avenue to address grievances.  The House labor bill 
did not require an internal claims review procedure.  While the Senate labor bill did include a 
version of ERISA Section 503, the bill that went to the conference committee provided for 
                                                            
267 Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 820.   
 
268 Makar, 872 F.2d at 83 (internal citations omitted) (“By preventing premature interference with an employee 
benefit plan’s remedial provisions, the exhaustion requirement enables plan fiduciaries to efficiently manage their 
funds; correct their errors; interpret plan provisions; and assemble a factual record which will assist a court in 
reviewing the fiduciaries’ actions.”); Denton v. First Nat’l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1303 n.13 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Another important facet of the exhaustion requirement is that it prevents fiduciaries from avoiding their duties 
under the Plan by insulating all benefit decisions in the protective mantel of federal judicial review.  If fiduciaries 
were to find their decisions more closely supervised by an intervening federal judiciary, it is likely that they would 
go to court to seek instruction by declaratory relief on questions involving claims for benefits, rather than deciding 
those questions themselves as Congress intended.”); Amato, 618 F.2d at 567 (“[I]mplementation of the exhaustion 
requirement will enhance their ability to expertly and efficiently manage their funds by preventing premature 
judicial intervention in their decision-making processes.”). 
 




voluntary arbitration instead.  The main concern was protecting participants and giving them 
easy, cheap ways to recover their benefits.  As Senator Williams stated, a participant or 
beneficiary “would have the right” to know why his or her claims was denied and “would be 
entitled to a full and fair review.”  This language focuses on the participant or beneficiary’s 
rights – not the employer’s rights.  The adoption of an exhaustion requirement actually 
represented a step backwards from state law pre-ERISA (Conison 1992, 22-25).270   
 
“Congress unquestionably intended courts to develop some set of rules to govern actions for 
benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B).  But the rules developed must be consistent with the 
purposes of ERISA.  The current law pays little attention to ERISA’s central purpose of 
safeguarding benefit expectations.  Indeed, it often seems perversely designed to thwart benefit 
expectations, for no better reason than judicial force of habit” (Conison 1992, 3).   
 
While Frank Cummings worried about the dollar amounts of pension claims being too small to 
motivate lawyers to take the cases as necessary to pursue a participant’s rights, perhaps he should 
instead have worried about whether the courts would be willing to review pension cases.  As 
Law Professor Jay Conison (1992, 61) argues, “the main policy argument advanced for 
deference has been that it reduces judicial caseload,” but this was not the concern of ERISA.  
Courts are hostile to benefit claims because they are fact-intensive and usually involve small 
value claims, even though there is no evidence that a less deferential standard of review would 
                                                            
 
270 “Thus, the legislative history provides no support for the view that a suit for benefits was intended to be the 




overwhelm court dockets.  Regardless, Congress mandated that courts decide benefit claims, and 
the judicial thwarting of its role has allowed control over retirement security to flow unhindered 
to the private sector.   
 
Impact of Delegation on Healthcare 
 
While the legislative history of ERISA focuses on pension reform, ERISA dramatically altered 
healthcare in the United States with few outside the industry aware of the changes.  ERISA did 
not impose detailed rules for the provision of health benefits by employers other than reporting 
and disclosure requirements and fiduciary protections.  Yet the courts’ use of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard to review benefit claims applied to health plans as well, and ERISA’s broad 
preemption clause effectively allowed employers and health insurance companies to opt in to the 
generous deference provided by courts to ERISA-covered benefit plans through self-insurance 
(Wooten 2004, 281). 
 
ERISA’s preemption clause allowed employers to avoid state regulation of healthcare and deny 
benefits to an increasing number of participants.  The clause mandates that ERISA “supercede[s] 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” 
with an exception for any law that “regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”271  The “deemer 
clause” then prevents the application of these state insurance, banking, and securities laws to 
employee benefit plans.  In the case of health plans, the “deemer clause” provides that an 
                                                            





employee benefit plan will not be “deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to 
be engaged in the business of insurance” for the purpose of state insurance laws.272  
 
To take advantage of the pre-emption of state laws and the favorable standard of review for 
benefit claims, particularly when healthcare costs started to skyrocket in the 1980s, many 
additional employers began to self-insure.  Although at the time of ERISA large health plans had 
begun to self-insure, the trend now included many smaller plans.  The development of utilization 
review brought employers administering health plans and their third party administrators (often 
insurance companies) into diagnostic decisions.  The plans now frequently had to approve 
healthcare decisions before the services could be provided – in effect deciding what type of care 
an employee or relative could receive (Wooten 2004, 281-83). 
 
Self-insurance benefited employers with little risk of significant liability.  They purchased “stop-
loss” policies to prevent unanticipated liability if benefit payments exceeded estimated costs.  
And they increasingly denied benefit claims through utilization review, while plan participants 
faced an uphill battle appealing denials in court.  At worst, the plan would have to pay the claim 
and attorneys’ fees after a lawsuit because courts also interpreted ERISA’s remedies narrowly 
(Wooten 2004, 281-83).  Scandals over bad faith denials of benefit claims were exposed slowly 
and called into question the involvement of ERISA fiduciaries in healthcare decisions.273 
 
                                                            
272 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 
273 See Langbein (2007b, 1317-21) discussing scandal over the UNUM/Provident Corporation’s long-term policy of 




Courts downplayed the conflict of interest faced by these fiduciaries deciding benefit claims.  
They argued that “small” benefit claims did not make an administrator at a company with 
billions of dollars in annual revenue conflicted.  Yet the pattern of denial of small benefit claims 
added up to significant additional revenue.  Courts also found comfort in employers’ reputational 
concerns, arguing that if their health plans unfairly denied benefit claims employees would go 
elsewhere.  Given the opaque process of deciding benefit claims, however, employees had little 
chance to compare employers based on their administration of health plans.  Employers and third 
party administrators also had significant financial incentives to deny claims that overrode 
reputational concerns.  Finally, courts argued that benefit costs were passed on to employers 
through experience rating later.  In the competitive insurance market, insurance companies 
needed to absorb much of the unexpected costs, though (Langbein 2007b, 1327-31). 
 
While there is hope that the Affordable Care Act’s provisions requiring external review will 
provide an opportunity to increase the fairness of decisions by administrators of health plans 
(Goldin 2011), the political pressure applied by employers and insurance companies to contain 
costs and increase profits will be difficult to resist.   
 
The crisis caused by denying pension benefit claims attracts little attention.  Perhaps the decline 
in defined benefit pensions has ameliorated the effects of these benefit denials.  Or maybe the 
economic recession made salary the primary concern of the workforce.  Employees also 




to rely on welfare plan participants to finally secure the protections they were promised under 
ERISA.   
 
 
The United States is not the only country whose judiciary has failed to adequately protect 
pension beneficiaries when available tools made it possible.  Law Professor Elizabeth Shilton 
(2011, 83) declared, “For employee pension rights [in Canada], the promise of trust law has 
proved to be a false one.”  Recognizing that courts “share a responsibility with legislatures for 
distributive outcomes within employment pension plans,” she takes issue with the abdication of 
Canadian courts in their role as protectors of employee pension rights (84).  In the end, Shilton 
finds that the need to facilitate voluntary pensions overcomes the moral aspect of the fiduciary 
duties inherent in trust law.  “If employers can over-ride the most ‘fundamental’ characteristics 
of a trust simply by inserting explicit wording, then it is employers, rather than the courts, who 
will ultimately define the scope and content of trust commitments” (98-99).   
 
Refusing to absolve judges of their responsibility for the turn that pension law has taken in 
Canada, Shilton notes, “The analysis of the case law in this paper has identified numerous 
analytic nodes where courts applying the common law have made choices—choices not dictated 
by ‘the law,’ but by predispositions and values, and the weighing of those policy factors they 
identify as relevant and important” (112).  While acknowledging the need for additional 




sensitive issue, Shilton sees an important role for the courts in shifting the common law and 
finding a stronger role for fiduciary protections (114).   
 
Similarly, I argue here that the failure to create a single, expert bureaucratic agency to supervise 
Congress’ delegation of authority to private fiduciaries has left the courts as the only government 
institution capable of properly supervising fiduciaries and finally creating a coherent body of 
pension policy that focuses on protecting workers’ expectations.  The courts have made choices, 
as Shilton says, and these choices were not mandated by ERISA but instead based on factors 
important to the judges and fear of involvement in this unwieldy statute.  It is time for the courts 
to reexamine ERISA’s legislative history and focus on its underlying goals.  Congress did not 
mandate a highly deferential standard of review for benefit claims or a restriction on the types of 
evidence that courts will hear.  The courts did that, and they can therefore find a way to better 






The years leading up to the passage of ERISA were a moment when inertia gave way to reform, 
when a traditional laissez faire attitude towards employee benefits yielded to concerns of worker 
protection.  John Witt writes of the passage of workers’ compensation laws that “the dialects of 
free labor gave way to the languages of security and social insurance” (207).  The notion of free 
labor that dominated after the end of slavery and the Civil War gave way because it ignored risk 
and failed to insure against or shift the costs of such risk away from those least able to bear them 
(14-16).  Similarly, ERISA came to fruition because the risks associated with pension loss – the 
default, forfeiture, and agency risks discussed above274 – were too much for workers to bear, and 
the public took notice.  After ERISA, employers systematically shifted those risks back to 
workers. 
 
Employers avoided default and forfeiture risks by shifting their defined benefit pension plans to 
defined contribution plans.  ERISA’s funding requirements forced employers to fund future 
benefits now instead of making grand promises that it would fund later or renege on as business 
allowed.  This increased the cost and decreased the flexibility of promising generous pensions.  
Strict vesting standards designed to protect employees from forfeiting pensions if they quit or 
were fired from employment (the forfeiture risk) meant increased pension costs for employers.  
Employers were counting on many short-term employees to forfeit their pensions when 
                                                            
274 As a reminder, employees lost all or a portion of their expected pensions when:  (1) plan managers “misuse[d] or 
[stole] assets” (“agency risk”); (2) the employees quit or were fired from employment (“forfeiture risk”); or (3) an 




considering the cost of providing long-term employees with guaranteed retirement income for 
years.  When pension costs went up because employers had to maintain a higher level of funding 
and many employees no longer forfeited their benefits, employers reacted by paying small sums 
(if any) now into tax-deferred plans with no commitment to continue paying past the termination 
of employment.  Actuarial uncertainties regarding mortality were also eliminated.   
 
My dissertation, however, has focused on how employers shifted the agency risk of poor 
fiduciary behavior with respect to plan assets back to workers.  Although Wooten’s discussion of 
agency risk centers on fiduciary theft and misappropriation of assets for the fiduciary’s own 
benefit, I write here of discretion.  As any student of contract law knows, even when 
relationships are governed by a legal document (in the case of ERISA, the plan document and 
summary plan description provided to the worker), endless disputes can arise about how to 
interpret that document.  The discretion left to ERISA’s fiduciaries and the refusal of either the 
bureaucracy or the courts to review the fiduciaries’ use of that discretion without great deference, 
has allowed fiduciaries to decide nearly all close calls in their favor (and their employer’s favor).  
This is also an agency risk that ERISA was designed to protect against.  If ERISA’s fiduciaries 
can circumvent the statute’s goals and risk shifting in this manner, then its system of 
accountability has failed. 
   
To determine the effectiveness of the political and legal accountability regimes under ERISA 
designed to supervise the delegation of authority over private pensions to fiduciaries, we need to 




[W]e should be able to specify at least six important things: who is 
liable or accountable to whom; what they are liable to be called to 
account for: through what processes accountability is to be 
assured; by what standards the putatively accountable behavior is 
to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding those 
standards have been breached.  
 
(Mashaw 2006, 118, quoted in Freeman and Minow 2009, 16).  ERISA seeks to hold fiduciaries 
accountable (while acknowledging that the agents of the employer who serve as fiduciaries are 
conflicted and need to be closely watched).  Yet the statute’s answers to the other criteria are less 
clear. 
 
To whom are ERISA fiduciaries liable?  Ultimately, the employees who will receive pension 
(and other) benefits are supposed to be the masters to whom fiduciaries answer.  Yet Congress, 
influenced also by those employers, is the more powerful party to whom employers answer.  The 
threat of legislation placing additional burdens on employers is a powerful lever that Congress 
has, while employees under ERISA can only file lawsuits that typically involve small claims and 
present little threat to the overall well-being of employers.  Employers also answer to the IRS 
and DOL, with whom they have ongoing relationships, and the courts.  Given that employers 
must serve various masters and these institutional parties do not have the same goals as 
employees and their beneficiaries, it becomes far more difficult to hold fiduciaries accountable. 
 
Also unclear is what fiduciaries are liable to be called to account for.  Is it acceptable that 
fiduciaries use their discretion to decide all cases where the statute or the plan documents are 




conflicted decision makers to keep their thumbs on the scale.  Only grave abuses of their powers 
result in a searching judicial review.   
 
After the tangle that Congress wove under ERISA, the courts have assured that the main 
processes through which fiduciaries are held accountable are lawsuits filed by employees or 
beneficiaries against the pension plan and its fiduciaries, and they determined the standards by 
which fiduciaries will be judged.  Continuing their tradition of deference to employers when 
deciding pension claims, the courts moved actively to shift pension policy once the bureaucracy 
was unable to act decisively.  In the end, fiduciaries are subject to little scrutiny.  The locus of 
adjudication in the courts instead of another administrative mechanism means that a body with 
little expertise in the subject matter and concerns of scarce resources was the death of 
accountability under ERISA. 
 
Congress intended for courts to enforce ERISA’s primary mission of safeguarding pension 
promises.  As was the case before ERISA (when plan participants relied on trust theories and 
breach of contract to seek redress in court), however, the courts gave sustained deference to the 
decisions made by employer representatives.  Faced with fiduciaries who had more experience 
and expertise in the administration of benefit plans and their own conflicting objective of judicial 
efficiency, courts abdicated the role Congress intended for them to play in the regulation of 
private pensions after ERISA and expanded the delegation of authority to fiduciaries.  This left 
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